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In the first chapter, using political corruption conviction data from the U.S. Department of 
Justice, I examine the impact of local corruption on firms’ debt maturity structure while 
exploring both demand-side and supply-side explanations. My results support the demand-side 
story and indicate that firms located in high corruption areas utilize less short-term debt to 
mitigate liquidity and refinancing risks. Consistent with this, I find the effect is more pronounced 
among firms with smaller size, lower asset redeployability, and higher volatility. My findings 
remain robust to the inclusion of an array of controls expected to influence debt maturity 
preferences as well as time, industry, and state fixed effects. Moreover, a seemingly unrelated 
regression approach, instrumental variables regression, propensity score matching, and placebo 
analyses corroborate my findings. Altogether, my results indicate that firms alter their debt 
maturity choices in response to local corruption to limit refinancing risk and the uncertainty 
created by corrupt government officials. In the second chapter, I investigate the effects of firm-
level political risk on corporate investments and operating performance. I find that diversified 
firms are better able than focused firms in mitigating idiosyncratic political risk. Diversified 
firms accomplish this feat via efficient use of the internal capital market that allows segments to 
alleviate political risk adversity. When exposed to political risk, diversified firms do not spend 
more on lobbying and political donations than the focused firms in the subsequent period, 
implying that diversified firms do not manage political risk politically. The main findings are 
robust to a battery of endogeneity tests. 
 
JEL classification: D73, G18, G32, G34, E22, E24, E32, E6, G31; G32, G38, H32 
 
Keywords: Debt maturity, Liquidity risk, Cost of debt, Political Corruption, 




Chapter 1: Implications of Public Corruption for Local Firms: Evidence 
from Corporate Debt Maturity 
1.1. Introduction 
Political corruption can substantially impact firm performance leading companies to 
devote extensive time and resources to minimize its associated risks. For instance, Caprio, 
Faccio, and McConnell (2013) find that corruption increases the risk of expropriation, making 
firms less willing to hold cash and more likely to invest in hard-to-expropriate assets (e.g., fixed 
assets and inventory). Consistent with this, Hossain et al. (2021) show that firms located in 
corrupt environments distribute a greater percentage of earnings as dividends, and Dass et al. 
(2016) reveal that firms in more corrupt areas have significantly lower value and informational 
transparency, all else equal. In this study, I extend the literature on local (state-level) political 
corruption by examining how and to what extent political corruption impacts firms’ debt 
maturity structure. The maturity structure is a significant part of corporate financial policies, as 
failing to optimally structure debt obligations can lead to underinvestment (Gulen and Ion, 
2016), increased debt costs (Myers, 1977; Flannery, 1986), and refinancing risks (Diamond, 
1991; Harford, Klasa, and Maxwell, 2014). Thus, I predict that firms will structure debt-maturity 
to mitigate the risks posed by local political corruption. 
The effect of political corruption (PC) on firm-level business activities has gained 
extensive consideration in the finance and economics literature (Bardhan 1997; Dass et al. 2016; 
Francis et al. 2014; Rose-Ackerman 1975; Svensson 2005), yet its effect on the corporate debt 
maturity structure and leverage decisions of U.S. firms has remained mostly unexplored. Thus, 
although traditional finance theory offers a rich understanding of the determinants of corporate 
debt maturity based on industry and firm-level characteristics (Flannery, 1986; Johnson, 2003; 
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Myers, 1977), the effects of external factors such as PC are less well understood. I fill this gap in 
the existing literature by empirically investigating how local political corruption affects 
corporate debt maturity structure while exploring both supply- and demand-side explanations.  
The supply-side hypothesis predicts that lenders are less willing to provide long-term 
debt in high PC environments. Firms operating in corrupt areas are exposed to more business 
uncertainty and cash-flow volatility, which aggravates borrowers’ and lenders’ information 
asymmetry problems. Consistent with this, several studies find that when external frictions are 
high, the supply side responds by offering shorter-maturity loans (Custódio et al., 2013; Rajan 
and Zingales, 1995; Stulz, 2000). Whereas longer-term debt requires greater continued 
monitoring, short-term debt allows lenders to adjust interest rates or discontinue the lending 
relationship entirely when the not-so-distant maturity date is reached. High PC indicates the 
presence of unfavorable business conditions and greater risk to the borrowing firm. Thus, the 
supply-side hypothesis predicts that lenders will prefer to issue shorter-maturity loans and will 
only agree to extend long-term debt at an interest rate premium. 
In contrast, the demand-side hypothesis predicts that firms in high political corruption 
areas will prefer to use less short-term debt. Prior research highlights that short-term debt is 
associated with more significant liquidity mismatch and roll-over risk (Choi, Hackbarth, and 
Zechner, 2018; Custódio et al., 2013; Diamond, 1991; Pan, Wang, and Yang, 2019). High 
political corruption is expected to exacerbate such risks by increasing uncertainty and the 
potential for expropriation. After negative performance realizations, firms may be unable to 
refinance their existing short-term debt or be forced to do so at substantially higher interest rates 
to prevent a liquidity shortage. Hence, borrowers make a cautious choice of debt-maturity when 
the real and financial frictions are high by choosing less short-term debt in their debt-maturity 
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profiles (Alfaro, Bloom, and Lin, 2018). Overall, I expect that demand-side factors will play a 
more significant role in shaping lending agreements because corporate executives have 
significant human and financial capital tied to the firm, thus, prompting the consideration of 
relevant risk factors when deciding on their optimal capital structure, including the local political 
climate. In contrast, lenders tend to hold diversified portfolios and emphasize traditional risk 
measures based on firm financial statements.   
To test my hypothesis, I measure annual state-level PC following the methodologies 
described in Brown et al. (2019); Dass et al. (2016); and Hossain et al. (2021) using the political 
corruption convictions per capita computed from the U.S. Department of Justice’s (DOJ) Public 
Integrity Section (PIN) reports.1 The PIN data provides information about the number of crimes 
committed by government officials’ violation of public trust and has been widely used in the 
political economy and finance literatures (Butler, Fauver, and Mortal, 2009; Dass et al., 2016; 
Glaeser and Saks, 2006).2 While much of the corruption literature focuses on broad international 
samples or emerging economies where corruption is particularly rampant (e.g., Johan and Najar, 
2010; Khwaja and Mian, 2005; Yusoff et al., 2015), the number of political corruption 
convictions against government officials in the U.S. District Courts is still substantial, with 
22,900 total convictions across the country during my sample period from 1994 to 2017. The 
number of corruption convictions also varies extensively across states, indicating that public 
firms located in high corruption states are exposed to a much greater risk of political 
expropriation and incur an additional cost of doing business (Dass et al., 2016). For instance, the 
 
1We find similar results in robustness tests when repeating our analysis with corruption measured at the district 
level corresponding to the 94 U.S. federal judicial districts.   
2See Smith (2016) for a detailed discussion of the various corruption measures used in the literature and why the 
U.S. DOJ conviction data is expected to be more reliable. Both Glaeser and Saks (2006) and Smith (2016) also 
discuss why it is highly unlikely that more corrupt areas would have fewer official convictions.   
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most corrupt state in my sample has more than nine times as many corruption convictions per 
capita relative to the least corrupt state. Such evidence suggests the presence of extensive state-
level variation and validates my motivation for exploring the impact of PC on local public firms’ 
debt-maturity decisions. 
Consistent with the demand-side hypothesis, I document a strong negative relationship 
between PC and the use of short-term debt. I begin my analysis by sorting all states into PC 
quartiles each year, and my univariate analysis provides initial evidence that firms headquartered 
in the top quartile of PC states use less short-maturity debt than firms in the bottom quartile. 
Additionally, the difference between the highest and lowest corruption quartiles is largest when 
considering only debt maturing within one year, and the difference diminishes monotonically as 
longer maturities are considered. Specifically, the percentage of debt maturing within one, two, 
three, four, and five years is 7.66%, 6.19%, 4.24%, 3.18%, and 2.57% lower, respectively, for 
the top corruption quartile firms compared to the bottom corruption quartile firms. On the other 
hand, for the top corruption quartile firms the percentage of debt maturing in more than one, 
three, and five years is 2.76%, 4.81%, 7.16% higher, respectively. To further highlight the 
economic magnitude of the effect, in my sample a firm headquartered in Louisiana (most corrupt 
State) has 36% more long-term debt on average (i.e. debt maturing in more than three years) than 
a firm headquartered in Oregon (least corrupt State). 
I subsequently estimate ordinary least square (OLS) regressions and IV-GMM models 
with the percentage of debt maturing within one to five years as the dependent variable, denoted 
ST1 through ST5. The results are consistent with my predictions and the univariate analysis 
results, as I find a high level of PC is associated with firms using significantly less short-maturity 
debt. PC exhibits a significant negative relation with ST1, ST2, and ST3, while the relation 
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becomes insignificant when including relatively longer maturity debt in ST4 and ST5. This 
finding is consistent with the demand-side explanation and implies that increased PC contributes 
to a significant reduction in firms’ use of debt maturing within one to three years. My analyses 
include industry and year fixed effects to control for unobservable differences that contribute to 
variation in firm maturity preferences, and I obtain similar inferences when adding state fixed 
effects suggesting that even within states firms place less reliance on short-term debt when local 
political corruption is more pervasive. In contrast, I do not find support for the supply-side 
explanation, as firms in corrupt areas utilize a lower percentage of short-term debt, and I do not 
find evidence of a significant differential impact on the cost of short- versus long-maturity debt 
in high corruption areas. This is consistent with evidence from Smith (2016) that firms in high 
PC areas are more leveraged than firms in low PC areas, highlighting lenders’ willingness to 
extent debt in corrupt environments. Altogether, my evidence indicates that firms consider the 
extent of unscrupulous actions by local government officials when determining the maturity 
structure of their debt commitments, but well-diversified lenders do not significantly alter their 
lending terms.  
Individual company circumstances are likely to either amplify or attenuate the effect of 
corruption on maturity preferences, so I examine whether the strength of the PC-debt-maturity 
relation varies across firms using a series of interactions in order to better understand the 
mechanism driving the negative PC-short-term-debt relation. Consistent with the overall effect 
being driven by liquidity and refinancing risks, I find PC’s negative relation with short-term debt 
usage is most pronounced among firms with small size, low market-to-book ratio, low asset 
redeployability, and high volatility. Additionally, I find the effect is stronger among non-
investment grade firms, which are likely to incur elevated borrowing costs and may struggle to 
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refinance outstanding debts at affordable interest rates should conditions deteriorate further. 
Given prior evidence that financial markets behave differently under Republican versus 
Democratic political regimes (Belo et al., 2013), I also test whether the strength of the PC-
maturity relation varies under different political party leadership. My results suggest the negative 
relation between corruption and short-term debt usage is driven by instances when Republicans 
control both legislative chambers of the firm’s headquarter state. This is consistent with the 
findings of Di Giuli and Kostovetsky (2014) who document that firms score higher in corporate 
social responsibility when they have Democratic founders, CEOs, and directors, as well as when 
they are headquartered in Democratic-leaning states. Overall, variation in the strength of the PC-
maturity relation across firms adds further support to my demand-side hypothesis that companies 
exposed to high political corruption reduce their reliance on short-term debt to limit liquidity and 
refinancing risks.  
While the inclusion of industry, year, and state fixed effects in my main analysis limits 
the risk of omitted variable bias, I also conduct a battery of tests designed to further reduce 
potential endogeneity concerns. First, I explore the inclusion of firm or industry-year fixed 
effects and document consistent results. Next, I employ a seemingly unrelated regression 
analysis and find that firms in high PC areas prefer long-term debt over other sources of capital 
when choosing among different financing sources for new investments. I also use instruments for 
corruption (McCarty, Poole, and Rosenthal, 1997; Gulen and Ion, 2016), which reasserts my 
baseline results and suggests the observed relationship with debt maturity is attributable to 
variation in corruption, and a propensity score matching analysis yields similar inferences when 
comparing firms in high PC areas to otherwise similar firms that only differ significantly in their 
exposure to political corruption. To further enhance the reliability of my results, I implement a 
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falsification test using randomly generated corruption data, and I find my placebo corruption 
variable is insignificant in all specifications, thus, highlighting the robustness of my findings. 
Last, to mitigate concerns that the relation is driven by maturity structure decisions made in prior 
periods, I repeat my analysis using data on new debt issues and find that when local corruption is 
high firms issue significantly less short-term debt. Altogether, the evidence supports my 
hypothesis and suggests that firms alter their debt-maturity profiles to reduce liquidity and 
refinancing risks when political corruption is high. 
While I focus specifically on corruption, my study is closely related to prior research 
examining the effects of policy uncertainty. For instance, Çolak et al. (2017) find that policy 
uncertainty reduces IPO activity and leads to an increased cost of capital, and Waisman et al. 
(2015) provide evidence that political uncertainty is associated with higher corporate bond 
spreads, particularly in the periods surrounding U.S. presidential elections. Additionally, several 
studies suggest that high policy uncertainty leads firms to shorten debt maturity, as long-term 
debt is prone to greater mispricing and more sensitive to changes in firm value (Datta et al., 
2019; Pan et al., 2019; Tran and Phan, 2017). In contrast, my results suggest that in the case of 
corruption, firms’ liquidity and refinancing concerns outweigh worries regarding long-term 
debt’s potential mispricing and contribution to the underinvestment problem (Myers, 1977; 
Flannery, 1986; Datta et al, 2005). Two important differences are expected to contribute to the 
differences between the effects of corruption and policy uncertainty. First, whereas studies such 
as Datta et al. (2019) measure policy uncertainty using the national-level economic policy 
uncertainty index (EPU) of Baker et al. (2016), I measure corruption at the state (or judicial 
district) level, thus, reflecting risks that affect some firms but not others. Many large regional and 
national lenders are likely to consider the effects of nationwide political uncertainty in their 
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lending policies, consistent with the evidence in Waisman et al. (2015), whereas exposure to 
local corruption can be diversified away. This contributes to a reduced supply-side effect. 
Second, whereas political uncertainty results in more favorable outcomes in some instances, 
corruption is typically associated with negative effects, as Shleifer and Vishny (1993) and 
Lindgreen (2004) argue that corruption destroys economic activities’ coherence through the 
misallocation of resources. To ensure variation in policy uncertainty does not explain my results, 
I re-estimate my main specifications with the inclusion of the EPU Index and find the results are 
largely unchanged, as PC enters with a significant negative coefficient when predicting my short-
term debt variables, ST1 through ST3. This corroborates my earlier findings and provides added 
support for the demand-side explanation.   
My study makes several significant contributions to the literature. First, I add to the 
growing research on the effects of political corruption in developed countries where corruption 
alters the performance and behavior of many of the largest firms in the world (Brown et al., 
2019; Dass et al., 2016; Glaeser and Saks, 2006). Second, Smith (2016) finds that firms in high 
PC areas manage liquidity downward and leverage upward to protect against the 
misappropriation of valuable resources by unscrupulous politicians. I extend this line of work by 
examining how corruption influences U.S. firms’ debt-maturity preferences while evaluating 
both demand and supply-side explanations. My evidence is consistent with the demand-side 
explanation and highlights a robust negative relationship between PC and the use of short-term 
debt. I disaggregate debt-maturity using fourteen variables to gain a sharper perspective 
regarding the specific firm-level response to political corruption, and I find that higher corruption 
is associated with significantly lower use of debt maturing within one, two, and three years. My 
work also contributes to the debt policy literature (Graham and Leary, 2011) by quantifying the 
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determining role PC plays in corporate debt policy. To the best of my knowledge, mine is the 
first study to document how U.S. firms structure their debt policy in high local political 
corruption environments to mitigate the increased liquidity and refinancing risks. Last, I conduct 
a series of robustness tests designed to minimize endogeneity concerns. My results indicate a 
highly robust relationship with corruption contributing to significant differences in debt-maturity 
structure both within and across states. 
I organize the rest of the paper as follows. Section 2 briefly discusses how firms develop 
their debt policy and choose between short- and long-term debt to minimize PC’s effect. Section 
3 outlines the data sources, sample selection, variables construction, and specifies the research 
design. Section 4 summarizes the key variables and main empirical results. Section 5 presents a 
series of robustness and sensitivity tests, and Section 6 concludes the paper.    
1.2. Hypothesis development 
In this section, I outline two competing theories regarding the firm’s choice of debt-
maturity in a high PC environment, and I develop my primary hypothesis. First, the supply-side 
theory considers how lenders structure their debt offers when external frictions are high. Prior 
studies document that lenders prefer to extend short-maturity loans when business volatility 
increases (Custódio et al., 2013; Rajan and Zingales, 1995; Stulz, 2000). In related work, 
Waisman et al. (2015) argue that under high political uncertainty lenders are less willing to 
provide long-term debt since the monitoring costs and risks are higher than for short-term debt. 
Similarly, my supply-side explanation predicts that lenders will prefer to extend short-term debt 
in high PC environments and will only extend long-term debt at an interest rate premium given 
its greater monitoring costs and the risk of expropriation. 
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By contrast, the demand-side story predicts that firms will prefer to use less short-term 
debt in high PC environments. Using short-term debt creates higher liquidity mismatch and roll-
over risk (Choi et al., 2018; Custódio et al., 2013; Diamond, 1991; Pan et al., 2019), and these 
adverse characteristics of short-term debt can be exacerbated in high PC environments. Diamond 
(1991) highlights that the optimal debt maturity structure weighs the likelihood that credit quality 
will improve against refinancing and liquidity risk. When PC is high, firms must consider their 
internal prospects and the greater external threats posed by corrupt government officials. As a 
result, risk-averse borrowers will tend to limit the amount of short-term debt in their debt-
maturity profiles.  
Smith (2016) documents that firms exposed to high political corruption are more highly 
leveraged on average, suggesting that lenders remain willing to supply debt to firms located in 
high PC states. Such evidence is consistent with large regional and national lenders pricing in the 
average corruption risk while applying consistent terms across loan offerings rather than varying 
terms based on borrower location with respect to perceived local corruption. While lenders hold 
more diversified portfolios, firm executives typically have a disproportionate amount of wealth 
tied to firm performance in the form of stock, stock options, and recurring compensation. Thus, I 
hypothesize that demand-side factors will play a greater role resulting in firms taking on less 
short-term debt to mitigate liquidity and refinancing risks. 
 
Hypothesis 1:  All else equal, firms operating in a high political corruption environment will use 




Gopalan and Xie (2011) suggest that firms with greater exposure to refinancing risk have lower 
credit quality on average. While all firms have an incentive to limit potential liquidity and 
rollover risks, such concerns should be particularly pronounced among less stable firms with 
lower credit quality. Consequently, I expect managing refinancing risk to be a larger concern 
among low market-to-book firms, which tend to exhibit greater distress, as well as among 
smaller, non-investment grade, and highly volatile firms. I also predict liquidity risks will play a 
greater role among firms with low asset redeployability and firms that operate within a single 
business segment given their lower flexibility. This leads to my second hypothesis.  
 
Hypothesis 2:  All else equal, the negative relation between exposure to PC and reliance on 
short-maturity debt will be stronger among small, low market-to-book, non-investment grade, 
and highly volatile firms as well as among firms with low asset redeployability and undiversified 
business operations. 
1.3. Data and Research Design 
To investigate the effects of PC on corporate debt maturity, I obtain Federal public 
corruption conviction data from the Public Integrity Section of the United States Department of 
Justice.3 Accounting data is obtained from Compustat annual fundamentals, and I construct my 
diversification measure using business segment data from Compustat historical industry segment 
files. Additionally, I collect state partisan composition data from the National Conference of 
State Legislature (NCSL).4 My sample firms must have headquarters in the U.S. to be included 
in the analysis (Heider and Ljungqvist, 2015). I focus on the firms’ headquarters state rather than 
 
3 Federal public corruption conviction data is available at the Public Integrity Section of The United States 
Department of Justice. https://www.justice.gov/criminal/pin 




state of incorporation as the majority of firms’ business operations are concentrated in the 
headquarter location (John and Kadyrzhanova, 2011). I expect that PC plays a more significant 
role in the location where firms compete for business opportunities such as business contracts, 
tax benefits, and favorable regulations. Following the literature, I exclude financial (sic 6000-
6999) and utility firms (sic 4890-4999) from the final sample, as such companies are highly 
regulated and have unique capital structures that may not be appropriate for my analysis. I then 
merge corruption data with firm-level accounting data by state and year. I drop firms with 
missing or non-positive assets, missing or non-positive sales, or missing or non-positive equity in 
Compustat. I also exclude firms where the accounting ratio of the debt-maturity variables (ST1 to 
ST5) exceeds one (Shin and Stulz, 1998). Finally, I winsorize all continuous regression variables 
at their 1st and 99th percentiles to limit the effect of outliers. My sample period begins in 1994 to 
match the earliest year of headquarter location data from 10-K and 10-Q filings available through 
EDGAR5, and my sample ends in 2017. These sample selection procedures result in 45,038 firm-
year observations.  
1.3.1 Measure of political corruption 
Following the prior literature (Brown et al. 2019; Dass et al. 2016; Hossain et al. 2021; 
Hossain and Kryzanowski 2021; Hossain et al. 2020; Smith 2016), I construct an annual state-
level corruption variable using the number of federal public corruption convictions within each 
state’s district courts as reported in the DOJ’s annual reports to Congress.6 I then scale the 
number of corruption convictions by the state’s population (per 100k) each year which yields a 
per capita measure of political corruption. The state population data is obtained from the United 
 
5 Smith (2016) suggests that headquarter location data is less reliable prior to the first availability of SEC filings as 
well as for firms for which SEC filings are unavailable.     
6 The Federal public corruption conviction data is available for 94 Federal judicial districts and the U.S. territories. 
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States Census Bureau, and I standardize the corruption variable by its sample standard deviation 
for ease of interpretation. Using the DOJ’s conviction data from the Public Integrity Section 
(PIN) is advantageous compared to survey-based data, as the former provides a more objective 
measure of corruption and is not influenced by perception. About 75% of the PIN report’s 
convictions are associated with government officials’ misconduct with the remaining 25% of 
convictions attributed to private citizens’ political corruption convictions. Therefore, the PIN 
report provides a reliable picture of state-level political corruption which is expected to affect 
firms’ financing and leverage decisions. Figure 1.1 illustrates the state-level time-series averages 
of corruption over the sample period. I observe significant variation in the corruption conviction 
rates across U.S. states which is expected to result in meaningful differences in firms’ debt-
maturity structure decisions if PC alters firms’ assessment of liquidity and refinancing risk.  




1.3.2 Control variables 
Following the corruption literature (Aidt, 2016; Baxamusa and Jalal., 2014; Brown et al., 
2019; Dass et al., 2016; Mauro, 1995; Smith, 2016; Reinikka and Svensson, 2002) as well as the 
debt-maturity and leverage literature (Barclay, Marx, and Smith, 2003; Brockman, Martin, and 
Unlu, 2010; Huang et al., 2016; Stohs and Mauer, 1996), I include a set of control variables to 
account for expected differences in debt maturity structure and minimize concerns that my 
results are driven by omitted variables. My state-level control variables include the natural 
logarithm of annual state GDP and a dummy variable that takes a value of one when a single 
party controls both legislative chambers of the firm’s headquarter state and zero otherwise 
(LEGISLATIVE CONTROL). I also include the Partisan Conflict Index (PCI) that measures the 
disagreement among politicians at the federal level7, the spread between the 10-year and 3-month 
Treasury bond rates (TERM SPREAD), and the LEADING INDEX from the Federal Reserve 
which provides a 6-month-ahead state-level prediction of economic performance.  
Firm-level debt maturity control variables include SIZE (log total assets), MB (market-to-
book ratio), DIVIDEND YIELD, ASSETS MATURITY, EARNINGS VOLATILITY, LEVERAGE, 
ROA, TANGIBILITY (net property, plant, and equipment), CAPX (capital expenditures), Z-
SCORE DUMMY (indicator equal to one if Altman Z-score > 1.81), ABNORMAL EARNINGS, 
DIVERSIFICATION (indicator equal to one if more than one business segment), and RATED 
(indicator equal to one if the firm has an S&P rating for long-term debt). My analyses also 
include year, industry, and state fixed effects to control for unobservable time, industry, and state 
 
7PCI index data is available at Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia. The PCI index is constructed measuring the 
political disagreement among federal-level politicians in a given month. This is a textual based measure that relies 
on the number of disagreements reported in a given month in the newspaper.  A higher PCI indicates a higher-level 
of partisan conflict.  
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factors that contribute to variation in firms’ debt maturity preferences. Appendix A1 provides 
details on the measurement, definition, and data sources for all variables.  
1.3.3 Location of firm headquarters 
Data on the state of firms’ headquarters location is available in Compustat; however, the 
recorded locations can sometimes be inaccurate, as Compustat does not report firms’ historical 
headquarters (HQ) location (Heider and Ljungqvist, 2015). If the firm’s HQ location is 
erroneous, then firms located in a low PC state but reported to be in a high PC state (or vice 
versa) will create noise in the measured relation between PC and debt-maturity. To overcome 
this issue, I use firms’ historical HQ locations from the 10-K/Q filings from EDGAR available at 
Augmented 10-X Header data.8  
1.3.4 Dependent variables 
The prior literature uses several different measures to proxy for corporate debt-maturity 
structure. Standard measurements include the portion of the firm’s debt that matures within three 
years (Datta, Iskandar-datta, Raman, 2005; Johnson, 2003) or five years (Brockman et al., 2010). 
To develop a full understanding of the relationship between corruption and debt-maturity, I 
follow Huang et al. (2016) and separately consider the proportion of debt that matures within one 
year (ST1), two years (ST2), three years (ST3), four years (ST4), and five years (ST5). In 
robustness tests, I also explore a variety of alternative short-term debt proxies that are used in 
prior studies. The measurement, definitions, and data sources for all key variables and alternative 
measures are described in Appendix A1.  
1.3.5 Model specification 
To test my main hypothesis, I apply the following baseline OLS regression model with 
standard errors clustered by firm; 
 





𝐷𝑒𝑏𝑡𝑚𝑎𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑖𝑡𝑦 = 𝛼0 + 𝛼1𝐶𝑜𝑟𝑟𝑢𝑝𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 + 𝛼2𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸 + 𝛼3𝑀𝐵 + 𝛼4𝑅𝑂𝐴 + 𝛼5𝐶𝐴𝑃𝑋 +
𝛼6𝑇𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑖𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦 + 𝛼7𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑀𝑎𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑖𝑡𝑦 + 𝛼8𝐴𝑏𝑛𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑙𝐸𝑎𝑟𝑛𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑠 + 𝛼9𝐸𝑎𝑟𝑛𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑠𝑉𝑜𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦 +
𝛼10𝑍 − 𝑆𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑑𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦 + 𝛼11𝐷𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑠𝑖𝑓𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 + 𝛼12𝐷𝑖𝑣𝑖𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑌𝑖𝑒𝑙𝑑 + 𝛼13𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑑 +
 𝛼14𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒 + 𝛼15𝑇𝑒𝑟𝑚𝑆𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑑 + 𝛼16𝑙𝑛(𝑆𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑒 𝐺𝐷𝑃) +
𝛼17𝑙𝑛(𝑃𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑖𝑠𝑎𝑛 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑓𝑙𝑖𝑐𝑡 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑥) + 𝛼18𝐿𝑒𝑔𝑖𝑠𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙 + 𝛼19𝐿𝑒𝑎𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑔𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑥 + .        (1)  
Prior studies suggest debt maturity and leverage are jointly determined. I address this 
concern by using an IV-GMM approach which estimates the relation between political 
corruption and corporate debt maturity while instrumenting LEVERAGE. Following previous 
studies in the debt-maturity and leverage literature (e.g., Barclay et al., 2003; Datta et al., 2005; 
Johnson, 2003), I include a Net Operating Loss Indicator, Investment Tax Credit Indicator, 
TANGIBILITY, and ROA as instruments in the IV-GMM estimations. My two-step feasible 
GMM process provides an efficient estimation of the model coefficients and a consistent 
estimation of the standard errors.9 Once again, I include time, industry, and state fixed effects to 
mitigate potential omitted variable concerns. With CORRUPTION measured by state-year, 
controlling for state fixed effects provides a more stringent test that evaluates the difference in 
firms’ debt maturity preferences in a given state when its level of corruption is high compared to 
when corruption is low.  
 
9In subsequent robustness tests, we address the possibility that Corruption and debt-maturity may be correlated 
with unobserved factors by employing an instrumental variable approach where the instruments are associated 
with Corruption but unrelated to corporate debt-maturity. 
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1.4. Empirical results  
1.4.1 Summary statistics  
Table 1.1 provides the ranking of the fifty U.S. states by their average number of 
corruption convictions scaled by the state’s population (in 100k) during the sample period from 
1994 to 2017.  
Table 1.1: State level political corruption 
This table reports the ranking of U.S. states by their average number of corruption convictions during the sample 
period (1994-2017) scaled by the state population (in 100k). The ranking is ordered from the most to least corrupt 
state according to the time-series average of the reported convictions in the PIN reports. The furthermost right 
column reports the total number of corruption convictions during the same period.  
 
Rank (High to 
Low) 
Corruption related allegations  scaled by 
100k state Population [1994-2017] 
SD p25 p50 p75 Total 
LA 0.81 0.24 0.61 0.83 0.98 912 
MT 0.74 0.75 0.20 0.50 0.84 180 
SD 0.67 0.48 0.26 0.53 0.97 133 
ND 0.62 0.60 0.26 0.47 0.89 100 
MS 0.61 0.39 0.30 0.57 0.81 438 
AK 0.57 0.65 0.14 0.44 0.65 96 
KY 0.56 0.19 0.38 0.49 0.66 583 
VA 0.46 0.21 0.33 0.43 0.57 879 
AL 0.45 0.25 0.29 0.42 0.57 512 
IL 0.44 0.18 0.30 0.44 0.53 1359 
MD 0.42 0.31 0.15 0.37 0.56 595 
NJ 0.41 0.14 0.31 0.34 0.51 870 
FL 0.40 0.16 0.31 0.37 0.46 1706 
OK 0.40 0.17 0.25 0.36 0.57 360 
TN 0.39 0.13 0.30 0.37 0.51 588 
PA 0.38 0.11 0.30 0.37 0.43 1171 
OH 0.37 0.17 0.27 0.36 0.48 1066 
WV 0.37 0.26 0.22 0.33 0.49 170 
DE 0.37 0.34 0.11 0.24 0.57 76 
NY 0.35 0.13 0.24 0.35 0.43 1651 
HI 0.32 0.27 0.14 0.28 0.38 100 
GA 0.32 0.17 0.23 0.33 0.42 708 
MO 0.32 0.11 0.23 0.31 0.40 455 
TX 0.31 0.09 0.24 0.29 0.34 1814 
WY 0.31 0.38 0.00 0.20 0.52 40 
MA 0.30 0.12 0.23 0.28 0.41 481 
RI 0.28 0.23 0.10 0.20 0.38 74 
AR 0.28 0.20 0.14 0.20 0.44 195 
AZ 0.27 0.19 0.15 0.25 0.32 402 
ME 0.26 0.20 0.15 0.24 0.38 83 
ID 0.23 0.18 0.07 0.24 0.34 79 
CA 0.23 0.09 0.18 0.22 0.25 2004 




Table 1.1: State level political corruption (continued) 
 
Rank (High to  
Low) 
Corruption related allegations  scaled by 
100k state Population [1994-2017] 
SD p25 p50 p75 Total 
NM 0.23 0.16 0.11 0.19 0.34 111 
VT 0.23 0.23 0.00 0.17 0.33 35 
CT 0.22 0.17 0.11 0.22 0.31 194 
MI 0.21 0.07 0.17 0.21 0.26 521 
SC 0.18 0.17 0.09 0.15 0.20 187 
WI 0.18 0.07 0.12 0.17 0.22 242 
NC 0.17 0.07 0.11 0.17 0.21 365 
NV 0.16 0.15 0.00 0.15 0.26 86 
KS 0.15 0.11 0.07 0.14 0.20 102 
IA 0.15 0.10 0.07 0.13 0.19 111 
NE 0.14 0.12 0.06 0.11 0.21 63 
WA 0.14 0.08 0.07 0.12 0.18 214 
MN 0.11 0.07 0.07 0.11 0.15 145 
CO 0.11 0.12 0.02 0.06 0.15 125 
UT 0.10 0.10 0.03 0.07 0.19 63 
OR 0.08 0.07 0.03 0.08 0.11 74 
NH 0.08 0.10 0.00 0.07 0.09 24 
 
Figure 1.2: The relationship between Short-term debt and Corruption 
 
This figure presents the relationship between the use of short-maturity debt (ST1 to ST5) and 
standardized political corruption. The univariate relationship is controlled for Fama-French 12 





The ranking is ordered from the most to least corrupt state according to the time-series 
averages of the reported conviction rates in the PIN reports, and the final column reports the total 
number of corruption convictions during the sample period. The per capita corruption 
convictions are highest in the District of Columbia (not reported in the table) given that it is an 
administrative district, which I treat as an outlier. Louisiana is ranked first in corruption among 
all 50 states, while Oregon has the lowest per-capita corruption convictions. Louisiana is 9.97 
times more corrupt than Oregon and 2.45 times more corrupt than the average state based on my 
measure.  
Figure 1.2 illustrates the univariate relationship between corruption and my five different 
short-term debt measures after controlling for Fama-French industry effects. In all instances, I 
observe that as corruption increases, firms’ usage of short-term debt declines. Table 2 reports 
summary statistics for my key regression variables over my sample period from 1994 to 2017. In 
Panel A, I sort states into corruption quartiles each year and calculate the average of each debt-
maturity variable (ST1 to ST5) for each quartile. Additionally, the panel’s rightmost column 
reports the mean difference of the debt-maturity variables between the lowest and highest 
corruption quartiles. The mean difference is positive and significant at the five-percent level or 
better for each variable indicating that firms in the high corruption quartile states use 
significantly less short-term debt than firms in the low corruption quartile states. Overall, the 
evidence from this preliminary analysis is consistent with my hypothesis that firms use less 
short-term debt in high corruption areas to reduce liquidity and refinancing risk; however, my 
subsequent tests aim to evaluate whether such differences are attributable to corruption.    
Panel B presents descriptive statistics for my control variables, and the rightmost column 
again reports the mean difference between firms in the low and high PC states. The results 
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highlight a number of significant differences, as firms in low corruption states have significantly 
lower LEVERAGE, ROA, TANGIBILITY, and DIVIDEND YIELD, as well as higher MB, 
ABNORMAL EARNINGS, and EARNING VOLATILITY relative to firms in high PC states. Thus, 
while corruption may influence firms’ decisions regarding short-term debt use, it is necessary to 
account for differences along other dimensions. My subsequent analyses control for these 
differences in characteristics that have been shown to influence leverage and maturity decisions, 
and I explore a battery of tests designed to mitigate any remaining endogeneity concerns. Panel 
C reports the pairwise correlation coefficients between CORRUPTION and my debt-maturity 
variables. 
Figure 1.3: Mean difference of corruption 
This figure presents the mean difference of my short-maturity debt variables (ST1 to ST5) and long-term debt-
maturity (DM1, DM3, DM5) for firms in states with the lowest and highest Political Corruption (PC). My variables 
are ST1: Debt maturing within 1 year, ST2: Debt maturing within 2 years, ST3: Debt maturing within 3 years, ST4: 
Debt maturing within 4 years, ST5: Debt maturing within 5 years, DM1: Portion of debt maturing in more than 1 
year, DM3: Portion of debt maturing in more than 3 years, DM5: Portion of debt maturing in more than 5 years.  I 
sort PC into quartiles each year over the sample period and calculate the mean difference each short-term and long-
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Table 1.2: Summary statistics for variables 
Panel A of the table presents summary statistics for the short-term debt variables (ST1 to ST5) by corruption quartile, Panel B presents pooled summary statistics 
for my main variables of interest, and Panel C reports the correlations between Corruption and my debt maturity variables. My sample period starts in 1994 and 
ends in 2017, and firms must have their HQ location in the U.S and non-missing HQ location in their 10-K/Q filing to be included in the sample. Following the 
literature, I exclude financial (sic 6000-6999) and utilities firms (sic 4890-4999) from the final sample. I also drop firms with missing or non-positive assets, 
missing or non-positive sales, and missing or non-positive equity in Compustat, and I exclude firms where the accounting ratio of the debt-maturity variables 
(ST1 to ST5) exceeds one. Finally, I winsorize all the continuous firm-level regression variables at their respective 1st and 99th percentiles to limit the effects of 
outliers. The final column reports t-tests for the difference in means where *, **, and *** denote the 10%, 5%, and 1% significance level respectively. 
 
Panel A: Summary Statistics of Dependent Variables 
QUARTILE   LOW CORRUPTION     HIGH CORRUPTION   Mean Difference  
(Low-High) Variable   ST1 ST2 ST3 ST4 ST5     ST1 ST2 ST3 ST4 ST5   
Mean   0.30 0.45 0.57 0.66 0.76     0.28 0.42 0.54 0.64 0.74   ST1 0.021 *** 
SD   0.34 0.38 0.38 0.35 0.31     0.32 0.37 0.37 0.35 0.31   ST2 0.026 *** 
p25   0.03 0.09 0.20 0.35 0.53     0.02 0.09 0.19 0.33 0.51   ST3 0.023 *** 
p50   0.14 0.34 0.57 0.79 0.97     0.13 0.31 0.52 0.73 0.92   ST4 0.020 *** 
p75   0.49 0.87 0.99 1.00 1.00     0.43 0.79 0.98 0.99 1.00   ST5 0.019 *** 
 
Panel B: Summary Statistics of Independent and control variables 
Variables Mean SD p25 p50 p75 
Mean Difference (Low-High 
Corruption Quartile) 
Firm Variables 
SIZE 5.677 2.237 4.029 5.711 7.272 -0.003   
LEVERAGE 0.176 0.162 0.045 0.133 0.262 -0.019 *** 
MB 1.952 1.641 1.090 1.457 2.146 0.146 *** 
ROA 0.059 0.217 0.038 0.108 0.162 -0.023 *** 
CAPX 0.057 0.063 0.018 0.036 0.069 -0.001   
TANGIBILITY 0.273 0.228 0.095 0.203 0.388 -0.009 *** 
ASST MATURITY 9.159 10.905 2.569 5.605 11.807 0.092   
ABNORMAL EARNINGS 0.013 0.333 -0.037 0.005 0.040 0.014 *** 
ERNS VOLATLITY 0.079 0.119 0.018 0.039 0.088 0.007 *** 
Z-SCORE DUMMY 0.829 0.376 1.000 1.000 1.000 -0.015 *** 
DIVERSIFICATION 0.429 0.495 0.000 0.000 1.000 -0.005   
DIVIDEND YIELD 0.009 0.023 0.000 0.000 0.011 -0.001 *** 
RATED 0.270 0.444 0.000 0.000 1.000 -0.046 *** 
LOSS CARRY FORWARD 0.473 0.499 0.000 0.000 1.000 0.088 *** 
INVESTMENT TAX CREDIT 0.133 0.339 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.067 *** 
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State and Macro Variables 
TERM SPREAD 1.624 1.027 0.870 1.520 2.710     
STATE ln(GDP) 10.771 0.228 10.672 10.807 10.928     
PARTISAN CONFLICT INDEX 4.629 0.264 4.449 4.502 4.882     
LEGISLATIVE CONTROL DUMMY 0.767 0.423 1.000 1.000 1.000     
LEADING INDEX 1.355 1.146 0.870 1.590 2.050     
 
Panel C: Pairwise Correlation Coefficients 
Variables ST1 ST2 ST3 ST4 ST5 LT1 LT2 LT3 LT4 LT5 LEVERAGE CORRUPTION 
ST 0.681* 0.502* 0.397* 0.325* 0.262* -0.191* -0.274* -0.352* -0.439* -0.550* -0.077* -0.009* 
ST1   0.826* 0.690* 0.579* 0.475* 0.588* 0.349* 0.186* 0.039* -0.120* -0.250* -0.035* 
ST2 
  
  0.856* 0.728* 0.599* 0.549* 0.694* 0.492* 0.316* 0.128* -0.285* -0.039* 
ST3 
  
  0.858* 0.709* 0.483* 0.621* 0.719* 0.518* 0.305* -0.272* -0.038* 
ST4 
  
  0.827* 0.416* 0.539* 0.629* 0.707* 0.463* -0.244* -0.035* 
ST5 
  
  0.345* 0.447* 0.523* 0.588* 0.661* -0.214* -0.034* 
LT1 
  
  0.774* 0.642* 0.542* 0.453* -0.248* -0.037* 
LT2 
  
  0.841* 0.717* 0.601* -0.241* -0.037* 
LT3 
  
  0.861* 0.728* -0.208* -0.032* 
LT4 
  
  0.852* -0.163* -0.027* 
LT5 
  
  -0.113* -0.023* 





















Figure 1.3 graphically illustrates the univariate relation between CORRUPTION and 
short-term debt use. Firms in the least corrupt states have 7.66% higher average one-year debt 
ratios, ST1, relative to firms in the most corrupt areas. Additionally, as the debt maturity 
increases, the difference between the lowest and highest corruption quartile diminishes 
monotonically. The mean differences for ST1, ST2, ST3, ST4, and ST5 are 7.66%, 6.19%, 4.24%, 
3.18%, and 2.57%, respectively, among firms in the bottom corruption quartile compared to 
firms in the top corruption. Further, the mean values for the proportion of debt maturing in more 
than one year (DM1), three years (DM3), and five years (DM5) is 2.76%, 4.81%, and 7.16% 
lower, respectively, among firms in the bottom corruption quartile compared to the top 
corruption quartile firms.  
Figure 1.4: Debt-maturity and Corruption 
This figure plots the univariate relationship corruption and portion of debt maturing in more than 3 years and within 
3 years respectively. The regression is estimated using an Epanechnikov kernel at 95% confidence interval 
(indicated with the shadow region). I standardized corruption by its standard deviation. The state-level number of 





Figure 1.4 subsequently illustrates the univariate relation between state-level corruption 
and debt-maturity with a regression estimated using an Epanechnikov kernel with a 95% 
confidence interval (indicated with the shadow region). As predicted, I observe that the 
proportion of short-term debt (ST3) decreases and the proportion of long-term debt (DM3) 
increases as the level of PC increases. Such evidence provides initial support for my hypothesis 
that corruption alters firms’ debt maturity decisions. 
1.4.2 Are firms in high political corruption states more likely to cut short-maturity debt? 
1.4.2.1 Baseline results -OLS regression 
I begin my multivariate analyses with a set of OLS regressions using the five different 
debt-maturity dependent variables (i.e., ST1 to ST5) with the results presented in Table 3. My 
regressions include year and industry fixed effects in columns (1) through (5), and I subsequently 
add state fixed effects in columns (6) through (10). Consistent with my hypothesis, the estimated 
CORRUPTION coefficients are negative and statistically significant for ST1 to ST3 in columns 
(1)-(3) and (6)-(8). In contrast, the coefficients are insignificant when the dependent variable is 
ST4 or ST5.10 These results indicate that firms operating in highly corrupt states tend to use less 
short-maturity debt in their overall corporate debt structure. Interestingly, I find qualitatively 
similar results both with and without state fixed effects. Jiang, John, and Qian (2018) document 
that firms in more religious areas have a lower cost of debt, while Huang and Shang (2019) 
observe lower leverage and short-term debt ratios in areas with more significant social capital. 
My inclusion of state fixed effects ensures the observed relation is not attributable to regional 
 
10In unreported analyses, we re-estimate the regressions using three measures of long-term debt as in Custódio et 
al. (2013), constructed as the proportion of debt maturing in more than one year (DM1), three years (DM3), and 
five years (DM5). The results yield similar inferences and are available upon request. 
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differences unrelated to political corruption that could explain the results. Altogether, the results 
provide support for Hypothesis 1.  
 
1.4.2.2  Endogeneity and instrumental variables 
Although the baseline OLS results are consistent with my main hypothesis, these results 
may suffer from endogeneity between debt maturity and leverage. I address this concern by 
reexamining the relationship between political corruption and debt maturity structure while 
instrumenting leverage using commonly used instruments from the debt-maturity literature (e.g., 
Barclay et al., 2003; Datta et al., 2005; Johnson, 2003). Table 4 presents the estimates from the 
IV-GMM estimations. Consistent with my hypothesis, the estimated coefficients for 
CORRUPTION are negative and statistically significant for ST1 to ST3. The economic 
significance of the estimated coefficients is also considerable, as a one standard deviation 
increase in CORRUPTION is associated with a 0.84 percentage point decrease in debt maturing 
within one year, a 0.76 percentage point decrease in debt maturing within 2 years, and a 0.64 
percentage point decrease in debt maturing within three years. Relative to the averages of the 
proportion of debt maturing within one, two, and three years in my sample of 28.75%, 43.52, and 
55.42%, this corresponds to a reduction in ST1, ST2, and ST3 by 2.92%, 1.74%, and 1.15% per 
standard deviation, respectively.11  
 
11In Appendix Table A2, we repeat the analyses and find similar results with CORRUPTION measured at the judicial 
district level. The analyses include year, industry, and U.S. judicial district fixed effects.   
26 
 
Table 1.3: Relationship between PC and debt-maturity-OLS Regression 
In this table, I present the OLS regression estimates over my sample period from 1994 to 2017. I consider five different measures of debt-maturity as the 
dependent variable which includes ST1: debt maturing within 1 year, ST2: debt maturing within 2 years, ST3: debt maturing within 3 years, ST4: debt maturing 
within 4 years, and ST5: debt maturing within 5 years. My main variable of interest is Corruption, which reflects the state-level number of corruption convictions 
scaled by the state population (in 100k). I then standardize Corruption by its standard deviation. I include time fixed effects, Fama-French 48 industries fixed 
effects, and state fixed effects to control for any unobservable time, industry, and state-specific factors that affect maturity preferences. Standard errors clustered 
by firm are shown in brackets, and statistical significance is denoted as *** =p<1%, ** =p<5%, * =p<10%. 
VARIABLES ST1 ST2 ST3 ST4 ST5 ST1 ST2 ST3 ST4 ST5 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
CORRUPTION -0.5937*** -0.5673** -0.4596** -0.2849 -0.1189 -0.3954* -0.5560** -0.5526** -0.2857 -0.2193 
  [0.2075] [0.2281] [0.2334] [0.2262] [0.2219] [0.2094] [0.2366] [0.2466] [0.2362] [0.2237] 
SIZE -0.0477*** -0.0696*** -0.0769*** -0.0736*** -0.0622*** -0.0475*** -0.0698*** -0.0772*** -0.0739*** -0.0626*** 
  [0.0016] [0.0017] [0.0017] [0.0016] [0.0015] [0.0016] [0.0017] [0.0017] [0.0016] [0.0015] 
MB -0.0056*** -0.0047*** -0.0067*** -0.0077*** -0.0058*** -0.0060*** -0.0051*** -0.0070*** -0.0079*** -0.0060*** 
  [0.0016] [0.0016] [0.0015] [0.0014] [0.0013] [0.0016] [0.0016] [0.0015] [0.0014] [0.0013] 
ROA -0.0785*** -0.0690*** -0.0229* 0.0143 0.0333*** -0.0757*** -0.0657*** -0.0202* 0.0165 0.0354*** 
  [0.0125] [0.0125] [0.0119] [0.0108] [0.0098] [0.0124] [0.0124] [0.0118] [0.0108] [0.0098] 
CAPX -0.1179*** -0.1367*** -0.1009** -0.048 0.0641 -0.1207*** -0.1475*** -0.1085** -0.0546 0.0614 
  [0.0384] [0.0455] [0.0477] [0.0458] [0.0442] [0.0384] [0.0451] [0.0470] [0.0454] [0.0440] 
TANGIBILITY -0.1658*** -0.1619*** -0.1242*** -0.0927*** -0.0904*** -0.1621*** -0.1569*** -0.1214*** -0.0907*** -0.0871*** 
  [0.0193] [0.0206] [0.0214] [0.0205] [0.0198] [0.0193] [0.0207] [0.0214] [0.0205] [0.0197] 
ASSETS MATURITY 0.0000 0.0000 -0.0005 -0.0008*** -0.0011*** 0.0000 -0.0001 -0.0005* -0.0008*** -0.0011*** 
  [0.0003] [0.0003] [0.0003] [0.0003] [0.0003] [0.0003] [0.0003] [0.0003] [0.0003] [0.0003] 
ABNORMAL EARNINGS 0.0235*** 0.0246*** 0.0204*** 0.0144*** 0.0151*** 0.0238*** 0.0247*** 0.0207*** 0.0148*** 0.0156*** 
  [0.0046] [0.0050] [0.0047] [0.0042] [0.0037] [0.0046] [0.0050] [0.0047] [0.0042] [0.0037] 
EARNINGS VOLATLITY 0.1138*** 0.0912*** 0.0422** 0.000 -0.0278* 0.1104*** 0.0883*** 0.0417** 0.0005 -0.0261* 
  [0.0200] [0.0196] [0.0184] [0.0167] [0.0151] [0.0200] [0.0195] [0.0183] [0.0167] [0.0151] 
Z-SCORE DUMMY -0.0290*** -0.0324*** -0.0211*** -0.0106 -0.0029 -0.0289*** -0.0326*** -0.0217*** -0.011 -0.0026 
  [0.0073] [0.0079] [0.0077] [0.0072] [0.0067] [0.0073] [0.0078] [0.0076] [0.0071] [0.0067] 
DIVERSIFICATION -0.0091* -0.0201*** -0.0214*** -0.0193*** -0.0162*** -0.0083 -0.0187*** -0.0200*** -0.0179*** -0.0148*** 
  [0.0054] [0.0059] [0.0059] [0.0057] [0.0056] [0.0054] [0.0059] [0.0058] [0.0056] [0.0055] 
DIVIDEND YIELD 0.2042** 0.2480** 0.2435*** 0.1888** 0.0159 0.2132** 0.2640*** 0.2643*** 0.2102** 0.0401 
  [0.0900] [0.0965] [0.0933] [0.0880] [0.0851] [0.0894] [0.0960] [0.0930] [0.0876] [0.0846] 
LEVERAGE -0.4041*** -0.5150*** -0.4889*** -0.4024*** -0.2792*** -0.4022*** -0.5149*** -0.4898*** -0.4031*** -0.2802*** 
  [0.0244] [0.0253] [0.0242] [0.0222] [0.0202] [0.0241] [0.0251] [0.0240] [0.0221] [0.0203] 
TERM SPREAD 0.0888*** 0.0532 0.013 -0.0861* -0.2059*** 0.0072 0.0156 -0.0031 -0.0791 -0.2152*** 
  [0.0342] [0.0438] [0.0456] [0.0478] [0.0362] [0.0512] [0.0622] [0.0629] [0.0638] [0.0547] 
ln(STATE GDP) 0.0202 0.0144 0.013 0.0185 -0.0035 -0.084 -0.0356 -0.0107 0.0249 -0.0164 
  [0.0206] [0.0225] [0.0224] [0.0211] [0.0206] [0.0520] [0.0585] [0.0584] [0.0557] [0.0541] 
ln(PCI) 0.0493 0.0417 0.0207 -0.069 -0.1689*** 0.0100 0.0247 0.014 -0.0638 -0.1721*** 
  [0.0458] [0.0616] [0.0648] [0.0700] [0.0484] [0.0495] [0.0657] [0.0684] [0.0736] [0.0530] 
LEGISLATIVE CONTROL 0.0048 0.0077 0.0066 0.0091* 0.0067 0.0013 -0.0001 -0.0019 0.0008 -0.0037 
  [0.0051] [0.0055] [0.0054] [0.0053] [0.0050] [0.0048] [0.0054] [0.0055] [0.0053] [0.0050] 
LEADING INDEX -0.0016 -0.0007 -0.0016 -0.0002 0.0034 -0.0047** -0.0034 -0.0046* -0.0026 0.0019 
  [0.0024] [0.0027] [0.0027] [0.0026] [0.0025] [0.0021] [0.0025] [0.0025] [0.0025] [0.0023] 
Constant 0.0228 0.4937 0.8709* 1.5213*** 2.4789*** 1.5263* 1.2671 1.4344 1.6404* 2.9043*** 
  [0.4023] [0.4934] [0.5045] [0.5188] [0.4158] [0.8026] [0.9389] [0.9385] [0.9267] [0.8522] 
Observations 48,592 41,527 41,447 41,297 40,512 48,592 41,527 41,447 41,297 40,512 
Adjusted R-squared 0.244 0.338 0.337 0.301 0.26 0.248 0.342 0.341 0.305 0.265 
Year FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Industry FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
State FE NO NO NO NO NO YES YES YES YES YES 
27 
 
The estimated coefficients of the control variables are also consistent with the debt-
maturity and corruption literature. Firms with more growth opportunities (high market-to-book 
ratio, MB) use more short-term debt to minimize the underinvestment problem (Myers 1977), 
and firms with greater ABNORMAL EARNINGS also have a higher proportion of their debt in the 
short-maturity window. Similarly, higher EARNINGS VOLATILITY causes firms to use more 
short-maturity debt, consistent with capital suppliers being reluctant to offer long-term debt 
when earnings are unstable (Datta et al., 2005). I also find evidence that firms with S&P credit 
ratings (RATED) and firms with high Z-score (Z-SCORE DUMMY) use more short-term debt, 
consistent with their having greater ability to satisfy short-term debt obligations, whereas SIZE, 
ROA, and TANGIBILITY exhibit significant negative relations with short-term debt usage. The 
IV-GMM estimations also yield consistent results both with and without state fixed effects, and 
altogether the results support my main hypothesis that firms in high PC environments utilize less 
short-maturity debt to help reduce liquidity and refinancing risk.  
 
1.4.3 Corruption versus economic policy uncertainty 
I next repeat my IV-GMM analyses with the inclusion of the Economic Policy 
Uncertainty (EPU) Index of Baker et al. (2016) given that both corruption and EPU reflect 
sources of risk related to the political landscape. EPU is a newspaper-based measure of policy 
uncertainty and reflects the political risks related to policy decision-making changes – such as 
Democrats being more likely to impose stricter environmental policies than Republicans. Several 
studies (Datta et al. 2019; Tran and Phan 2017; Waisman et al. 2015) rely on the aggregate EPU 
as a proxy to investigate the effects of political uncertainty on debt-maturity. In Figure 1.5, I plot 
the average CORRUPTION across all states each year (= 
1
𝑁
∑ 𝐶𝑜𝑟𝑟𝑢𝑝𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖,𝑡𝑖 ) and compare it 
with EPU. The correlation between average corruption and EPU is -0.0643 in my sample, 
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implying these two measures are distinct from each other and the effects of one are unlikely to 
explain the other. Additionally, whereas EPU is constructed at the national level, I compute 
CORRUPTION separately for each state thereby offering greater exploitable variation and 
capturing the local political threats for each firm.   
The results of my tests which simultaneously include CORRUPTION and POLICY 
UNCERTAINTY are shown in Table 5. Consistent with political corruption presenting a distinct 
risk to firms that is independent of EPU, I find the CORRUPTION variable’s coefficients are 
negative and statistically significant for ST1 to ST3 and remain largely unchanged from my 
previous analyses. This result supports the notion that political corruption is related to the 
concept of risk which arises from the rent-seeking behavior of corrupt politicians (Smith 2016) 
rather than uncertainty (unexpected results or shocks) (Datta et al. 2019). 
Figure 1.5: Relationship between policy uncertainty and political corruption 
This figure plots the univariate relationship policy uncertainty and political corruption. The graphical displays a 





Table 1.4: Relationship between PC and debt-maturity- IV GMM Regression 
 
In this table, I present the second stage IV-GMM estimates over my sample period from 1994 to 2017. I consider five different measures of debt-maturity as the 
dependent variable which includes ST1: debt maturing within 1 year, ST2: debt maturing within 2 years, ST3: debt maturing within 3 years, ST4: debt maturing 
within 4 years, and ST5: debt maturing within 5 years. My main variable of interest is Corruption, which reflects the state-level number of corruption convictions 
scaled by the state population (in 100k). I then standardize Corruption by its standard deviation. I include time fixed effects, Fama-French 48 industries fixed 
effects, and state fixed effects to control for any unobservable time, industry, and state-specific factors that affect maturity preferences.  Standard errors clustered 
by firm are shown in brackets, and statistical significance is denoted as *** =p<1%, ** =p<5%, * =p<10%. 
VARIABLES 
ST1 ST2 ST3 ST4 ST5 ST1 ST2 ST3 ST4 ST5 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
CORRUPTION -0.8405*** -0.7649*** -0.6429** -0.3752 -0.1795 -0.4640** -0.5716** -0.5815** -0.3146 -0.2325 
  [0.2625] [0.2844] [0.2931] [0.2694] [0.2610] [0.2321] [0.2612] [0.2709] [0.2492] [0.2366] 
SIZE -0.0387*** -0.0518*** -0.0512*** -0.0435*** -0.0299*** -0.0383*** -0.0519*** -0.0515*** -0.0437*** -0.0302*** 
  [0.0026] [0.0031] [0.0032] [0.0030] [0.0028] [0.0026] [0.0031] [0.0032] [0.0029] [0.0028] 
MB 0.0170* 0.0228* 0.0241** 0.0180* 0.0206** 0.0177* 0.0229** 0.0237** 0.0180* 0.0206** 
  [0.0100] [0.0118] [0.0118] [0.0108] [0.0105] [0.0099] [0.0117] [0.0117] [0.0106] [0.0102] 
ROA -0.1156*** -0.1170*** -0.0816*** -0.0427** -0.0272 -0.1115*** -0.1109*** -0.0748*** -0.0376** -0.022 
  [0.0198] [0.0213] [0.0209] [0.0188] [0.0181] [0.0189] [0.0200] [0.0194] [0.0175] [0.0167] 
CAPX 0.1547 0.1614 0.2248 0.2071 0.3291** 0.1623 0.1557 0.2153 0.2042 0.3293** 
  [0.1303] [0.1453] [0.1487] [0.1364] [0.1358] [0.1285] [0.1436] [0.1463] [0.1340] [0.1329] 
TANGIBILITY -0.3175*** -0.3382*** -0.3210*** -0.2555*** -0.2596*** -0.3207*** -0.3384*** -0.3199*** -0.2582*** -0.2606*** 
  [0.0707] [0.0791] [0.0802] [0.0735] [0.0726] [0.0703] [0.0791] [0.0797] [0.0729] [0.0716] 
ASSETS MATURITY 0.0009* 0.0010* 0.0008 0.0003 0.0000 0.0009* 0.0011* 0.0008 0.0004 0.0000 
  [0.0005] [0.0005] [0.0005] [0.0005] [0.0005] [0.0005] [0.0005] [0.0005] [0.0005] [0.0005] 
ABNORMAL EARNINGS 0.0296*** 0.0301*** 0.0259*** 0.0179*** 0.0172*** 0.0302*** 0.0301*** 0.0258*** 0.0182*** 0.0174*** 
  [0.0058] [0.0061] [0.0060] [0.0053] [0.0047] [0.0058] [0.0061] [0.0060] [0.0053] [0.0047] 
EARNINGS VOLATLITY 0.2038*** 0.2183*** 0.1946*** 0.1417*** 0.1202*** 0.2031*** 0.2171*** 0.1934*** 0.1432*** 0.1226*** 
  [0.0415] [0.0504] [0.0507] [0.0463] [0.0451] [0.0411] [0.0500] [0.0500] [0.0456] [0.0441] 
Z-SCORE DUMMY 0.1652* 0.1920* 0.2256** 0.1873** 0.2030** 0.1765** 0.1988** 0.2265** 0.1916** 0.2072** 
  [0.0867] [0.1003] [0.1012] [0.0925] [0.0915] [0.0872] [0.1005] [0.1008] [0.0919] [0.0903] 
DIVERSIFICATION -0.0110* -0.0216*** -0.0221*** -0.0180*** -0.0146** -0.0099 -0.0199*** -0.0203*** -0.0165*** -0.0130** 
  [0.0061] [0.0068] [0.0070] [0.0063] [0.0063] [0.0061] [0.0068] [0.0068] [0.0062] [0.0061] 
DIVIDEND YIELD 0.2517** 0.3295*** 0.3486*** 0.3014*** 0.1394 0.2714*** 0.3551*** 0.3775*** 0.3275*** 0.1678* 
  [0.1029] [0.1155] [0.1140] [0.0958] [0.0929] [0.1046] [0.1170] [0.1149] [0.0968] [0.0942] 
RATED -0.0983*** -0.1623*** -0.2222*** -0.2472*** -0.2654*** -0.1016*** -0.1642*** -0.2225*** -0.2484*** -0.2670*** 
  [0.0276] [0.0319] [0.0324] [0.0298] [0.0296] [0.0276] [0.0319] [0.0321] [0.0294] [0.0290] 
LEVERAGE 0.6075 0.6616 0.8251 0.6844 0.8533* 0.6714 0.7028 0.8383 0.7123 0.8778* 
  [0.4438] [0.5062] [0.5108] [0.4668] [0.4617] [0.4483] [0.5100] [0.5113] [0.4659] [0.4580] 
TERM SPREAD -0.0214 -0.1361** -0.2436*** -0.3658*** -0.5006*** -0.1794** -0.2573*** -0.3518*** -0.4426*** -0.5986*** 
  [0.0491] [0.0619] [0.0641] [0.0620] [0.0525] [0.0817] [0.0966] [0.0976] [0.0923] [0.0847] 
  [0.0029] [0.0033] [0.0035] [0.0032] [0.0031] [0.0022] [0.0027] [0.0027] [0.0026] [0.0024] 
 Macro Economics Control Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 48,592 41,527 41,447 41,297 40,512 48,592 41,527 41,447 41,297 40,512 
Adjusted R-squared 0.123 0.218 0.201 0.217 0.147 0.113 0.214 0.203 0.216 0.146 
Weak IV test 17.58 15.64 15.70 15.85 15.54 17.10 15.11 15.16 15.35 15.09 
Overidentification test 0.95 0.76 0.73 0.83 0.66 0.76 0.60 0.58 0.72 0.82 
Year FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Industry FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 





1.4.4 Fixed effect regressions 
My baseline regression results control for industry, year, and state fixed effects. Yet, 
corrupt politicians may target and solicit specific industries depending on factors such as firms’ 
business models, resources, and ESG activities. Because these industry characteristics may vary 
over time and affect debt maturity as well, I include industry-by-year fixed effects to control for 
industry-specific effects that are unique to each time period (Heider and Ljungqvist 2015; Hasan 
et al. 2020). I also explore the results when instead controlling for firm fixed effects that account 
for unobservable firm-level factors contributing to differences in debt-maturity preferences 
across firms. Although my baseline analyses include a set of control variables commonly used in   
the debt-maturity and corruption literatures, the addition of firm fixed effects provides a strict 
test that controls for the average debt maturity differences across firms and only exploits within-
firm variation.    
Table 6, panels A and B present the results with the inclusion of firm fixed effects and 
industry-year fixed effects, respectively. In the interest of space, I only report the estimated 
coefficient of CORRUPTION. In both panels the CORRUPTION coefficient remains significant 
for ST1 through ST3 and becomes insignificant when incorporating relatively longer-term debt in 
ST4 and ST5. These results suggest that my findings are not driven by omitted industry-level 
factors that vary across years or by omitted firm-level factors, thus, providing greater assurance 
that differences in political corruption contribute to firms’ debt-maturity choices.   
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Table 1.5: The Effects of Corruption and Economic Policy Uncertainty 
In this table, I present the second stage IV-GMM estimates that control for Economic Policy Uncertainty. I consider five different measures of debt-maturity as 
the dependent variable that measure the proportion of debt maturing within 1 to 5 years (ST1 to ST5). Policy Uncertainty is measured using the EPU Index 
developed by Baker et al. (2016). I include time fixed effects, Fama-French 48 industries fixed effects, and state fixed effects in the regression to control for any 
unobservable time-, industry-, and state-level factors that affect maturity preferences. Standard errors clustered by firm are shown in brackets, and statistical 
significance is denoted as *** =p<1%, ** =p<5%, * =p<10%. 
 
VARIABLES 
ST1 ST2 ST3 ST4 ST5 ST1 ST2 ST3 ST4 ST5 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
CORRUPTION -0.8405*** -0.7649*** -0.6429** -0.3751 -0.1795 -0.4640** -0.5716** -0.5815** -0.3146 -0.2325 
  [0.2625] [0.2844] [0.2931] [0.2694] [0.2610] [0.2321] [0.2612] [0.2709] [0.2492] [0.2366] 
POLICY UNCERTAINTY -0.0004 0.0024 0.0054** 0.0103*** 0.0167*** 0.0070** 0.0081** 0.0106*** 0.0139*** 0.0214*** 
  [0.0017] [0.0020] [0.0022] [0.0020] [0.0018] [0.0032] [0.0037] [0.0038] [0.0035] [0.0033] 
SIZE -0.0387*** -0.0518*** -0.0512*** -0.0435*** -0.0299*** -0.0383*** -0.0519*** -0.0515*** -0.0437*** -0.0302*** 
  [0.0026] [0.0031] [0.0032] [0.0030] [0.0028] [0.0026] [0.0031] [0.0032] [0.0029] [0.0028] 
MB 0.0170* 0.0228* 0.0241** 0.0180* 0.0206** 0.0177* 0.0229** 0.0237** 0.0180* 0.0206** 
  [0.0100] [0.0118] [0.0118] [0.0108] [0.0105] [0.0099] [0.0117] [0.0117] [0.0106] [0.0102] 
ROA -0.1156*** -0.1170*** -0.0816*** -0.0427** -0.0272 -0.1115*** -0.1109*** -0.0748*** -0.0376** -0.022 
  [0.0198] [0.0213] [0.0209] [0.0188] [0.0181] [0.0189] [0.0200] [0.0194] [0.0175] [0.0167] 
CAPX 0.1547 0.1614 0.2248 0.2071 0.3291** 0.1623 0.1557 0.2153 0.2042 0.3293** 
  [0.1303] [0.1453] [0.1487] [0.1364] [0.1358] [0.1285] [0.1437] [0.1463] [0.1340] [0.1329] 
TANGIBILITY -0.3175*** -0.3382*** -0.3210*** -0.2556*** -0.2596*** -0.3207*** -0.3384*** -0.3199*** -0.2582*** -0.2606*** 
  [0.0707] [0.0791] [0.0802] [0.0735] [0.0726] [0.0703] [0.0791] [0.0797] [0.0729] [0.0716] 
ASSETS MATURITY 0.0009* 0.0010* 0.0008 0.0003 0.0000 0.0009* 0.0011* 0.0008 0.0004 0.0000 
  [0.0005] [0.0005] [0.0005] [0.0005] [0.0005] [0.0005] [0.0005] [0.0005] [0.0005] [0.0005] 
ABNORMAL EARNINGS 0.0296*** 0.0301*** 0.0259*** 0.0179*** 0.0172*** 0.0302*** 0.0301*** 0.0258*** 0.0182*** 0.0174*** 
  [0.0058] [0.0061] [0.0060] [0.0053] [0.0047] [0.0058] [0.0061] [0.0060] [0.0053] [0.0047] 
EARNINGS VOLATLITY 0.2038*** 0.2183*** 0.1946*** 0.1417*** 0.1202*** 0.2031*** 0.2171*** 0.1934*** 0.1432*** 0.1226*** 
  [0.0415] [0.0504] [0.0507] [0.0463] [0.0451] [0.0411] [0.0500] [0.0500] [0.0456] [0.0441] 
Z-SCORE DUMMY 0.1652* 0.1920* 0.2256** 0.1873** 0.2030** 0.1765** 0.1988** 0.2265** 0.1916** 0.2072** 
  [0.0867] [0.1003] [0.1012] [0.0925] [0.0915] [0.0872] [0.1005] [0.1008] [0.0919] [0.0904] 
DIVERSIFICATION -0.0110* -0.0216*** -0.0221*** -0.0180*** -0.0146** -0.0099 -0.0199*** -0.0203*** -0.0165*** -0.0130** 
  [0.0061] [0.0068] [0.0070] [0.0063] [0.0063] [0.0061] [0.0068] [0.0068] [0.0062] [0.0061] 
DIVIDEND YIELD 0.2517** 0.3294*** 0.3486*** 0.3014*** 0.1394 0.2714*** 0.3550*** 0.3774*** 0.3275*** 0.1678* 
  [0.1029] [0.1155] [0.1140] [0.0958] [0.0929] [0.1046] [0.1170] [0.1149] [0.0968] [0.0942] 
RATED -0.0983*** -0.1623*** -0.2222*** -0.2472*** -0.2654*** -0.1016*** -0.1642*** -0.2225*** -0.2484*** -0.2670*** 
  [0.0276] [0.0319] [0.0324] [0.0298] [0.0296] [0.0276] [0.0319] [0.0321] [0.0294] [0.0290] 
LEVERAGE 0.6075 0.6616 0.8251 0.6844 0.8533* 0.6714 0.7028 0.8382 0.7123 0.8778* 
  [0.4438] [0.5062] [0.5108] [0.4668] [0.4617] [0.4483] [0.5100] [0.5113] [0.4659] [0.4580] 
Macro Economic Control  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
                      
Observations 48,592 41,527 41,447 41,297 40,512 48,592 41,527 41,447 41,297 40,512 
Adjusted R-squared 0.123 0.218 0.201 0.217 0.147 0.113 0.214 0.203 0.216 0.146 
Weak IV test 17.58 15.64 15.69 15.85 15.54 17.03 15.13 15.16 15.30 15.09 
Overidentification test 0.95 0.76 0.73 0.83 0.66 0.76 0.60 0.58 0.72 0.82 
Year FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Industry FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 




1.4.5 Supply side explanation of PC and debt-maturity relationship 
While the evidence that firms in politically corrupt environments tend to rely less on 
short-term debt is consistent with the predictions of the demand-side hypothesis, prior work 
indicates that lenders may prefer to offer short-maturity loans when business uncertainty and the 
cost of external monitoring are high (Custódio et al., 2013; Rajan and Zingales, 1995; Stulz, 
2000). By lending short term, capital suppliers can exit the lending arrangement at the maturity 
date if the borrowing firm’s financial condition shows signs of deterioration. Although I observe 
that firms in high PC areas choose to utilize a higher proportion of long-term debt, they may be 
forced to pay an interest rate premium for the right to borrow long term. Alternatively, well-
diversified lenders may focus primarily on traditional risk measures constructed from firm 
financial statements, while local corruption only influences the demand side. Likewise, if lenders 
factor in the overall risk of corruption into loan pricing but do not adjust loan rates across 
geographic regions, then I would not expect to find a significant relationship between my 
measure of political corruption and loan terms. I specify the following regression model to test  
these predictions following Bharath, Dahiya, Saunders, and Srinivasan (2011), which I modify to 
test the impact of corruption on the cost of debt. 
𝐶𝑜𝑠𝑡 𝑜𝑓 𝑑𝑒𝑏𝑡 = 𝛼0 + 𝛼1𝐶𝑜𝑟𝑟𝑢𝑝𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 + 𝛼2𝐶𝑜𝑟𝑟𝑢𝑝𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 ∗ log(𝑀𝑎𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑖𝑡𝑦) +
+𝛼3 log(𝑀𝑎𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑖𝑡𝑦) + 𝛼4 log(𝐿𝑜𝑎𝑛 𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒) + 𝛼5𝐶𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒 + 𝛼6𝐶𝑢𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜 +
𝛼7𝐶𝑜𝑙𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑙 + 𝐵𝑎𝑠𝑒𝑙𝑖𝑛𝑒 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠 +                                                                                                (2)                                 
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Table 1.6: Fixed effect regressions 
In this table, I present the second stage IV-GMM estimates with the inclusion of additional fixed effects. Specifically, Panel A reports estimates when adding 
firm fixed effects, and Panel B reports estimates with Industry-Year FE. My sample period is 1994 to 2017. I consider five different measures of debt-maturity as 
the dependent variable which includes ST1: Debt maturing within 1 year, ST2: Debt maturing within 2 years, ST3: Debt maturing within 3 years, ST4: Debt 
maturing within 4 years, and ST5: Debt maturing within 5 years. Standard errors are clustered at the firm level and shown in brackets. Statistical significance is 
denoted as *** =p<1%, ** =p<5%, * =p<10%. 
Panel A: Firm Fixed-Effect 
ST1 ST2 ST3 ST4 ST5 ST1 ST2 ST3 ST4 ST5 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
CORRUPTION -0.4307** -0.4719** -0.4446* -0.2062 -0.189 -0.3961** -0.4415** -0.4428* -0.2136 -0.1963 
  [0.1956] [0.2200] [0.2322] [0.2205] [0.2140] [0.1979] [0.2252] [0.2375] [0.2249] [0.2155] 
Controls  YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Observations 48,086 40,862 40,774 40,619 39,817 48,086 40,862 40,774 40,619 39,817 
Adjusted R-squared -0.005 0.043 0.054 0.054 0.006 -0.009 0.029 0.038 0.044 0.003 
Weak IV test 18.32 0.33 18.09 17.86 17.89 19.60 19.48 19.52 19.25 19.36 
Overidentification test 0.35 0.57 0.60 0.70 0.60 0.36 0.56 0.59 0.70 0.55 
Firms Fixed Effects YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Year FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
State FE NO NO NO NO NO YES YES YES YES YES 
                      
Panel B: Fixed-Effect Interaction 
ST1 ST2 ST3 ST4 ST5 ST1 ST2 ST3 ST4 ST5 
(11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16) (17) (18) (19) (20) 
CORRUPTION -0.8521*** -0.7859*** -0.6368** -0.3594 -0.1094 -0.5283** -0.6300** -0.6225** -0.3276 -0.1928 
  [0.2600] [0.2865] [0.2918] [0.2659] [0.2565] [0.2350] [0.2689] [0.2755] [0.2521] [0.2382] 
Controls  YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Observations 48,583 41,518 41,438 41,288 40,502 48,583 41,518 41,438 41,288 40,502 
Adjusted R-squared -0.119 -0.161 -0.193 -0.128 -0.167 -0.147 -0.18 -0.203 -0.143 -0.19 
Weak IV test 50.287 44.09 44.51 45.22 44.16 49.65 43.09 43.5 44.26 42.93 
Overidentification test 0.78 0.82 0.80 0.99 0.46 0.99 0.63 0.64 0.88 0.60 
State FE NO NO NO NO NO YES YES YES YES YES 




The cost of debt and relevant loan data is obtained from the Dealscan database for my 
sample period of 1994 to 2017.12 My dependent variables are All-in-Spread Drawn and All-in-
Spread Undrawn, where All-in-Spread Drawn represents the total spread over the LIBOR 
computed based on dollars drawn, and All-in-Spread Undrawn represents the all-in spread over 
the LIBOR based on dollars available. In addition to the control variables used in Equation 1 
(Baseline Controls), I add log(Maturity), Collateral, and log(Loan Size) to the regression model 
following the cost of debt literature. Equation (2) tests for an independent effect of corruption on 
the cost of debt as indicated by the 1 coefficient as well as whether the effect of corruption has a 
more pronounced effect on longer maturity loans as indicated by the 2 interaction coefficient. If 
lenders are more averse to extending long-maturity loans in high PC environments, I should 
expect to find a positive and significant interaction coefficient.  
The results across all specifications in Table 7 indicate no significant relationship between my 
corruption variable and cost of debt — neither the corruption variable nor its interaction with 
loan maturity are significantly related to the cost of borrowing. Thus, the demand-side story 
appears to be driving the observed negative relation between corruption and short-maturity debt 
utilization, as firms in high corruption areas choose to use more short-term debt; however, 
lenders do not charge an interest rate premium that varies with local corruption.   
  
 
12We merge the Dealscan database with the Compustat and corruption data using the Dealscan-Compustat linking 
database from Chava and Roberts (2008).    
35 
 
Table 1.7: Supply side explanation of PC and Debt-maturity 
This table presents OLS results that evaluate the effect of corruption on debt-maturity from the perspective of debt 
suppliers. The dependent variables are “All-in-Spread Drawn” and “All-in-Spread Undrawn”, where the all-in 
spread drawn represents the total spread (including interest and fees) over the LIBOR based on dollars drawn and 
all-in spread undrawn measures the total spread (including interest and fees) over the LIBOR based on dollars 
available. I add LOAN MATURITY, COLLATERAL, and LOAN SIZE to the regression model following the cost 
of debt literature. My sample period is 1994 to 2017, and I include time fixed effects, Fama-French 48 industries 
fixed effects, and state fixed effects to control for any unobservable time-, industry-, and state-level factors. 
Standard errors clustered by state and firm are shown in brackets with statistical significance denoted by *** 
=p<1%, ** =p<5%, * =p<10%. 
VARIABLES All-in-Spread Drawn All-in-Spread Undrawn 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
CORRUPTION (Per 100K Population) 11.018** 71.58 77.396 1.324 -0.415 3.641 
  [5.342] [82.720] [82.815] [0.988] [13.392] [14.423] 
LOAN MATURITY 5.601** 8.184* 8.605* 3.916*** 3.842*** 4.019*** 
  [2.235] [4.567] [4.699] [0.339] [0.691] [0.739] 
CORRUPTION * LOAN MATURITY   -8.464 -7.699   0.244 -0.322 
    [11.480] [11.622]   [1.846] [1.971] 
COLLATERAL 71.470*** 71.485*** 71.352*** 12.014*** 12.014*** 12.044*** 
  [3.149] [3.146] [3.113] [0.481] [0.481] [0.497] 
LOAN SIZE -25.210*** -25.236*** -24.989*** -2.529*** -2.528*** -2.495*** 
  [1.335] [1.332] [1.366] [0.337] [0.338] [0.344] 
COVERAGE -19.052*** -19.057*** -19.060*** -2.759*** -2.759*** -2.751*** 
  [1.765] [1.765] [1.770] [0.364] [0.364] [0.365] 
CURRENT RATIO -4.047*** -4.037*** -3.822*** 0.076 0.076 0.073 
  [1.076] [1.075] [1.035] [0.194] [0.194] [0.194] 
BASELINE CONTROLS YES YES YES YES YES YES 
  [1.838] [1.840] [1.851] [0.235] [0.236] [0.241] 
Observations 7,740 7,740 7,740 5,381 5,381 5,381 
Adjusted R-squared 0.509 0.509 0.513 0.465 0.465 0.465 
Industry FE YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Year FE YES YES YES YES YES YES 
State FE NO NO YES NO NO YES 
 
1.4.6 Underlying mechanisms 
My results provide evidence consistent with firms located in high corruption areas using 
less short-maturity debt to minimize liquidity and refinancing risk. Given this finding, 
Hypothesis 2 predicts the effect should be particularly pronounced among firms where liquidity 
and refinancing risks are expected to be more significant. To test for differential effects within 
my sample, I dichotomize my corruption measure based on the median cross-sectional values to 
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explore the potential channels.13 In particular, I sort the sample each year into above and below 
median corruption subgroups, where a firm is considered to be located in a high PC area if its 
headquarters’ state belongs to the above-median group. I then set the variable HI CORRUPTION 
equal to one for the high corruption area firms and zero otherwise, and I explore a set of HI 
CORRUPTION interactions to test whether the effect is stronger among firms with 
characteristics indicative of greater refinancing risk. My interaction variables include MB, SIZE, 
RATED, INV GRADE, LOW REDEPLOYABILITY, REALIZED VOLATILITY, IMPLIED 
VOLATILITY, REPUBLICAN CONTROL, and DIVERSIFICATION.  
Table 8 presents the results. I find the negative relation between corruption and short-
term debt use is stronger (weaker) for value (growth) firms (HI CORRUPTION * MB = 
0.0095**). This result is consistent with low-priced value firms exhibiting greater levels of 
distress on average and limiting their exposure to liquidity and refinancing risks when corruption 
is high. Specification (2) indicates a stronger (weaker) effect among small (large) firms as the HI 
CORRUPTION * SIZE coefficient is positive and highly significant. This is consistent with 
smaller firms having lower credit quality on average and less ability to evade the adverse effects 
of political corruption. Column (3) indicates no significant difference between firms with and 
without an S&P credit rating; however, the effect is stronger (weaker) among non-investment 
grade (investment grade) firms. This once again supports the demand-side hypothesis, as non-
investment grade firms face substantially higher refinancing risk as a result of their low credit 
ratings. In Columns (4) through (8), I find the result is concentrated within firms with lower asset 
 
13Iacobucci et al. (2015) provide evidence that the median split may be preferred as more parsimonious. 
Categorizing continuous variables by splitting them at their median is commonly used in the political science studies 
(Loomis et al. 2009; Manzetti and Wilson 2007; Grosjean and Senik 2011). For example, Hossain et al. (2021) 
dichotomize the annual corruption sample based on the median corruption level. 
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Table 1.8: PC and Debt-maturity Mechanisms 
In this table, I present the second stage IV-GMM estimates that explore potential mechanisms that drive the relation between corruption and debt maturity. HI CORRUPTION is a 
dummy variable set equal to one if the state-level corruption is higher than sample median and zero otherwise. My sample period is 1994 to 2017, and I include time fixed effects, 
Fama-French 48 industries fixed effects, and state fixed effects to control for any unobservable time-, industry-, state-level factors. Standard errors clustered at the firm level are 
shown in brackets with statistical significance denoted by *** =p<1%, ** =p<5%, * =p<10%.  
VARIABLES 
ST3 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
HI CORRUPTION -0.0280*** -0.0561*** -0.0132** 0.0013 0.0017 0.0102 0.0022 -0.0194*** 
  [0.0092] [0.0161] [0.0063] [0.0065] [0.0102] [0.0108] [0.0077] [0.0066] 
HI CORRUPTION*MB 0.0095**               
  [0.0044]               
HI CORRUPTION*SIZE   0.0081***             
    [0.0027]             
HI CORRUPTION*RATED     0.0013           
      [0.0135]           
HI CORRUPTION*INV GRD     0.0394**           
      [0.0177]           
INV GRADE     0.2602***           
      [0.0581]           
HI CORRUPTION*LOW REDEPLOYABILITY       -0.0250**         
        [0.0097]         
LOW REDEPLOYABILITY       -0.0045         
        [0.0095]         
HI CORRUPTION*HI REALIZED VOLATILITY         -0.0290*       
          [0.0154]       
REALIZED VOLATILITY         0.0198       
          [0.0182]       
HI CORRUPTION*HI IMPLIED VOLATILITY           -0.0349**     
            [0.0155]     
IMPLIED VOLATILITY           0.017     
            [0.0265]     
HI CORRUPTION*REPUBLICAN CONTROL             -0.0213**   
              [0.0107]   
REPUBLICAN CONTROL             0.0093   
              [0.0124]   
HI CORRUPTION*DIVERSIFICATION               0.0207** 
                [0.0101] 
Controls as in main model? YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Observations 41,447 41,447 41,447 41,447 31,280 17,223 31,940 41,447 
Adjusted R-squared 0.09 0.09 -0.02 0.10 0.033 0.06 0.13 0.10 
Weak IV test 43.16 43.48 33.2 43.89 44.02 29.62 15.63 15.82 
Overidentification test 0.59 0.62 0.85 0.58 0.58 0.90 0.12 0.11 
Year FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Industry FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 





redeployability14, higher realized and implied volatility, in states where republicans 
control both legislative chambers of the firm’s headquarter state, and among firms with only one 
business segment which are likely to be more vulnerable to corrupt politicians’ rent-seeking 
behavior (Bai et al. 2013). The significant negative coefficient on the HI CORRUPTION * 
REPUBLICAN CONTROL interaction adds to existing evidence that financial markets are 
influenced by political regimes. For example, Di Giuli and Kostovetsky (2014) find that firms 
headquartered in Democratic-leaning states score higher on CSR. Additionally, Belo et al. (2013) 
document predictable variation in firms’ cash flow and stock return over the political cycle. My 
analysis examines whether a state’s incumbents’ party affiliation alters political corruption’s 
effect on debt maturity, and the evidence suggests firms in highly corrupt states shorten debt-
maturity primarily in Republican-controlled states. Altogether, the evidence provides support for 
Hypothesis 2 and suggests firms alter debt-maturity structure in response to political corruption 
to manage liquidity and refinancing risks.   
1.4.7 Corruption, debt-maturity, and shareholders’ equity 
Next, I examine the effects of PC on the firm’s choice among long-term debt, short-term 
debt, and equity for financing decisions. Smith (2016) finds that firms in high PC areas use more 
leverage on average than firms in low PC areas. My earlier findings provide strong evidence that 
firms in high PC areas also manage debt-maturity structure by increasingly taking less short-
maturity debt and more long-maturity debt. Thus, it is expected that when choosing among 
sources of financing for investments, high PC area firms would use more long-term debt at the 
expense of short-term debt and equity. I formally test this prediction with a regression 
 
14Redeployability indicates the extent to which assets have alternative uses. The redeployability data is used in Kim 
and Kung (2017) and available at the author’s website from 1985 to 2015. See: 
http://blogs.cornell.edu/hyunseobkim/research. In our analysis, low Redeployability is a dummy variable that takes a 
value of one if the degree of redeployability of a firm’s assets is lower than the sample median redeployability. 
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framework widely used in the corporate financial policy literature (Benlemlih, 2017; Gatchev et 
al., 2010). Specifically, I estimate the following system of equations: 
 
𝑆ℎ𝑜𝑟𝑡 − 𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑚𝐷𝑒𝑏𝑡𝐼𝑠𝑠𝑢𝑒 = 𝛽11 + 𝛽21𝛥𝑁𝐹𝐴 ∗ 𝐻𝐼 𝐶𝑂𝑅𝑅𝑈𝑃𝑇𝐼𝑂𝑁 + 𝛽31𝛥𝑁𝑊𝐶 ∗ 𝐻𝐼 𝐶𝑂𝑅𝑅𝑈𝑃𝑇𝐼𝑂𝑁 +
𝛽41𝛥𝐶𝑎𝑠ℎ 𝐻𝑜𝑙𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑠 ∗ 𝐻𝐼 𝐶𝑂𝑅𝑅𝑈𝑃𝑇𝐼𝑂𝑁 +  𝛽51𝛥𝑁𝐹𝐴 + 𝛽61𝛥𝑁𝑊𝐶 + 𝛽71𝐶𝑎𝑠ℎ 𝐻𝑜𝑙𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑠 +
 𝛽81𝐻𝐼 𝐶𝑂𝑅𝑅𝑈𝑃𝑇𝐼𝑂𝑁 + 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠                                                                                                                                             (3)  
 
𝐿𝑜𝑛𝑔 − 𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑚𝐷𝑒𝑏𝑡𝐼𝑠𝑠𝑢𝑒 = 𝛽12 + 𝛽22𝛥𝑁𝐹𝐴 ∗ 𝐻𝐼 𝐶𝑂𝑅𝑅𝑈𝑃𝑇𝐼𝑂𝑁 + 𝛽32𝛥𝑁𝑊𝐶 ∗ 𝐻𝐼 𝐶𝑂𝑅𝑅𝑈𝑃𝑇𝐼𝑂𝑁 +
𝛽42𝛥𝐶𝑎𝑠ℎ 𝐻𝑜𝑙𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑠 ∗ 𝐻𝐼 𝐶𝑂𝑅𝑅𝑈𝑃𝑇𝐼𝑂𝑁 +  𝛽52𝛥𝑁𝐹𝐴 + 𝛽62𝛥𝑁𝑊𝐶 + 𝛽72𝐶𝑎𝑠ℎ 𝐻𝑜𝑙𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑠 +
 𝛽82𝐻𝐼 𝐶𝑂𝑅𝑅𝑈𝑃𝑇𝐼𝑂𝑁 + 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠                                                                                                                                             (4)  
 
𝐸𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑡𝑦𝐼𝑠𝑠𝑢𝑒 = 𝛽13 + 𝛽23𝛥𝑁𝐹𝐴 ∗ 𝐻𝐼 𝐶𝑂𝑅𝑅𝑈𝑃𝑇𝐼𝑂𝑁 + 𝛽33𝛥𝑁𝑊𝐶 ∗ 𝐻𝐼 𝐶𝑂𝑅𝑅𝑈𝑃𝑇𝐼𝑂𝑁 + 𝛽43𝛥𝐶𝑎𝑠ℎ 𝐻𝑜𝑙𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑠 ∗
𝐻𝐼 𝐶𝑂𝑅𝑅𝑈𝑃𝑇𝐼𝑂𝑁 + 𝛽53𝛥𝑁𝐹𝐴 +  𝛽63𝛥𝑁𝑊𝐶 + 𝛽73𝐶𝑎𝑠ℎ 𝐻𝑜𝑙𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑠 + 𝛽83𝐻𝐼 𝐶𝑂𝑅𝑅𝑈𝑃𝑇𝐼𝑂𝑁 +
𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠                                                                                                                                                                                             (5)  
 
where my main variable of interest is corruption’s interaction with the change in net fixed assets 
(𝛥𝑁𝐹𝐴) from period t-1 to t scaled by the book value of total assets, as large increases in net 
fixed assets are indicative of new investment projects. The three dependent variables in my 
system of equations include Short-term Debt Issue measured as the change in short-term debt 
from year t-1 to t scaled by book value of total assets; Long-term Debt Issue measured as the 
change in long-term debt from year t-1 to t scaled by book value of total assets; and Equity Issue 
measured as the change in the sale of new equity less repurchases of equity scaled by total assets. 
I regress each of the three financing measures on 𝛥𝑁𝐹𝐴, 𝛥𝑁𝐹𝐴 ∗ 𝐻𝐼 𝐶𝑂𝑅𝑅𝑈𝑃𝑇𝐼𝑂𝑁, and a set 
of controls using a seemingly unrelated regression approach which captures simultaneity among 





Table 9: Firms’ financing decisions and corruption 
This table presents the estimates from a system of equations representing the extent to which investments are financed with 
𝑆ℎ𝑜𝑟𝑡 − 𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑚 𝐷𝑒𝑏𝑡 𝐼𝑠𝑠𝑢𝑒, 𝐿𝑜𝑛𝑔 − 𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑚 𝐷𝑒𝑏𝑡 𝐼𝑠𝑠𝑢𝑒, and 𝑁𝑒𝑡 𝐸𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑡𝑦 𝐼𝑠𝑠𝑢𝑒 using a framework similar to Gatchev et al. 
(2009). I employ a seemingly unrelated regression approach that considers simultaneity among investments and different sources 
of financing. HI CORRUPTION is a dummy variable set equal to one if the state-level corruption is higher than the sample 
median and zero otherwise. I include time fixed effects, Fama-French 48 industries fixed effects, and state fixed effects to control 
for any unobservable time-, industry-, and state-level factors. Standard errors are reported in the parenthesis, and 
heteroskedasticity robust standard errors are clustered by firm and fiscal year. Industry fixed effects are defined by two-digit SIC 
code. The sample period is from 1994 to 2017 with statistical significance denoted by *** =p<1%, ** =p<5%, * =p<10%. 
 
Dependent variable Short-Term Debt Issue Long-Term Debt Issue Equity Issue 
Δ NFA * HI CORRUPTION -0.0063 0.0372*** 0.0116 
   [0.0079]  [0.0116] [0.0179] 
Δ NWC * HI CORRUPTION  0.0248***  0.0464*** -0.0295* 
   [0.0076]  [0.0111] [0.0171] 
Δ CASH HOLDINGS * HI CORRUPTION  0.0103**  0.0058 -0.0281** 
   [0.0050]  [0.0073] [0.0112] 
Δ NFA  0.1225***  0.5162*** 0.0635*** 
   [0.0063]  [0.0093] [0.0142] 
Δ NWC  0.1211***  0.1582*** 0.2374*** 
   [0.0055]  [0.0081] [0.0125] 
Δ CASH HOLDINGS  0.0057*  0.0782*** 0.6600*** 
   [0.0034]  [0.0050] [0.0076] 
HI CORRUPTION -0.0006 -0.0012 -0.0006 
   [0.0008]  [0.0012] [0.0019] 
Controls Yes Yes Yes 
Time Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes 
Industry Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes 
State Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 42,633 42,633 42,633 
R-squared 0.06 0.21 0.24 
 
Table 9 reports the results from my system of equations. Consistent with my earlier 
analyses, I find the degree to which investments are financed using long-term debt increases with 
corruption. The estimated 𝛥𝑁𝐹𝐴 ×  𝐻𝐼 𝐶𝑂𝑅𝑅𝑈𝑃𝑇𝐼𝑂𝑁 coefficient for short-term debt and equity 
is -0.0063 and 0.0116, respectively, and statistically insignificant. In contrast, the estimated 
coefficient of the 𝛥𝑁FA × 𝐻𝐼 𝐶𝑂𝑅𝑅𝑈𝑃𝑇𝐼𝑂𝑁 interaction is 0.0372 and significant at the 1% 
level in the Long-Term Debt Issue equation, suggesting that when choosing among financing 
sources for new investment projects, high PC area firms prefer long-term debt over other sources 





5. Robustness Tests  
1.5.1 Matching estimation 
I conduct a series of robustness tests to ensure my results are driven by differences in PC 
rather than differences along another dimension. First, I use a propensity score matching 
estimation to adjust for observable pre-treatment differences between the low corruption and 
high corruption subgroups. I define the firm-year treatment (control) group as firms in the top 
(bottom) quartile of my Corruption measure. In my matching procedure, I use a robust set of 
covariates that include the firm characteristics used in my baseline regression (SIZE, MB, 
ASSETS MATURITY, ROA, CAPX, TANGIBILITY, Z-SCORE DUMMY, RATED, ABNORMAL 
EARNINGS, EARNINGS VOLATILITY, DIVERSIFICATION, and DIVIDEND YIELD). 
Following Smith and Todd (2005), I use three different approaches to ensure my matched sample 
analysis’ robustness. Model 1 uses nearest neighbor matching with at least four matches and a 
caliper of 0.05, Model 2 uses radius matching within a 0.05 caliper to take advantage of 
situations where multiple high-quality matches exist, and Model 3 uses local linear regression 
matching with a bandwidth of 0.5 to adjust for pre-treatment differences between the low and 
high corruption subgroups. I also test the validity of my models to ensure the results are not 
driven by confounding variables using Mantel-Haenszel test statistics with Rosenbaum bounds 
which evaluate the sensitivity of the estimated average treatment effects on the treated in the 
presence of potential hidden bias.  
I report the results in Table 10. The estimated difference between the matched samples in 
all three model specifications is significant for ST1, ST2, and ST3 with firms in high corruption 
areas using less short-term debt. The average treatment effect on the treated ranges from -0.013 
to -0.015 for ST1, from -0.014 to -0.020 for ST2, and from -0.008 to -0.011 for ST3. 
Additionally, the difference between treatment and control firms is significant at the one percent 
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Table 1.10: Propensity Score Matching 
In this table, I present the average treatment effect on the treated for the dependent variables (ST1 to ST5) as a proxy for the debt-maturity structure. My outcome variables include 
ST1: Debt maturing within 1 year, ST2: Debt maturing within 2 years, ST3: Debt maturing within 3 years, ST4: Debt maturing within 4 years, and ST5: Debt maturing within 5 
years. My sample period is 1994 to 2017. I include firm-level variables used in equation 1 for the matching estimation. In addition, time fixed effects and Fama-French 48 
industries fixed effects are included to control for any unobservable time- and industry-level factors. Model 1 uses four nearest neighbor matching with common support, Model 2 
uses radius matching, and Model 3 uses local linear regression matching to adjust pre-treatment observable differences between observations in low corruption and high corruption 
areas. Statistical significance of matching estimates is denoted as *** =p<1%, ** =p<5%, * =p<10%. In the final row, for robustness of the matching, I report the inference of 
Mantel-Haenszel test statistics from Rosenbaum bounds to check sensitivity of estimated average treatment effects on the treated in the presence of hidden bias.  
Average Treatment Effect of 
Treated (ATET)
Treated Control Diff T-stat Treated Control Diff T-stat Treated Control Diff T-stat Treated Control Diff T-stat Treated Control Diff T-stat
0.280 0.295 -0.014*** 3.41 0.428 0.442 -0.014*** 2.80 0.549 0.557 -0.008* 1.65 0.649 0.652 -0.003 0.65 0.740 0.740 0.000 0.89
Model 2: Radius matching 
(caliper .05)
0.280 0.296 -0.015*** 4.60 0.428 0.444 -0.016*** 4.20 0.549 0.559 -0.010** 1.97 0.649 0.655 -0.005 1.08 0.745 0.744 0.001 0.22
Model 3: Local Linear 
Regression




No Hidden BiasMantel-Haenszel bounds
Model 1: Four Nearest 




ST1 ST2 ST3 ST4 ST5
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level for ST1 and ST2 across all matching procedures, and the difference in ST3 is 
significant at the ten percent level with nearest neighbor matching and at the five percent level 
with radius matching and matching via local linear regression. These findings reassert the results 
of my prior analyses which suggest that firms operating in politically corrupt states use less 
short-maturity debt compared to their otherwise similar counterparts in less corrupt areas to 
mitigate the increased uncertainty and refinancing risk associated with an elevated level of 
political corruption.  
1.5.2 Instrumental variable for corruption 
My earlier IV-GMM analyses address the concern that leverage and debt-maturity are 
jointly determined. To further ensure the robustness of my results, I employ an additional 
instrumental variables approach to address the endogeneity concern that PC and debt-maturity 
are correlated with unobserved factors. I instrument my CORRUPTION measure as follows, 
Corruption = ∫(𝐿𝑒𝑔𝑖𝑠𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙, 𝑙𝑛(𝑆𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑒𝐺𝐷𝑃), 𝑈𝑛𝑒𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑜𝑦𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡, 𝐺𝐶𝐼𝑆𝐶,  𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝐵𝑜𝑟𝑑𝑒𝑟, 𝐶𝑜𝑟𝑟𝑢𝑝𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑡−1)        (6)  
where my instrumental variables are expected to be associated with political corruption but 
should have no direct impact on firms’ corporate debt-maturity preferences. The instrument 
GCISC is a measure of capital city isolation and is commonly used in the local political 
corruption literature (Hossain et al. 2021; Smith 2016). Campante and Do (2014) find that 
isolated capital states have more corruption than states with non-isolated capitals, as isolation 
reduces lawmakers’ accountability because residents are less involved in capital politics when 
they live far from the capital.15 The value of GCISC ranges from zero to one, where a value of 
zero indicates that everyone in the state lives the farthest distance possible from the capital, and a 
 
15We thank the authors for generously sharing the Isolated capital (GCISC) data. We use the GCISC for the 2010 
census year.  
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Table 1.11: Instrumental variables for corruption 
In this table, I present the second stage IV-GMM estimates using instrumental variables for Corruption defined in equation (6). My sample period is 1994 to 2017. I include time 
fixed effects, Fama-French 48 industries fixed effects, and state fixed effects to control for any unobservable time, industry, state effects. Standard errors clustered by firms are 
shown in brackets. Statistical significance is denoted as *** =p<1%, ** =p<5%, * =p<10%.  
VARIABLES 
ST1 ST2 ST3 ST4 ST5 ST1 ST2 ST3 ST4 ST5 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
CORRUPTION -0.9313*** -0.7299** -0.7740*** -0.2281 0.416 -1.0056** -1.5187** -1.5535** -0.9672 -0.0877 
  [0.2984] [0.3254] [0.2908] [0.2882] [0.2899] [0.4414] [0.6582] [0.6167] [0.6091] [0.4305] 
SIZE -0.0405*** -0.0539*** -0.0539*** -0.0468*** -0.0341*** -0.0413*** -0.0536*** -0.0542*** -0.0467*** -0.0341*** 
  [0.0018] [0.0023] [0.0022] [0.0021] [0.0023] [0.0023] [0.0028] [0.0024] [0.0023] [0.0025] 
MB -0.0039*** -0.0029** -0.0044*** -0.0052*** -0.0034*** -0.0051*** -0.0031** -0.0049*** -0.0057*** -0.0036*** 
  [0.0015] [0.0013] [0.0012] [0.0012] [0.0012] [0.0015] [0.0013] [0.0012] [0.0012] [0.0012] 
ROA -0.0935*** -0.0909*** -0.0552*** -0.0122 0.005 -0.0845*** -0.0880*** -0.0463*** -0.0078 0.0073 
  [0.0144] [0.0128] [0.0114] [0.0110] [0.0111] [0.0140] [0.0141] [0.0126] [0.0118] [0.0111] 
CAPX -0.1572*** -0.0999* -0.0644 -0.0577 0.0726** -0.1094** -0.1073* -0.0831 -0.049 0.0732** 
  [0.0571] [0.0595] [0.0578] [0.0450] [0.0339] [0.0453] [0.0593] [0.0541] [0.0445] [0.0333] 
TANGIBILITY -0.1645*** -0.1874*** -0.1494*** -0.1034*** -0.0988*** -0.1625*** -0.1829*** -0.1463*** -0.1110*** -0.0920*** 
  [0.0213] [0.0205] [0.0179] [0.0162] [0.0160] [0.0181] [0.0215] [0.0193] [0.0149] [0.0173] 
ASSETS MATURITY 0.0002 0.0001 -0.0001 -0.0005* -0.0010*** 0.0001 0.0002 -0.0002 -0.0004* -0.0011*** 
  [0.0003] [0.0003] [0.0003] [0.0003] [0.0002] [0.0003] [0.0003] [0.0003] [0.0003] [0.0002] 
ABNORMAL EARNINGS 0.0274*** 0.0242*** 0.0176*** 0.0119*** 0.0111*** 0.0262*** 0.0222*** 0.0177*** 0.0123*** 0.0120*** 
  [0.0051] [0.0040] [0.0034] [0.0027] [0.0023] [0.0049] [0.0037] [0.0036] [0.0030] [0.0023] 
EARNINGS VOLATLITY 0.1182*** 0.1193*** 0.0899*** 0.0552*** 0.0277*** 0.1195*** 0.1180*** 0.0906*** 0.0595*** 0.0335*** 
  [0.0145] [0.0168] [0.0148] [0.0109] [0.0090] [0.0164] [0.0175] [0.0148] [0.0115] [0.0095] 
Z-SCORE DUMMY -0.0311*** -0.0367*** -0.0256*** -0.0156** -0.0095* -0.0312*** -0.0374*** -0.0276*** -0.0156** -0.0105** 
  [0.0084] [0.0098] [0.0078] [0.0068] [0.0056] [0.0082] [0.0095] [0.0078] [0.0067] [0.0052] 
DIVERSIFICATION -0.0083* -0.0179*** -0.0209*** -0.0152*** -0.0105** -0.0098** -0.0193*** -0.0206*** -0.0159*** -0.0106** 
  [0.0043] [0.0049] [0.0048] [0.0048] [0.0049] [0.0046] [0.0051] [0.0047] [0.0047] [0.0048] 
DIVIDEND YIELD 0.2512*** 0.4197*** 0.4468*** 0.3272*** 0.0146 0.2509*** 0.3875*** 0.4267*** 0.3483*** 0.0103 
  [0.0843] [0.1182] [0.1076] [0.0937] [0.0892] [0.0832] [0.1253] [0.1249] [0.1054] [0.0938] 
RATED -0.0349*** -0.0894*** -0.1417*** -0.1852*** -0.1993*** -0.0405*** -0.0898*** -0.1416*** -0.1836*** -0.1950*** 
  [0.0054] [0.0076] [0.0115] [0.0129] [0.0153] [0.0062] [0.0080] [0.0121] [0.0139] [0.0161] 
LEVERAGE -0.3495*** -0.4391*** -0.4155*** -0.3192*** -0.1941*** -0.3852*** -0.4351*** -0.4101*** -0.3043*** -0.2060*** 
  [0.0409] [0.0443] [0.0381] [0.0333] [0.0307] [0.0479] [0.0461] [0.0335] [0.0282] [0.0294] 
Macro State Control  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
                      
Observations 43,700 37,498 37,424 37,286 36,594 43,700 37,498 37,424 37,286 36,594 
Adjusted R-squared 0.177 0.261 0.275 0.262 0.246 0.17 0.253 0.268 0.256 0.241 
Weak IV test 104.34 80.62 80.23 80.40 80.72 31.29 32.93 32.68 32.76 32.39 
Overidentification test 0.34 0.24 0.13 0.65 0.06 0.68 0.07 0.10 0.36 0.07 
Year FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Industry FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
State FE NO NO NO NO NO YES YES YES YES YES 
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value of one indicates everyone lives in the capital. The Total Border is the log of total border 
miles shared with another state and country (Campante and Do 2014; Holmes 1995). Since the 
capital isolation measure may partially depend on the geographical shape and size of the state, I 
also control for total border miles (Campante and Do 2014). My final instrument is the lagged 
value of CORRUPTION, which is commonly used in the political economy literature, as past 
corruption should be correlated with current levels of corruption but should be unrelated to 
current debt-maturity decisions except through its association with current corruption (Bellemare 
et al. 2017; Wang 2020; Reed 2015).  
The second-stage estimation results are presented in Table 11 and are highly consistent 
with my main findings from Table 4. The instruments are not weak since the reported 
Kleibergen-Paap rk Wald F statistic greatly exceeds ten in all cases. Additionally, the 
overidentification test (Hansen J statistic) of all instruments indicates that the instruments are 
uncorrelated with the error term. Overall, this adds support to my prior findings and suggests my 
results are unlikely to be caused by endogeneity.  
1.5.3 Placebo analysis 
I next perform a placebo analysis to ensure the validity of my inferences regarding 
political corruption and its effect on local firms’ choice of debt-maturity. To conduct the 
analysis, I randomly assign state-level political corruption to different years as a falsification test. 
If an elevated level of political corruption causes firms to choose less short-term debt, I should 
not find a significant relationship between the placebo corruption and debt-maturity (Acharya 
and Xu, 2017; Datta et al., 2019). Figure 1.6 presents the time-series average of treated and 





Figure 1.6: Treated vs Placebo 
This figure presents the time-series average of treated and randomly assigned corruption over the sample period. For 




I present the placebo test results in Table 12. My artificial randomly assigned corruption 
data exhibits a strong positive correlation (0.52) with treated corruption data but does not 
demonstrate a significant relation with debt-maturity for any of my dependent variables – both 
with and without state fixed effects. These findings further confirm the robustness of the 
corruption measure and its implications for firms’ debt-maturity preferences.  
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Table 1.12: Placebo Analysis 
In this table, I present the second stage IV-GMM estimates using placebo analysis with randomly assigned Corruption. I consider five different measures of debt-maturity as the 
dependent variable which include ST1: Debt maturing within 1 year, ST2: Debt maturing within 2 years, ST3: Debt maturing within 3 years, ST4: Debt maturing within 4 years, 
and ST5: Debt maturing within 5 years. My sample period is 1994 to 2017, and I include time fixed effects, Fama-French 48 industries fixed effects, and state fixed effects to 
control for any unobservable time-, industry-, state-level factors. Standard errors clustered by firms are shown in brackets. Statistical significance is denoted as *** =p<1%, ** 
=p<5%, * =p<10%.  
VARIABLES 
ST1 ST2 ST3 ST4 ST5 ST1 ST2 ST3 ST4 ST5 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
CORRUPTION -0.258 -0.1893 -0.178 -0.1612 -0.0715 -0.0865 0.1337 0.1421 -0.1298 0.0119 
  [0.2477] [0.2758] [0.2803] [0.2597] [0.2511] [0.2061] [0.2544] [0.2616] [0.2425] [0.2213] 
SIZE -0.0388*** -0.0519*** -0.0512*** -0.0435*** -0.0300*** -0.0384*** -0.0519*** -0.0515*** -0.0436*** -0.0302*** 
  [0.0026] [0.0031] [0.0032] [0.0029] [0.0028] [0.0026] [0.0031] [0.0032] [0.0029] [0.0028] 
MB 0.0167* 0.0226* 0.0241** 0.0180* 0.0201* 0.0175* 0.0230** 0.0240** 0.0183* 0.0204** 
  [0.0099] [0.0117] [0.0118] [0.0108] [0.0105] [0.0099] [0.0117] [0.0117] [0.0106] [0.0103] 
ROA -0.1157*** -0.1174*** -0.0821*** -0.0431** -0.0266 -0.1112*** -0.1111*** -0.0752*** -0.0380** -0.0217 
  [0.0198] [0.0213] [0.0209] [0.0189] [0.0182] [0.0189] [0.0200] [0.0195] [0.0175] [0.0167] 
CAPX 0.1526 0.1621 0.2272 0.2093 0.3221** 0.1602 0.1571 0.2186 0.2076 0.3258** 
  [0.1298] [0.1451] [0.1487] [0.1367] [0.1366] [0.1285] [0.1438] [0.1467] [0.1346] [0.1337] 
TANGIBILITY -0.3154*** -0.3373*** -0.3211*** -0.2561*** -0.2559*** -0.3200*** -0.3399*** -0.3224*** -0.2604*** -0.2591*** 
  [0.0704] [0.0788] [0.0800] [0.0734] [0.0729] [0.0703] [0.0792] [0.0799] [0.0732] [0.0720] 
ASSETS MATURITY 0.0008* 0.0010* 0.0008 0.0003 0.000 0.0009* 0.0011** 0.0008 0.0004 0.000 
  [0.0005] [0.0005] [0.0005] [0.0005] [0.0005] [0.0005] [0.0005] [0.0005] [0.0005] [0.0005] 
ABNORMAL EARNINGS 0.0298*** 0.0303*** 0.0261*** 0.0181*** 0.0171*** 0.0303*** 0.0303*** 0.0261*** 0.0184*** 0.0174*** 
  [0.0058] [0.0061] [0.0060] [0.0053] [0.0047] [0.0058] [0.0061] [0.0060] [0.0053] [0.0047] 
EARNINGS VOLATLITY 0.2023*** 0.2173*** 0.1942*** 0.1418*** 0.1179*** 0.2020*** 0.2172*** 0.1940*** 0.1442*** 0.1215*** 
  [0.0412] [0.0501] [0.0505] [0.0462] [0.0451] [0.0411] [0.0500] [0.0501] [0.0458] [0.0444] 
RATED -0.0978*** -0.1623*** -0.2226*** -0.2475*** -0.2640*** -0.1010*** -0.1645*** -0.2233*** -0.2492*** -0.2663*** 
  [0.0275] [0.0319] [0.0324] [0.0298] [0.0297] [0.0276] [0.0319] [0.0322] [0.0295] [0.0292] 
Z-SCORE DUMMY 0.1619* 0.1904* 0.2255** 0.1880** 0.1979** 0.1748** 0.1997** 0.2290** 0.1943** 0.2048** 
  [0.0862] [0.0998] [0.1009] [0.0925] [0.0918] [0.0873] [0.1007] [0.1011] [0.0923] [0.0910] 
DIVERSIFICATION -0.0108* -0.0214*** -0.0219*** -0.0179*** -0.0145** -0.0099 -0.0198*** -0.0202*** -0.0164*** -0.0130** 
  [0.0061] [0.0068] [0.0069] [0.0063] [0.0063] [0.0061] [0.0068] [0.0068] [0.0062] [0.0061] 
DIVIDEND YIELD 0.2490** 0.3281*** 0.3483*** 0.3015*** 0.1355 0.2714*** 0.3567*** 0.3799*** 0.3294*** 0.1653* 
  [0.1026] [0.1154] [0.1140] [0.0960] [0.0931] [0.1046] [0.1172] [0.1151] [0.0971] [0.0946] 
LEVERAGE 0.5913 0.6532 0.8247 0.6878 0.8279* 0.6624 0.7074 0.8512* 0.7257 0.8659* 
  [0.4413] [0.5038] [0.5092] [0.4665] [0.4630] [0.4488] [0.5109] [0.5127] [0.4682] [0.4612] 
Macro State Controls  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
                      
Observations 48,592 41,527 41,447 41,297 40,512 48,592 41,527 41,447 41,297 40,512 
Adjusted R-squared 0.125 0.218 0.199 0.215 0.153 0.113 0.21 0.197 0.21 0.147 
Weak IV test 17.89 15.81 15.85 16.00 15.68 17.10 15.07 15.13 15.31 15.04 
Overidentification test 0.99 0.79 0.76 0.84 0.65 0.77 0.61 0.59 0.73 0.81 
Year FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Industry FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
State FE NO NO NO NO NO YES YES YES YES YES 
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1.5.4 Corruption and alternative measures of debt-maturity 
I further investigate the relation between PC and debt-maturity using loan-maturity 
information from Dealscan. This analysis focuses solely on the maturity of new debt issues to 
alleviate the concern that overall debt-maturity structure is the result of both current and past 
decisions, and previously borrowed long-term debt that is nearing maturity is unlikely to reflect 
managerial preferences for shorter-term borrowings. To test the association between 
CORRUPTION and new debt issues, I define DEAL_ST1, DEAL_ST2, and DEAL_ST3 as 
indicator variables that equal one if the average loan maturity of new issues is less than one year, 
two years, and three years, respectively. Following Ben-Nasr et al. (2015), I also employ 
DM_ALT1 and DM_ALT2 as two additional alternative debt-maturity measures where DM_ALT1 
is a dummy variable that equals one if more than 50% of the firm’s total debt is short-term debt 
and zero otherwise, and DM_ALT2 is the difference between a firm’s total liabilities and long-
term liabilities, divided by its total liabilities (El Ghoul et al. 2016).  
I repeat my analyses using the Dealscan and alternate debt-maturity variables with the 
results presented in Table 13. Overall, the findings are qualitatively to my baseline results, as 
CORRUPTION enters with a negative and significant coefficient in all specifications. The 
analysis provides additional support for my hypothesis that firms operating in politically corrupt 
environments use significantly less short-term debt to limit liquidity and refinancing risk. 
1.6. Conclusion  
This study extends the political corruption and corporate debt-maturity literature by 
examining how local political corruption affects firms’ debt-maturity preferences. Specifically, I 
explore two competing theories that offer divergent predictions on the relationship between 
corruption and maturity preferences. The demand-side story predicts that firms operating in 
highly corrupt environments will use less short-term debt to limit liquidity and refinancing risks, 
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Table 1.13: PC and alternative measures of debt-maturity 
In this table, I present OLS regression results (left-hand side) and the second stage IV-GMM estimates (right-hand side) with alternative measures of short-term debt as the 
dependent variable. Specifically, I consider five alternate measures of debt-maturity where DEAL_ST1, DEAL_ST2, and DEAL_ST3 are constructed using new debt issues from 
the Dealscan database, and DM_ALT1 and DM_ALT2 are constructed using Compustat data following Ben-Nasr et al. (2015). DEAL_ST1, DEAL_ST2, and DEAL_ST3 are 
defined as indicator variables that equal one if loan maturity is less than one year, two years and three years, respectively. DM_ALT1 is an indicator variable that equals one if 
more than 50% of the firm’s total debt is short-term debt and zero otherwise. DM_ALT2 is the difference between a firm’s total liabilities and long-term liabilities, divided by its 
total liabilities. My sample period is 1994 to 2017, and I include time fixed effects, Fama-French 48 industries fixed effects, and state fixed effects to control for any unobservable 
time-, industry-, and state-level factors. Standard errors clustered by firm are shown in brackets with statistical significance denoted as *** =p<1%, ** =p<5%, * =p<10%.  
 
VARIABLES 
OLS   
DEAL_ST1 DEAL_ST2 DEAL_ST3 DM_ALT1 DM_ALT2   
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)   
CORRUPTION -0.296** -1.002*** -0.796** -0.6319** -0.5323** -0.5567*** -0.3805*   
  [0.135] [0.320] [0.398] [0.2569] [0.2677] [0.2067] [0.2078]   
SIZE -0.004*** 0.008** -0.001 -0.0465*** -0.0462*** -0.0425*** -0.0421***   
  [0.001] [0.003] [0.004] [0.0023] [0.0023] [0.0019] [0.0019]   
MB 0.000 0.015*** 0.013*** -0.0062*** -0.0066*** -0.0051*** -0.0055***   
  [0.002] [0.005] [0.005] [0.0020] [0.0020] [0.0016] [0.0016]   
ROA -0.122*** -0.267*** -0.299*** -0.1110*** -0.1074*** -0.0830*** -0.0802***   
  [0.026] [0.038] [0.041] [0.0161] [0.0159] [0.0126] [0.0124]   
CAPX 0.021 -0.124* -0.206** -0.0422 -0.0454 -0.1204*** -0.1232***   
  [0.033] [0.070] [0.091] [0.0472] [0.0473] [0.0382] [0.0382]   
TANGIBILITY -0.018 -0.027 -0.001 -0.2383*** -0.2339*** -0.1657*** -0.1622***   
  [0.015] [0.033] [0.040] [0.0239] [0.0240] [0.0193] [0.0193]   
ASSETS MATURITY 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.0004 0.0004 0.0001 0.0001   
  [0.000] [0.001] [0.001] [0.0004] [0.0004] [0.0003] [0.0003]   
ABNORMAL EARNINGS 0.006 0.012 0.007 0.0257*** 0.0260*** 0.0224*** 0.0227***   
  [0.006] [0.012] [0.015] [0.0059] [0.0059] [0.0046] [0.0046]   
EARNINGS VOLATLITY 0.063* 0.233*** 0.418*** 0.1421*** 0.1376*** 0.1239*** 0.1205***   
  [0.038] [0.059] [0.070] [0.0257] [0.0256] [0.0201] [0.0201]   
Z-SCORE DUMMY 0.002 -0.018 -0.017 -0.0327*** -0.0325*** -0.0294*** -0.0294***   
  [0.005] [0.012] [0.014] [0.0095] [0.0094] [0.0073] [0.0072]   
DIVERSIFICATION -0.002 -0.004 -0.01 -0.0168** -0.0155** -0.008 -0.0072   
  [0.003] [0.007] [0.009] [0.0067] [0.0067] [0.0054] [0.0054]   
DIVIDEND YIELD 0.09 0.554*** 0.573*** 0.153 0.1666 0.2196** 0.2278**   
  [0.069] [0.155] [0.182] [0.1078] [0.1073] [0.0898] [0.0893]   
RATED 0.003 0.014 -0.011 -0.0323*** -0.0332*** -0.0376*** -0.0380***   
  [0.003] [0.008] [0.011] [0.0081] [0.0081] [0.0068] [0.0067]   
LEVERAGE -0.036*** -0.251*** -0.270*** -0.3722*** -0.3719*** -0.3821*** -0.3802***   
  [0.013] [0.030] [0.037] [0.0322] [0.0318] [0.0243] [0.0241]   
TERM SPREAD 0.004 0.024** 0.034*** 0.0166 -0.074 0.053 -0.0391   
  [0.004] [0.010] [0.013] [0.0446] [0.0643] [0.0350] [0.0513]   
ln(STATE GDP) -0.01 -0.028 -0.019 0.0098 -0.1085* 0.0195 -0.0970*   
  [0.011] [0.026] [0.032] [0.0247] [0.0639] [0.0205] [0.0516]   
ln(PCI) -0.0311 -0.0421 -0.0814 -0.0299 -0.0744 -0.0266 -0.0723   





DEAL_ST1 DEAL_ST2 DEAL_ST3 DM_ALT1 DM_ALT2 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
LEGISLATIVE CONTROL -0.003 -0.003 -0.007 0.0044 -0.0014 0.0045 0.0009   
  [0.004] [0.008] [0.010] [0.0064] [0.0061] [0.0051] [0.0048]   
LEADING INDEX 0.002 -0.003 0.006 -0.0001 -0.0046* -0.0016 -0.0045**   
  [0.002] [0.005] [0.006] [0.0030] [0.0027] [0.0024] [0.0021]   
                  
Observations 13,306 13,306 13,306 49,198 49,198 49,198 49,198   
Adjusted R-squared 0.025 0.104 0.136 0.179 0.182 0.243 0.247   
Weak IV test                 
Overidentification test                 
Year FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES   
Industry FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES   




          GMM       
    DEAL_ST1 DEAL_ST2 DEAL_ST3 DM_ALT1 DM_ALT2 
    (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) 
CORRUPTION     -0.328** -0.883** -0.619* -0.9354*** -0.6008** -0.8324*** -0.4395* 
      [0.146] [0.356] [0.457] [0.3231] [0.2912] [0.2638] [0.2311] 
SIZE     -0.001 -0.004 -0.017 -0.0423*** -0.0419*** -0.0386*** -0.0382*** 
      [0.004] [0.010] [0.013] [0.0031] [0.0032] [0.0026] [0.0027] 
MB     0.013 -0.03 -0.055 0.0185 0.0193 0.0173* 0.0178* 
      [0.015] [0.041] [0.051] [0.0121] [0.0122] [0.0102] [0.0102] 
ROA     -0.127*** -0.249*** -0.272*** -0.1472*** -0.1421*** -0.1160*** -0.1116*** 
      [0.026] [0.042] [0.048] [0.0246] [0.0235] [0.0202] [0.0193] 
CAPX     0.075 -0.326* -0.506** 0.2676* 0.2762* 0.1599 0.1653 
      [0.073] [0.191] [0.240] [0.1589] [0.1575] [0.1333] [0.1315] 
TANGIBILITY     -0.05 0.094 0.179 -0.4063*** -0.4095*** -0.3180*** -0.3197*** 
      [0.042] [0.114] [0.140] [0.0863] [0.0863] [0.0726] [0.0722] 
ASSETS MATURITY     0.0000 -0.001 -0.002 0.0012** 0.0013** 0.0009* 0.0009* 
      [0.000] [0.001] [0.001] [0.0006] [0.0006] [0.0005] [0.0005] 
ABNORMAL EARNINGS     0.007 0.004 -0.004 0.0335*** 0.0342*** 0.0296*** 0.0301*** 
      [0.007] [0.015] [0.019] [0.0073] [0.0073] [0.0059] [0.0059] 
EARNINGS VOLATLITY     0.101* 0.092 0.208 0.2327*** 0.2312*** 0.2064*** 0.2049*** 
      [0.059] [0.136] [0.165] [0.0515] [0.0512] [0.0428] [0.0423] 
Z-SCORE DUMMY     0.05 -0.199 -0.287 0.1857* 0.1988* 0.1688* 0.1787** 
      [0.060] [0.162] [0.199] [0.1061] [0.1073] [0.0895] [0.0901] 
DIVERSIFICATION     0.0000 -0.01 -0.018 -0.0200*** -0.0183** -0.0108* -0.0097 
      [0.004] [0.009] [0.011] [0.0074] [0.0074] [0.0061] [0.0061] 
DIVIDEND YIELD     0.049 0.707*** 0.802*** 0.1896 0.2170* 0.2508** 0.2712*** 
      [0.091] [0.215] [0.264] [0.1199] [0.1217] [0.1026] [0.1042] 
RATED     -0.011 0.069 0.07 -0.0994*** -0.1035*** -0.0985*** -0.1012*** 
      [0.018] [0.050] [0.061] [0.0336] [0.0337] [0.0284] [0.0284] 
LEVERAGE     0.208 -1.168 -1.637 0.743 0.8139 0.6303 0.6867 
      [0.303] [0.818] [1.006] [0.5421] [0.5506] [0.4574] [0.4623] 
TERM SPREAD     -0.019 0.035 0.088 -0.0614 -0.2333** -0.0185 -0.1828** 
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VARIABLES           GMM       
     DEAL_ST1 DEAL_ST2 DEAL_ST3 DM_ALT1 DM_ALT2 
    (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) 
      [0.021] [0.057] [0.072] [0.0607] [0.1003] [0.0493] [0.0827] 
ln(STATE GDP)     -0.005 -0.048 -0.048 0.0381 -0.1818** 0.0447* -0.1632*** 
      [0.013] [0.033] [0.041] [0.0299] [0.0758] [0.0254] [0.0624] 
ln(PCI)     -0.0540 0.429* 0.581* -0.1988* -0.2851** -0.1805** -0.2623*** 
      [0.085] [0.252] [0.311] [0.1050] [0.1198] [0.0859] [0.0984] 
LEGISLATIVE CONTROL     -0.001 -0.008 -0.014 0.0109 0.0001 0.0103 0.0023 
      [0.004] [0.009] [0.011] [0.0078] [0.0067] [0.0064] [0.0053] 
LEADING INDEX     0.002 -0.004 0.004 0.0028 -0.0046 0.001 -0.0045** 
      [0.002] [0.005] [0.006] [0.0035] [0.0029] [0.0029] [0.0022] 
                    
Observations     13,306 13,306 13,306 49,198 49,198 49,198 49,198 
Adjusted R-squared     0.012 0.012 0.009 0.082 0.074 0.116 0.108 
Weak IV test     10.22 10.22 10.22 16.68 47.77 16.28 47.77 
Overidentification test     0.51 0.20 0.96 0.77 0.94 0.9174 0.73 
Year FE     YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Industry FE     YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 




which are exacerbated by the threat of expropriation. In contrast, the supply-side story 
predicts that lenders will prefer to supply short-term debt when corruption is high, given the high 
external frictions and business uncertainty. If lenders account for regional variation in the risk 
posed by corrupt government officials, I should observe that they only extend longer-term debt 
to borrowers at an interest rate premium. On the other hand, if lenders ignore the potential for 
corruption or only incorporate the average national corruption risk into loan pricing, I would not 
observe an increase in the lending spread when borrowers demand long-term debt. Overall, I 
hypothesize that demand-size forces will play a larger role, as borrowers are more likely to 
consider local factors when making significant capital raising decisions. Simultaneously, lenders 
have diversified portfolios that can better absorb the impact if corruption adversely affects a 
specific borrower or subgroup of borrowers.  
Consistent with my hypothesis, the results indicate that firms operating in high corruption 
states use significantly less short-term debt. A decomposition of overall debt reveals the 
reduction is driven by the use of significantly less debt maturing within one, two, and three 
years. My findings indicate a causal relationship between local political corruption and debt-
maturity preferences, which I confirm using various endogeneity tests. Consistent with the effect 
being driven by liquidity and refinancing concerns, I find the corruption-maturity relation is most 
pronounced in firms with small size, low market-to-book, non-investment grade credit ratings, 
low asset redeployability, and high realized and implied volatility. In contrast, I do not find any 
evidence to support the supply-side explanation, as firms in high corruption areas use a greater 
percentage of long-term debt but do not pay an interest rate premium related to local corruption. 
My main analysis includes industry, time, and state fixed effects to control for 
unobservable differences that contribute to variation in debt-maturity preferences. My measure 
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of corruption is constructed at the state level, so the inclusion of state fixed effects implies that 
even within states there is a significant effect in which firms rely less on short-term borrowing 
when incidents of local corruption are higher than usual. I also verify that my inferences remain 
unchanged when including industry-year of firm fixed effects, thereby greatly reducing potential 
omitted variable concerns. A matched sample analysis that adjusts for pre-treatment observable 
differences yields similar findings when comparing firms in high corruption areas to otherwise 
similar firms in low corruption areas. Further, using a seemingly unrelated system of equations 
regression approach, I document that firms in high PC areas use more long-term debt but less 
short-term debt and equity to finance new investments compared to firms in low PC areas. A 
placebo analysis with randomly assigned corruption also reaffirms my findings, as I only find a 
significant relationship between political corruption and debt maturity when using actual 
corruption data but not the placebo corruption data. Altogether, my results highlight that firms 












Appendix of Chapter 1 
Table A1: Variable descriptions and data sources 
Compustat data items are shown for accounting ratios 
Variable  Definition & Calculation 
ST Notes payable divided total debt 
=
𝑛𝑝
(𝐷𝐿𝐶 + 𝐷𝐿𝑇𝑇)⁄  
ST1 The portion of debt maturing within 1 year 
=
(𝑆𝑇 + 𝐷𝐷1)
(𝐷𝐿𝐶 + 𝐷𝐿𝑇𝑇)⁄  
ST2 The portion of debt maturing within 2 years 
=
(𝑆𝑇 + 𝐷𝐷1 + 𝐷𝐷2)
(𝐷𝐿𝐶 + 𝐷𝐿𝑇𝑇)⁄  
ST3 The portion of debt maturing within 3 years 
=
(𝑆𝑇 + 𝐷𝐷1 + 𝐷𝐷2 + 𝐷𝐷3)
(𝐷𝐿𝐶 + 𝐷𝐿𝑇𝑇)⁄  
ST4 The portion of debt maturing within 4 years 
=
(𝑆𝑇 + 𝐷𝐷1 + 𝐷𝐷2 + 𝐷𝐷3 + 𝐷𝐷4)
(𝐷𝐿𝐶 + 𝐷𝐿𝑇𝑇)⁄  
ST5 The portion of debt maturing within 5 years 
=
(𝑆𝑇 + 𝐷𝐷1 + 𝐷𝐷2 + 𝐷𝐷3 + 𝐷𝐷4 + 𝐷𝐷5)
(𝐷𝐿𝐶 + 𝐷𝐿𝑇𝑇)⁄  












LT1 The portion of Long-term debt maturing within 1 year 
=
(𝐷𝐷1)
(𝐷𝐿𝐶 + 𝐷𝐿𝑇𝑇)⁄  
LT2 The portion of Long-term debt maturing within 2 years 
=
(𝐷𝐷1 + 𝐷𝐷2)
(𝐷𝐿𝐶 + 𝐷𝐿𝑇𝑇)⁄  
LT3 The portion of Long-term debt maturing within 3 years 
=
(𝐷𝐷1 + 𝐷𝐷2 + 𝐷𝐷3)
(𝐷𝐿𝐶 + 𝐷𝐿𝑇𝑇)⁄  
LT4 The portion of Long-term debt maturing within 4 years 
=
(𝐷𝐷1 + 𝐷𝐷2 + 𝐷𝐷3 + 𝐷𝐷4)
(𝐷𝐿𝐶 + 𝐷𝐿𝑇𝑇)⁄  
LT5 The portion of Long-term debt maturing within 4 years 
=
(𝐷𝐷1 + 𝐷𝐷2 + 𝐷𝐷3 + 𝐷𝐷4 + 𝐷𝐷5)
(𝐷𝐿𝐶 + 𝐷𝐿𝑇𝑇)⁄  
ST_ALT1 A dummy variable that equals one if more than 50% of the firm’s total debt is short-term debt and 
zeroes otherwise 
ST_ALT2 The difference between a firm’s total liabilities and long-term liabilities, divided by its total 
liabilities 𝐷𝐿𝐶/(𝐷𝐿𝐶 + 𝐷𝐿𝑇𝑇) 
DS_ST1 A dummy variable that equals one if loan maturity is less than one year [Source: Dealscan] 
DS_ST2 A dummy variable that equals one if loan maturity is less than two years [Source: Dealscan] 
DS_ST3 A dummy variable that equals one if loan maturity is less than three years [Source: Dealscan] 
Short-Term Debt Issue The change in current liabilities (𝑑𝑙𝑐𝑡 − 𝑑𝑙𝑐𝑡−1 𝑎𝑡⁄ ) 
Long-Term Debt Issue The change in long-term liabilities (𝑑𝑙𝑡𝑡𝑡 − 𝑑𝑙𝑡𝑡𝑡−1 𝑎𝑡⁄ ) 






CORRUPTION The state level annual corruption is measured as the Federal public corruption conviction scaled by 
per million population. I standardize the variable to mean zero and standard deviation of 1.  
[Source: The Public Integrity Section of The United States Department of Justice.  
https://www.justice.gov/criminal/pin 






This dummy variable takes a value of 1 when a single party controls both legislative chambers of the 
firm’s headquarter state, otherwise 0.  




This dummy variable takes the value of 1 when Republicans control both legislative chambers of the 
firm’s headquarter state and 0 for the Democrats.  
[Source: National Conference of state Legislature (NCSL).  
http://www.ncsl.org/research/about-state-legislatures/partisan-composition.aspx] 
 
Ln(GDP) Natural logarithm of per capita state GDP. State per-capita GDP is chained 2012 dollars. 
[Source: Data is obtained from Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA). 
https://www.bea.gov/] 
TERM SPREAD This variable is measured as the difference between the 10-year and 3-month Treasury yield 
[Source: Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis 
https://fred.stlouisfed.org/] 
LEADING INDEX This index predicts six months growth rate of the state coincident index, which is composed of four 
state-level economic indicators (a) nonfarm payroll employment, (b) wages and salaries, (c) 
production workers average working hours, (d) unemployment rate. In addition to the coincident 
index, the leading index includes other state-level economic indicators such as housing permits, 
unemployment insurance claims, delivery times from supply management manufacturing survey, 
and interest rate spread between 10-year Treasury bond and 3-month treasury bills. Source: Federal 
Reserve Bank of Philadelphia [https://www.philadelphiafed.org/surveys-and-data/regional-
economic-analysis/state-leading-indexes] 






ASSETS MATURITY Book value of the weighted average of the maturities of property, plant, and equipment calculated as 
the gross ppegt divided by total assets times ppegt divided by the annual depreciation expense plus 
the current assets divided by the cost of goods sold times current assets divided by the cost of goods 
sold.  















This variable is calculated as the standard deviation of EBITDA over the past three years divided by 
the average assets for that period. 
Earnings Volatility =
3 years standard deviation of ebitda
3 years average of at
 
LEVERAGE Leverage is calculated as the total debt divided by the equity market value. 
Leverage =
dlc + dltt
prccf ∗ csho + at − ceq
 
MB This variable is calculated as the market value of the firm divided by the book value of the total 
assets. 
Market to book ratio =
prccf ∗ csho + at − ceq
at
 










SIZE Logarithm of total assets (at) 






Z-SCORE DUMMY Altman Z score is defined as an indicator variable equals 1 if Z>1.81. Where X 1 is calculated as the 
current assets minus current liabilities divided by the book value of total assets. X 2 is defined as 
retained earrings divided by the book value of total assets, X 3 is measured as the operating income 
before depreciation divided by the total assets, X 4 is market value of the equity divided by the total 
debt, and X 5 is sales divided by the book value of total assets. 






, X 2 =
re
at
, X 3 =
oiadp
at
, X 4 =
prccf∗csho
at




Net Operating Loss 
Dummy 
The variable takes value 1 if the firm report net operating loss carry forward (tlcf). 
 
Investment Tax Credit 
Dummy 
 





This variable is calculated as the standard deviation of EBITDA over the past three years divided by 
the average assets for that period. 
Earnings Volatility =
3 years standard deviation of ebitda







RATED Takes value of 1 if the firm has S&P rating for long-term debt and zero otherwise 
DIVERSIFICATION This variable takes value of 1 if the firm has more than 1 business segment and zero otherwise 
Investment grade (INV 
GRD) 
Takes the value of 1 if the firm’s S&P long term rating is more than B. 
Non-CP Takes the value of 1 if the firm does not have commercial paper (NP) 
All-in-Spread Drawn All-in spread drawn is the sum of spread over the LIBOR and an annual fee based on dollars drawn 
[Source: Dealscan] 
All-in-Spread Undrawn All in spread undrawn is the sum of spread over the LIBOR and annual fee based on total dollars 
available under the loan agreement [Source: Dealscan] 
log(Maturity)  The  natural log of difference between the start date and date of a loan facility [Source: Dealscan] 
log(Loan Size) Log of Loan size [Source: Dealscan] 
Ln(Sale) Natural logarithm of Sales 
Negative Income 
Dummy 
Takes the value of 1 if net income is negative for firm-year observation and zero otherwise 












Collateral Takes value of 1 if the loan is secured [Source: Dealscan] 
Current ratio Current assets dividend by current liabilities  
ln(1+INTEREST 
COVERAGE) 
Ebitda divided by total interest expenses 
Headquarter address Filing information of 10-K/Q from EDGAR available at Augmented 10-X Header data 




US monthly economic policy uncertainty data is obtained from Baker, Bloom, and Davis (2016) 




Firm-level Nonpolitical risk data is obtained from Hassan, Hollander, Lent, Tahoun, 
(2019) 
Risk Firm-level risk data is obtained from Hassan, Hollander, Lent, Tahoun, (2019). 
Low Redeployability Low Redeployability is a dummy variable that takes a value of 1 if the degree of redeployability of a 
firm’s assets is lower than the sample median redeployability. Redeployability indicates the extent to 
which assets have alternative uses. The redeployability data is used in Kim and Kung (2017) and 
available at the author’s website from 1985-2015: http://blogs.cornell.edu/hyunseobkim/research/ 
High Realized Volatility High Realized Volatility is a dummy variable takes value of 1 if a firm’s Realized Volatility is 
higher than sample median Realized Volatility. CRSP realized volatility is based on 12 months 
standard deviation of daily stock returns. Firm-level realized volatility data is obtained from Alfaro, 
Ivan, Nicholas Bloom, and Xiaoji Lin, The Finance Uncertainty Multiplier (2017) for 1997-2016. 
High Implied Volatility High Implied Volatility is a dummy variable takes value of 1 if a firm’s Implied Volatility is higher 
than sample median Implied Volatility. 365-day implied volatility of at the money forward calls. 
Firm-level implied volatility data is obtained from Alfaro, Ivan, Nicholas Bloom, and Xiaoji Lin, 




Table A2: Relationship between PC and debt-maturity using 94 federal judicial districts 
In this table, I present the second-stage IV-GMM estimates with corruption measured at the district level. I consider five different measures of debt-maturity as 
the dependent variable which include ST1: Debt maturing within 1 year, ST2: Debt maturing within 2 years, ST3: Debt maturing within 3 years, ST4: Debt 
maturing within 4 years, and ST5: Debt maturing within 5 years. My sample period is 1994 to 2017, and I include time fixed effects, Fama-French 48 industries 
fixed effects, and federal judicial district fixed effects in the IV-GMM regression to control for unobservable time-, industry-, and federal judicial district-level 
factors. Standard errors clustered by firm are shown in brackets with statistical significance denoted as *** =p<1%, ** =p<5%, * =p<10%. 
VARIABLES 
ST1 ST2 ST3 ST4 ST5 ST1 ST2 ST3 ST4 ST5 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
CORRUPTION -0.0045*** -0.0044*** -0.0040*** -0.0027** -0.002 -0.0028** -0.0039** -0.0040** -0.0023 -0.0021 
  [0.0012] [0.0013] [0.0013] [0.0013] [0.0012] [0.0014] [0.0016] [0.0016] [0.0015] [0.0015] 
SIZE -0.1220*** -0.1333*** -0.1133*** -0.0738*** -0.0278*** -0.1246*** -0.1421*** -0.1222*** -0.0821*** -0.0343*** 
  [0.0093] [0.0102] [0.0102] [0.0097] [0.0096] [0.0090] [0.0103] [0.0103] [0.0098] [0.0096] 
SIZE SQR 0.0059*** 0.0050*** 0.0028*** -0.0002 -0.0032*** 0.0061*** 0.0056*** 0.0034*** 0.0003 -0.0028*** 
  [0.0007] [0.0007] [0.0007] [0.0007] [0.0007] [0.0006] [0.0008] [0.0008] [0.0007] [0.0007] 
MB 0.0086 0.0072 0.0052 0.0014 0.0064 0.0086 0.013 0.0117 0.0078 0.0105 
  [0.0086] [0.0097] [0.0098] [0.0094] [0.0093] [0.0074] [0.0090] [0.0089] [0.0086] [0.0084] 
ROA -0.0732*** -0.0668*** -0.0292* -0.005 0.0008 -0.0590*** -0.0591*** -0.0257 -0.0034 0.0021 
  [0.0157] [0.0160] [0.0152] [0.0138] [0.0126] [0.0154] [0.0166] [0.0157] [0.0143] [0.0130] 
CAPX 0.1335 0.0456 0.0498 0.0343 0.1497 0.1858* 0.1875 0.184 0.1521 0.2308* 
  [0.1198] [0.1326] [0.1368] [0.1315] [0.1334] [0.1081] [0.1287] [0.1317] [0.1270] [0.1280] 
TANGIBILITY -0.2729*** -0.2400*** -0.1903*** -0.1396** -0.1571** -0.3054*** -0.3224*** -0.2802*** -0.2286*** -0.2234*** 
  [0.0612] [0.0671] [0.0680] [0.0652] [0.0650] [0.0557] [0.0667] [0.0670] [0.0640] [0.0633] 
ASSETS MATURITY 0.0006 0.0005 0.0001 -0.0003 -0.0005 0.0006 0.0006 0.0001 -0.0003 -0.0005 
  [0.0005] [0.0005] [0.0005] [0.0004] [0.0004] [0.0004] [0.0005] [0.0005] [0.0004] [0.0004] 
ABNORMAL EARNINGS 0.0249*** 0.0242*** 0.0235*** 0.0150** 0.0185*** 0.0267*** 0.0299*** 0.0289*** 0.0193*** 0.0213*** 
  [0.0063] [0.0067] [0.0065] [0.0058] [0.0050] [0.0059] [0.0065] [0.0062] [0.0055] [0.0048] 
EARNINGS VOLATLITY 0.1095*** 0.0883** 0.0655* 0.035 0.0402 0.1287*** 0.1246*** 0.0990*** 0.0654** 0.0594* 
  [0.0319] [0.0349] [0.0342] [0.0323] [0.0316] [0.0306] [0.0353] [0.0346] [0.0328] [0.0320] 
Z-SCORE DUMMY 0.1276* 0.093 0.0923 0.0666 0.0882 0.1404** 0.1532** 0.1529** 0.1261* 0.1250* 
  [0.0770] [0.0870] [0.0875] [0.0848] [0.0848] [0.0616] [0.0746] [0.0747] [0.0724] [0.0718] 
LEVERAGE 0.3413 0.0734 0.0429 -0.031 0.1743 0.3934 0.3662 0.3413 0.2606 0.3536 
  [0.3815] [0.4245] [0.4272] [0.4132] [0.4146] [0.3090] [0.3695] [0.3704] [0.3583] [0.3561] 
TERM SPREAD 0.1036*** 0.0462 0.007 -0.1020** -0.2394*** 0.0073 0.0222 0.0157 -0.091 -0.2758*** 
  [0.0375] [0.0466] [0.0492] [0.0498] [0.0395] [0.0572] [0.0690] [0.0705] [0.0701] [0.0619] 
ln(STATE GDP) 0.0652** 0.0506* 0.042 0.0365 0.0076 -0.0595 0.0267 0.0549 0.0544 -0.031 
  [0.0263] [0.0288] [0.0290] [0.0275] [0.0273] [0.0559] [0.0640] [0.0643] [0.0605] [0.0593] 
ln(PCI) 0.0313 0.0007 -0.0067 -0.1009 -0.2170*** -0.0057 -0.0072 0.0035 -0.0919 -0.2316*** 
  [0.0511] [0.0654] [0.0693] [0.0724] [0.0530] [0.0556] [0.0713] [0.0749] [0.0783] [0.0596] 
LEGISLATIVE CONTROL 0.0220*** 0.0206*** 0.0178** 0.0173** 0.0129* 0.0045 0.0029 0.0015 0.0057 0.0019 
  [0.0073] [0.0078] [0.0078] [0.0076] [0.0074] [0.0052] [0.0061] [0.0063] [0.0060] [0.0056] 
LEADING INDEX 0.0028 0.0046 0.0042 0.0036 0.0078** -0.0044* -0.0021 -0.0035 -0.0027 0.0029 
  [0.0032] [0.0035] [0.0035] [0.0033] [0.0033] [0.0024] [0.0029] [0.0030] [0.0029] [0.0027] 
                      
Observations 138,779 118,184 117,946 117,495 115,239 140,673 119,813 119,573 119,120 116,843 
Kleibergen–Paap rk Wald F 22.01 19.29 19.37 19.39 18.67 34.33 28.67 28.71 28.59 27.59 
Hansen J statistic (p value) 0.60 0.95 0.86 0.77 0.98 0.83 0.72 0.63 0.54 0.91 
Adjusted R-squared 0.18 0.31 0.31 0.29 0.24 0.17 0.26 0.27 0.25 0.20 
Year FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Industry FE YES YES YES YES YES NO NO NO NO NO 
US District FE NO NO NO NO NO  YES YES YES YES YES 
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Chapter 2: Implications of Public Corruption for Local Firms: Evidence 
from Corporate Debt Maturity 
2.1. Introduction 
Hassan et al. (2019) find that an overwhelming portion (i.e., 90%) of the variation 
in their measure of political risk occurs at the firm level rather than at the aggregate or 
sector level16. As a result, political risk (PR) brings about severe financial consequences 
for firms. For example, Julio and Yook (2012) find that firms worldwide reduce 
corporate investment by an average of 4.8% during the election years compared to non-
election years. Waisman et al. (2015) provide evidence that political uncertainty is 
associated with an average 34bps point higher corporate debt financing costs. Bradley et 
al. (2016) find that firms that are headquartered in states that are more aligned with the 
president after elections face more policy risk and thus incur higher yield spreads. 
Kelly et al. (2016) developed the model that political uncertainty commands a risk 
premium whose magnitude is larger in weaker economic conditions. Bradley et al. 
(2016) show that political uncertainty is detrimental to fund performance. Overall,  
their results imply that political bias is likely costly to taxpayers and pension 
beneficiaries. Çolak et al. (2017) examine IPO activities under political uncertainty 
surrounding gubernatorial and find fewer IPOs originating from a state when an 
election is scheduled. Pan et al. (2019) show that a) PR adversely affects debt maturity 
 
16 An anecdotal evidence of firm-level political risk is President Trump’s Twitter attacks on Amazon 
indicating the firm for exploiting U.S. Post Office, avoiding taxes, and using Washington Post as a covert lobbying 
tactic. “Donald Trump’s Twitter feud with Amazon explained” published in VOX (Apr 4, 2018) The consequence of 
firm-level political ire can be severely damaging to a firm’s operation. When Defense Department announced in 
October 2019 that it decided to award  a $10 billion defense contract    to Microsoft, the 2nd largest cloud service 
provider, instead of Amazon, the No. 1 cloud service provider  in the world,  many market analysts found it quite 
surprising and Amazon took the matter to federal court to question Trump. (“Amazon Looks to Question Trump in 
Pentagon Contracting Case” was published in the New York Times on Feb. 10, 2020) 
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and leverage at least five quarters into the future; b) these effects are more pronounced 
for firms with higher investment reversibility and a lower credit rating; c) both domestic 
PR and global PR affect debt maturity and leverage, but domestic PR’s effect is more 
significant; and d) overall, PR deteriorates the external financing environment, leading 
to firms using more short-term debt and having lower leverage. Gad et al. (2019) show 
that borrower-level political risk is reflected in the pricing and liquidity of public debt, 
the cost of private debt, and credit default swap spreads and recovery rates. They also 
show that lender-level political risk influences the supply of credit and has a significant 
effect on loan pricing.  
The main objective of the papers above is to study the effects of the firm-level 
risk brought about by political uncertainty. What strategies should firms adopt to 
mitigate this risk is beyond the scope of most of these papers. The purpose of my paper 
is to examine the role that the organizational form might play in combating the firm-
level risk endangered by PR. Specifically, I investigate if a diversified firm is better able 
to control the firm-level impact of PR than a focused firm. Additionally, I examine 
whether diversification intensity determines the extent to which the adverse effects of 
political risk are mitigated. In doing so, I employ the measures of PR risks developed by 
Hassan et al. (2019). I address the research question in two ways. First, I investigate 
whether the diversified firms are less sensitive to political risk because if one of their 
segments is subject to political risk, other segments may not be sensitive to the same 
risk. Therefore, the overall exposure of the diversified firm may be lower compared to a 
stand-alone firm. Second, a segment’s sensitivity to political risk within the firm might 
be lower than a stand-alone firm in the same industry due to the insurance effect from 
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internal capital markets within the diversified. 
The literature produces plenty of evidence on the effect of diversification on a   
firm’s risk. Some theoretical evidence indicates that diversification lessens firm-level risk.  
A key motivation for firms’ to diversify is to reduce the overall firm-level risk (Galai and 
Masulis 1976; Lewellen 1971). Imperfectly correlated industrial segments of diversified 
firms create coinsurance effects that minimize the countercyclical dead-weight costs 
(Hann et al. 2013). By developing a contingent claim model and considering the impact 
of risk, Mansi and Reeb (2002) show that diversification reduces firms’ overall risks. 
During the high external frictions such as recession periods, firms become increasingly 
diversified to minimize the effects of frictions risk (Kuppuswamy and Villalonga 2016; 
Matvos et al. 2018). Kuppuswamy and Villalonga (2016) find evidence of 
diversification value premium during the financial crisis period 2007-2009. They argue 
that diversified firms’ ability to reduce the impact of financial downturn risk is driven 
by their increased access to credit and by the presence of a strong internal capital market 
relative to their focused counterparts. Others argue that diversification is associated with 
high firm-level risks. Anderson et al. (2011) show that while diversification reduces the 
risk for some of the firms, corporate diversification’s average effects demonstrate a 
positive association with risks. Although diversification allows firms to translate growth 
options into assets in place, Zhang (2005) warns that such benefits could backfire when 
assets in place become riskier than growth options. Using a sample of 487 take-over 
bids, Harford (1999) finds that cash-rich firms often subscribe to higher risk by making 
value-destroying acquisitions. Studies that attempt to investigate whether diversification 
reduces/increases risks either use stock return volatility (Anderson et al. 2011), specific 
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shocks to firm-level uncertainty (e.g. using special corporate events) (Harford 1999; 
Hermalin and Katz 2000), countercyclical price of risk (Zhang 2005) or use an economy-
wide measure of shocks such as economic policy uncertainty, external market frictions 
(e.g. recession, election year). While many of these studies documents heterogeneous 
response to aggregate shocks, none of these investigate the within-firm response to 
idiosyncratic political risk under the diversified vs. focused firms’ setup.  
My results show that both the political risks and diversification reduce the 
firm-level average investments (Cho 2015; Rajan et al. 2000). However, 
diversification's negative effect appears to result from diversification inefficiencies 
(Ozbas and Scharfstein 2010), not from the firm-level political risk. To examine the 
impact on the level of diversification and PR, I follow (Shin and Stulz 1998) and group 
the firms in moderate-diversified (MD) and high-diversified (HD) groups17. I find that 
both moderate and highly diversified firms are associated with reduced investments and 
profitability. However, highly diversified firms are more likely to eliminate the impact 
of political risks on investment, and moderately diversified firms lessen the effects of 
political risks on profitability. 
The measure of political risk of Hassan et al. (2019) is based on textual analysis and 
related to how often political risk is mentioned in companies conference calls. For a stand-
alone firm and a diversified firm, the same measure may imply different exposures to 
political uncertainty. For example, both the diversified firms and stand-alone firms may 
mention political risk in a conference call, and for the stand-alone firm, it may imply that all 
 
17 Where a moderately diversified firm has more than 1 but less than 5 business segments operating in 
more than one 4 digits sic industry.  A highly diversified firm has 5 or more business segments operating  in more 
than one 4 digits sic industry and zero otherwise. 
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of its business faces a political risk. In contrast, a diversified firm may imply “one of my 
many segments faces a political risk.” Thus, the same measure may indicate a higher 
intensity of political risk exposure for the stand-alone firm than the diversified firm. To 
ensure that what I capture in the estimates are differences in the sensitivity to political risk,  
not the differences in exposure to political risk, I conduct a segment-level political risk 
analysis. I  also rely on this approach to test for internal capital markets as a potential 
channel to explain lower sensitivity to political risk and compare segment-level outcomes to 
individual segments' political risk exposure. Since political risk measure cannot be 
computed at the segment level,  I  estimate the stand-alone firms’ median political risk in the 
segment’s industry (two-digit SIC) as the proxy for the segment’s political risk for a 
diversified firm. Shin and Stulz (1998) use a similar approach to estimate a segment’s 
Tobin’s q by assigning the median Tobin’s q of stand-alone firms in the same two-digit 
industry to the segments of diversified firms. As median PR may not be the correct linear 
regression parameter, I  also measure mean segment-level PR as robustness but do not report 
the results for brevity. I use segment-level accounting information from Compustat and find 
that when faced with increase PR, the internal capital market of diversified firms allows the 
impacted segments to invest. This strategy is not available to focused firms. Thus, 
diversification is more valuable when the firms’ exposure to political risk is high. 
I test whether diversified firms manage political risk politically. The literature on 
firms’ political activities offers two distinct perspectives. One group views that only the 
large corporate entities can get the benefits from political engagement (Schattschneider 
1960; Schlozman and Tierney 1986).  The other group argues that lobbying establishes 
a democratic political environment where political outcome in favor of large firms is 
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hugely costly (Denzau and Munger 1986; Gray and Lowery 1996). If, instead, only the 
large firms spend more money on political gain, then I can expect the average money 
spending of the diversified firms will be more than the focused firms. Arguably, firms 
lobby for many different reasons. Therefore, it is expected that firms will allocate, if at 
all, only a portion of lobbying and PAC money directly for political risk mitigation. I 
find that when faced with political risk, diversified firms do not spend more on lobbying 
expenses or political donations than focused firms in the subsequent period implying 
that diversified firms do not manage political risk politically. 
Next, I conduct two falsification tests. First, I control for firm-level non-political 
risk and overall risk. Second, I examine the impacts of political risk on investments and 
operating performance of the diversified and focused firms at the time of high economic 
policy uncertainty (EPU). Suppose PR's adverse impacts on investments and 
profitability are mainly driven by the overall risks or economic policy uncertainty. In 
that case, controlling for these measures should significantly weaken the estimated 
coefficient of PR. My results indicate neither the overall risk nor EPU is associated 
substantially with PR's outcome variables. I apply a series of robustness tests to validate 
my findings and eliminate the concerns for endogeneity issues. These tests confirm my 
main conclusion that diversification reduces firm-level political risk. 
I make several contributions to the organizational structure literature. First, I 
show that the diversification strategy plays a vital role in mitigating adverse effects 
stemming from the firm-level political risk. Prior studies (Cosset and Suret 1995; Le 
and Zak 2006) that investigate the relationship between political uncertainty and 
performance of diversified firms over time and across sectors (using aggregate political 
64 
 
risk data) capture only 0.81% and 7.50% of the variations (Hassan et al. 2019). Second, 
I show the power of diversification in managing the within-firm differences in the 
remaining 92 percent. Third,  I  show that it is the internal capital market instrumental in 
combating investment inefficiency stemming from PR. Fourth, I show that diversified 
and focused firms do not behave any differently in lobbying expenses and political 
donations in subsequent periods. This bolsters my argument that it is the internal capital 
market and not the political strategy that is the primary driver in political risk 
management. Finally, my study also speaks to enhance the knowledge base of a quickly 
expanding political risk literature18. These studies are based on the pooled sample of 
firms considering the organization structure fixed. Instead, my study allows variation in 
the organizational structure and documents a phenomenon beyond the assumption of a 
fixed organizational structure. Akey and Lewellen (2017) find that the existing PR 
literature fails to disentangle the firm-level political sensitivity. By addressing the cross-
sectional variation in firm-level political risks, I document that in the presence of the 
rising political risk, diversification benefits exceed the costs stemming from the firm-
level political risk. 
I organize the rest of the paper as follows. Section 2.2 discusses the sample, data 
sources, and variables and provides summary statistics. Section 2.3 describes the 
methodologies I employ, while Section 2.4 presents evidence on how diversified firms 
outperform focused firms in managing PR. Section 2.5 presents a series of robustness 
and sensitivity tests, and Section 2.6 concludes the chapter. 
 
18 These studies document that firms’ exposure to an increased level of political risk is associated with 
reduced investments and operating performance (Julio and Yook, 2012), increase stock market liquidity (Debata and 
Mahakud, 2018), increase the cost of public and private borrowing (Gad et al., 2019), and decrease firms debt 
maturity and leverage (Pan et al., 2019) 
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2.2 Data, sample, and variable construction 
I use data from multiple sources to investigate the impact of firm-level political risks on the 
diversified and focused firms’ investments and operating performance. I obtain firm-level 
political risk, nonpolitical risk, absolute risk, and political sentiment data from Hassan et al. 
(2019). The data is available for US firms listed in the stock markets for the period 2002 to 
2018. Compustat is my source for accounting information. To construct the diversification 
measure, I use business segment data from Compustat historical industry segment files. I use 
policy uncertainty (EPU) measures from Baker et al. (2016), implied and realized volatility 
data from Alfaro et al. (2018)19. I obtain lobbying and PAC data20 from Fer r i s  e t  a l .  
(2019) . To measure the impact of political risk on intangible investments, I use 
intangible capital measures of Peters and Taylor (2017) from Wharton Research Data 
Services (WRDS). Following the literature, I exclude financial and utility firms (sic 
6000-6999 and sic 4890-4999) from the final sample as these firms may not be 
appropriate for my analysis. Also, I drop the firms with missing or non-positive assets in 
the Compustat sample. Finally, I winsorize all the regression variables at 1% percentile 
in each tail to remove outliers’ effects. 
2.2.1Measure of firm-level political risk 
Hassan et al. (2019) measure firm-level political risks using the firms’ conference call 
transcripts' textual analysis with the analysts and stakeholders. These call transcripts 
document management’s view regarding the firms’ exposure to the political risk in a 
 
19 Data for firm-level political risk, economic policy uncertainty, implied and realized volatility are 
available at https://www.policyuncertainty.com/index.html. 
20 The authors are grateful to Dr. Reza Houston for sharing lobbying and PAC data for the period 1999-2019. PAC 
contribution data is available from the Federal Election Commission through the CRP. PAC  accepts fund from 
connected firms and then distribute the funds to the intended political recipients  on behalf of the donors.  Ferris  et 
al.(2019) apply a fuzzy matching procedure to match PAC information     with the firms’ data. Lobbying data is 
available from the Center for Responsive Politics (CRP). 
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given quarter. Hassan et al. (2019) apply the patterned-based sequence classification 
methods to identify the linguistic differences associated with political and nonpolitical 
risks. They count the number of times management mentions the phrase “risk” and 
synonymous words during the conference call and assign weights to each bigram based 
on its frequency. Finally, they divide the weighted bigram frequency by the calls' total 
duration to obtain the firm-level political risk variable. Upon comparing their measure 
with existing aggregate political uncertainty indexes (Baker et al. 2016) and regulatory 
constraint index for industries (Al‐Ubaydli and McLaughlin 2017), Hassan et al. (2019) 
conclude that their measure accurately captures the cross-sectional variation in firm-
level political risks. I employ the measures suggested by Hassan et al. (2019). 
2.2.2Measuring diversification 
I use three categories of diversification. Following Berger and Hann (2003); Berger and 
Ofek (1995); Franco et al. (2016);(Mansi and Reeb 2002), I identify a firm as 
industrially diversified (dummy variable takes on the value of 1) when it has one or 
more business segments operate in more than one industry segment identified by 4-digit 
SIC codes. To determine industrial diversification levels, I group the diversified firms 
into moderate and high diversification categories (Shin and Stulz 1998). Moderately 
diversified is a binary variable that takes on the value of 1 if a firm has more than one 
but less than five business segments operating in more than one 4-digit sic industry and 
zero otherwise. Highly diversified is a binary variable that takes on the value of 1 if a 
firm has five or more business segments operating in more than one 4-digit sic industry 
and zero otherwise. 
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2.2.3 Dependent variables 
The dependent variables in the analysis are Investment, Mark-up, and profitability. I use 
a firm’s capital expenditure to the beginning of the year’s total assets ratio as the proxy for 
the investment activities (Matvos et al. 2018). To measure operating efficiencies and 
profitability, I use two measures of profitability, Mark-up,  and ROA. I define Mark-up 
for individual firms as Salesit divided by Salesit-Ebitit sales minus ebit at time t. Thus, 
Mark-up is essentially revenues- to-costs ratio. Azar (2011); Koch et al. (2018) use an 
identical measure of Mark-up. ROA is the operating income before depreciation divided 
by the beginning of the year’s assets. ROA is widely used in the corporate finance 
literature as a proxy for a firm’s profitability (Grant et al. 1988; Myers 1977). 
2.2.4 Control variables 
Following the literature on diversification and political risk, I control the variables 
widely used in the investments and profitability regressions. Control variables are: 
• Size measured as the natural logarithm of the book value of assets ((Hassan et al. 
2019)); 
• Market to book ratio (e.g.Krishnaswami and Subramaniam (1999)); 
• R&D (e.g. Ataullah et al. (2014)) proxied by the firms’ research and development 
expenditure scaled by the beginning of the year’s total assets; 
• Tangibility (e.g., Gopalan and Xie (2011)) as the ratio of firms’ net property, plant, 
and equipment to the beginning-of-the-year book value of assets’ 
• Leverage (e.g., Matvos et al. (2018)) is the total debt divided by the beginning of 
the year equity market value; 
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• R&D missing – Since many firms do not report their R&D expenditure to 
Compu- stat, I use a dummy to capture the magnitude of missing R&D values, 
and 
• Standard Deviation– Following Core et al. (1999), I use the standard deviation of 
the respective dependent variables for the prior three years. 
I provide detailed definitions and data sources of all the variables in Appendix B1. 
2..2.5 Summary Statistics 
Table 1 represents the summary statistics of the sample. Panel A of this table presents 
the summary statistics of firm characteristics for the full sample, focused firms, the 
diversified firms, and their mean differences. Panel C reports the mean of CAPX, 
Mark-up, and ROA for the focused firms, diversified firms, moderately diversified 
firms, and highly diversified firms based on yearly quintile ranking of firm-level 
political risk. 
In panel A, the mean difference is statistically significant for all the variables except for the 
nonpolitical risk. Firm-level average standardized political risk and risk are 6.47% and 
5.76% higher for the focused firm than the diversified firm. The average political risk for the 
focused and diversified firms during the sample period is 0.77 and 0.72, with the difference 
being significant at the 1% level. Focused firms in my sample have higher investments, 
market-to-book ratio,  R&D  expenditure, and all three types of risks. Diversified firms have 
higher average profitability, Size, and  Tangibility.  The average size of diversified firms is 
17.72% larger than the focused firms. Except for the Size, the standard deviations for all 
other variables are lower for the diversified firm, indicating that diversification benefits 
provide some stability in firms’ characteristics. 
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Table 2.1: Summary statistics 
 
The panel A of this table presents the summary statistics for the full sample, focused firms, and the diversified firms. CAPX is the capital expenditure scaled by 
the beginning of the year net property, plant and equipment (
𝑐𝑎𝑝𝑥𝑖,𝑡
𝑝𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖,𝑡−1⁄
). Markup is a profitability measure calculated as the sales scaled by the 
difference between the sales and earnings before interest and taxes (
𝑠𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠𝑖,𝑡
(𝑠𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠𝑖,𝑡 − 𝑒𝑏𝑖𝑡𝑖,𝑡)
⁄ ). Operating performance (ROA) is the ratio of operating income 
before depreciation to the book value of assets (
𝑜𝑖𝑑𝑏𝑝𝑖,𝑡
𝑎𝑡𝑖,𝑡−1
⁄ ). Size is the natural logarithm of the book value of assets. Tangibility is the ratio of net property, 
plant, and equipment to the book value of assets (
𝑝𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖,𝑡
𝑎𝑡𝑖,𝑡−1
⁄ ). Market to book value is calculated as the market value of the firm divided to the book value 
of the total assets (
(prcc_𝑓𝑖,𝑡 ∗ csho𝑖,𝑡 + at𝑖,𝑡 − ceq𝑖,𝑡)
𝑎𝑡𝑖,𝑡−1




⁄ ). Prisk is the political risk and Nprisk is a measure of nonpolitical risks the individual firm faces in each quarter and developed by Hassan, 
Hollander, Lent, Tahoun, (2019). They examine the transcripts of the firms’ quarterly earning-calls with analysts and measure the firm-level political risk based 
on the discussions that focus on the firms’ political risk. Both Prisk and Nprisk are standardized by their respective standard deviations. Panel B reports the 
distribution of industrially diversified segments over the sample period 2002-2018. Panel C reports the mean of CAPX, Markup, and ROA for the focused firms, 
diversified firms, moderately diversified firms, and highly diversified firms based on annual PRISK quintiles. Mod diversified is a dummy that takes a value of 1 
if a firm has more than 1 but less than 5 business segments operating in more than one 4 digits sic industry and zero otherwise. High diversified takes a value of 1 
if a firm has 5 or more business segments operating in more than one 4 digits sic industry and zero otherwise. Definitions and measurements of all the variables 
used in this study are provided in the appendix, along with data sources. Two-tailed t-statistics is used to measure the statistical significance of the mean 





  Full Sample   Focused Firm   Diversified Firm   Mean Difference 
  Mean Median Std   Mean Median Std   Mean Median Std   Focused-Diversified 
CAPX   0.332 0.221 0.361   0.374 0.249 0.403   0.258 0.190 0.254   0.074 *** 
MARKUP   1.036 1.072 0.307   0.997 1.054 0.356   1.106 1.093 0.173   -0.069 *** 
ROA   0.069 0.112 0.227   0.038 0.100 0.263   0.125 0.127 0.126   -0.056 *** 
SIZE   6.600 6.514 2.000   6.121 6.029 1.885   7.439 7.367 1.918   -0.839 *** 
TANGIBILITY   0.263 0.162 0.266   0.251 0.135 0.279   0.283 0.209 0.240   -0.020 *** 
MARKET TO BOOK   2.429 1.728 2.178   2.689 1.850 2.465   1.974 1.582 1.444   0.455 *** 
R&D INTENSITY   0.071 0.012 0.127   0.096 0.030 0.147   0.027 0.003 0.058   0.043 *** 
PRISK   0.748 0.493 0.823   0.765 0.506 0.838   0.719 0.472 0.795   0.030 *** 
NPRISK   0.845 0.604 0.824   0.848 0.603 0.828   0.842 0.606 0.818   0.004   
RISK   1.529 1.328 1.000   1.560 1.350 1.029   1.475 1.286 0.945   0.054 *** 




Panel B: Number of Firms across the industrially diversified business segments and across the sample period 2002-2018 
Year 
Number of Business Segments ( calculated as different four-digit SIC from the parent company) 
Total 
Single-Segment 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 or more 
2002 886 207 188 86 49 20 6 5 1,447 
2003 1151 258 231 110 53 26 7 4 1,840 
2004 1219 257 215 126 51 30 8 4 1,910 
2005 1311 276 235 129 53 29 5 5 2,043 
2006 1396 288 247 121 63 23 9 3 2,150 
2007 1454 298 261 118 62 19 11 3 2,226 
2008 1540 297 264 121 67 19 9 8 2,325 
2009 1468 304 255 124 71 22 7 6 2,257 
2010 1394 307 246 122 63 25 7 9 2,173 
2011 1,478 362 274 139 75 25 6 9 2,368 
2012 1,458 350 285 127 74 27 5 9 2,335 
2013 1,303 314 281 128 75 24 5 8 2,138 
2014 1,464 328 279 140 68 19 7 9 2,314 
2015 1,508 331 271 147 64 22 5 10 2,358 
2016 1,436 313 268 154 56 21 4 9 2,261 
2017 1,554 339 274 159 64 23 8 10 2,431 
2018 1,334 292 260 137 52 14 8 9 2,106 
                    





Panel C: The mean of CAPX, Markup, and ROA for the focused firms, diversified firms, moderately diversified firms, and highly diversified firms 
based on annual PRISK quintiles 
Firm-level political 
risk 
  Segment   Difference   
  Focused Firm (1) Diversified (2) Mod Diversified (3) Highly Diversified (4)   (1)-(2)   (1)-(3)   (1)-(4)   
  CAPX               
Lowest Political Risk   0.365 0.253 0.255 0.234   0.11 *** 0.11 *** 0.13 *** 
2   0.369 0.251 0.255 0.224   0.12 *** 0.11 *** 0.15 *** 
3   0.374 0.261 0.268 0.216   0.11 *** 0.11 *** 0.16 *** 
4   0.372 0.262 0.267 0.232   0.11 *** 0.11 *** 0.14 *** 
Highest Political Risk   0.389 0.261 0.265 0.238   0.13 *** 0.12 *** 0.15 *** 
    MARKUP               
Lowest Political Risk   1.021 1.092 1.089 1.124   -0.07 *** -0.07 *** -0.10 *** 
2   1.036 1.112 1.109 1.132   -0.08 *** -0.07 *** -0.10 *** 
3   1.031 1.115 1.111 1.144   -0.08 *** -0.08 *** -0.11 *** 
4   0.985 1.109 1.106 1.130   -0.12 *** -0.12 *** -0.14 *** 
Highest Political Risk   0.917 1.099 1.092 1.137   -0.18 *** -0.18 *** -0.22 *** 
    ROA               
Lowest Political Risk   0.064 0.125 0.123 0.151   -0.06 *** -0.06 *** -0.09 *** 
2   0.074 0.134 0.133 0.139   -0.06 *** -0.06 *** -0.06 *** 
3   0.059 0.131 0.130 0.140   -0.07 *** -0.07 *** -0.08 *** 
4   0.023 0.122 0.120 0.130   -0.10 *** -0.10 *** -0.11 *** 





Panel B reports the distribution of industrially diversified segments over the 
sample period 2002-2018. I define a subsidiary as a business segment when its four-
digit SIC is different from the parent company. The total number of business segments 
for diversified firms during the sample varies from 890 in 2011 to 561 in 2002. Panel  C 
sorts the firms into quintile based on the level of political risks. The quintile one is in 
the lowest political risk group, while quintile five represents the highest political risk 
group. I calculate the average CAPX, Mark-up, and ROA for focused, diversified, 
moderately diversified, and highly diversified firms. The far-right column of panel C 
reports the mean difference between the focused firms and different diversification 
levels.   
The mean differences are statistically significant for all levels of political risk 
indicating that, given the political risk exposure, firms’ investments and operating 
performance vary significantly. For example, when the political risk is highest, the focused 
group’s operating performance is adversely affected the most. 
Figure 2.1 (panel A) shows the binned scattered plot relationship between the 
number of business segments with firm-level political risk (standardized), CAPX, Mark-
up, and ROA. I control for 2-digit sic effects. Fig (a) of panel A depicts a statistically 
significant (at the 1% level) negative correlation (-0.0172) between the number of 
business segments and political risk. In other words, as the firms become more 
diversified, the level of political risk decreases. Fig (b) shows a statistically significant 
(at the 1% level) negative correlation (-0.1502) between the business segments and 
investment opportunities, indicating that industrial diversification leads to a reduction in 
investment activities due to the socialist allocation of internal capital(Shin and Stulz 
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1998)21. However, as expected, the proxies for operating efficiencies–Mark-up and 
ROA)–reveal a significantly positive correlation of respectively 0.1734 and 0.1667 (both 
at the 1% significant level) with the number of business segments. 
 
Figure 2.1(Panel A): Business Segments, Firm-Level Political Risk, Capx, Markup, and Roa 
Relations Controlled for 2-Digit Sic. 
 
Panel B of Figure 2.1 plots the political risk for focused and diversified firms 
at the 25th and the 75th percentiles and illustrates the intertemporal variations in 
political risk distribution by the Fama-French 12 industries class. At the lower 
 
21 Schattschneider (1960) first used the term socialism in the internal capital market where weaker segments receive 
capital support from the stronger segments even in the absence of valuable investment opportunities. 
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percentile of the distribution, the differences between the focused and diversified 
firms are minimal. Significant differences in the industry level's political risk 
distribution are observed at a higher (75th) percentile. Focused firms in healthcare, 
energy, and chemical industries have more political risk exposures than diversified 
firms in the same industries. 
Figure 2.1 (Panel B): Firm-Level Political Risk (standardized) for Focused and 
Diversified firms by Fama-French Industry 
 
 
2.3Methodology and empirical results 
I begin my analysis with the following two baseline regression models to 
investigate the impact of political risk on firm-level investments and profitability after 
controlling for diversification (1) and interaction effects between political risk and 
diversification (2). 
   (1) 
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   (2) 
The dependent variable  represents one of the three variables - CAPX, MARKUP, ROA in the 
regression models. CAPX is the capital expenditure scaled by the beginning of the year; net 
property, plant, and equipment’s Markup is a profitability measure calculated as the sales scaled 
by the difference between the sales and earnings before interest and taxes. Operating 
performance (ROA) is the ratio of operating income before depreciation to the book value of 
assets. 𝑃𝑅𝐼𝑆𝐾𝑖,𝑡 is the average political risk an individual firm faces in time t (Hassan et al. 
2019). 𝑃𝑅𝐼𝑆𝐾𝑖,𝑡 is standardized by its standard deviations. 𝐷𝐼𝑉𝐸𝑅𝑆𝐼𝐹𝐼𝐸𝐷𝑖,𝑡  is the diversification 
dummy variable takes the value of 1 if a firm has business segments operating in more than one 
four digits sic industry and zero otherwise.  is the vector of firm characteristics variables, 
including 𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑖,𝑡 measured as the natural logarithm of the book value of assets, 𝑇𝐴𝑁𝐺𝐼𝐵𝐼𝐿𝐼𝑇𝑌𝑖,𝑡 
is the ratio of net property, plant, and equipment to the book value of assets, 𝑀𝐴𝑅𝐾𝐸𝑇 − 𝑇𝑂 −
𝐵𝑂𝑂𝐾𝑖,𝑡, is the market value of the firm to the book value of the firm, 𝑅&𝐷𝑖,𝑡 is the ratio of 
firm’s R&D expenditure to its book value of assets, 𝑅&𝐷 𝐷𝑈𝑀𝑀𝑌𝑖,𝑡 takes value of 1 if R&D 
information is missing for a firm and zero otherwise, 𝐿𝐸𝑉𝐸𝑅𝐴𝐺𝐸𝑖,𝑡 is total debt divided by the 
equity market value. We use standard deviation of the respective dependent variables for the 
prior three years (Core et al. 1999). 𝛿𝑡 and 𝛿𝑖 represent a full set of year and industry fixed 
effects. In all the regression models, standard errors are clustered by firms. Retrenching the 
effects of firm-level political risks 
In this section, I examine the impacts of political risks on firms’ investments and 
operating efficiencies. Studies related to risk and uncertainty from political systems 
document an adverse effect on firm-level investing and operating activities (Gourio et al. 
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2015; Handley and Limao 2015; Koijen et al. 2016; Mueller et al. 2017). However, the 
literature disagrees regarding the impact of diversification on a firm’s investments and 
operating performance. On the one hand, many others (Anderson et al. 2011; Berger and 
Ofek 1995; Rajan et al. 2000; Shin and Stulz 1998), among others, propose that 
diversification might lead to inefficiencies in investments and operating performance from 
misallocation of internal resources within the segments of diversified firms. On the other 
hand, several studies suggest (Gopalan and Xie 2011; Yan 2006; Yan et al. 2010) that when 
the external market frictions increase, diversified firms perform better relative to the focused 
firms in minimizing the effects of risk. In the absence of a direct measure of firm-level 
political risk, prior studies banked aggregate and sector-level political risks to examine their 
impacts on firms’ performance. Therefore, previous studies fail to capture the firm-level 
political risks that comprise 91.69% of PR (Hassan et al. 2019). 
In table 2, panel A reports results for industrial diversification, and panel B reports 
results from regressions of 𝑦𝑖,𝑡 on the levels of industrial diversification, i.e., moderate 
and high levels of diversification. I use firm-clustered standard errors and report them in 
the parentheses. Columns (4)–(6) include the interaction term between the political risk 
and diversification to understand diversification's mediating role. 
Since my panel data is unbalanced, the error term of the ordinary least square 
(OLS) model is most likely to suffer from a lack of independence due to the repeated 
appearance of the same firms over the sample period (Petersen 2009). To  overcome this 
limitation of the panel data analysis, I include time, industry, and time × industry fixed 
effects. I observe that both political risk and diversification effects are negatively 
associated with all three dependent variables at the 1% significance level.   
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Table 2.2: Retrenching the effects of firm-level political risk 
This table reports the results from regressions that examine the mediating effects the level of diversification plays to 
retrench the firm-level political risks. Panel A reports the results for diversification, and panel B reports results for 
the moderately and highly diversified firms. Dependent variable CAPX  is the capital expenditure scales by the 
beginning of the year net property, plant and equipments(𝑐𝑎𝑝𝑥𝑖,𝑡 𝑝𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖,𝑡−1⁄ ); Markup is a profitability measure calculated 
as the sales scaled by the difference between the sales and earnings before interest and taxes(𝑠𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠𝑖,𝑡 (𝑠𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠𝑖,𝑡 − 𝑒𝑏𝑖𝑡𝑖,𝑡)⁄ ). 
Operating performance (ROA) is the ratio of operating income before depreciation to the book value of 
assets(𝑜𝑖𝑑𝑏𝑝𝑖,𝑡 𝑎𝑡𝑖,𝑡−1⁄ ). All other variables are defined in appendix A. Panel A presents the results for diversified firms, 
and Panel B and C present the baseline regression results from equations (1) and (2) for moderate and diversified 
firms. Firm clustered errors are reported in the parenthesis. Statistical significance is denoted as *** p<1%, ** 
p<5%, * p<10%.  
Panel A: Diversified Firms 
VARIABLES   CAPX MARKUP ROA CAPX MARKUP ROA 
    1  2  3  4  5  6  
PRISK   -0.007*** -0.015*** -0.011*** -0.011*** -0.021*** -0.013*** 
    [0.003] [0.003] [0.002] [0.003] [0.004] [0.002] 
DIVERSIFIED   -0.032*** -0.010** -0.015*** -0.039*** -0.023*** -0.019*** 
    [0.005] [0.005] [0.003] [0.006] [0.006] [0.004] 
DIVERSIFIED * PRISK         0.010** 0.018*** 0.007** 
          [0.005] [0.004] [0.003] 
SIZE   -0.010*** 0.051*** 0.024*** -0.010*** 0.050*** 0.024*** 
    [0.001] [0.002] [0.001] [0.001] [0.002] [0.001] 
TANGIBILITY   -0.043*** 0.115*** 0.104*** -0.043*** 0.114*** 0.103*** 
    [0.015] [0.019] [0.009] [0.015] [0.019] [0.009] 
MARKET TO BOOK   0.048*** 0.029*** 0.022*** 0.048*** 0.029*** 0.022*** 
    [0.002] [0.002] [0.001] [0.002] [0.002] [0.001] 
R&D INTENSITY   0.100*** -1.164*** -1.073*** 0.101*** -1.162*** -1.073*** 
    [0.035] [0.036] [0.031] [0.035] [0.036] [0.031] 
R&D MISSING DUMMY   -0.023*** -0.011 -0.023*** -0.022*** -0.01 -0.023*** 
    [0.007] [0.007] [0.005] [0.007] [0.007] [0.005] 
LEVERAGE   -0.046*** -0.039*** -0.065*** -0.046*** -0.039*** -0.065*** 
    [0.012] [0.012] [0.009] [0.012] [0.012] [0.009] 
STD OF CAPX   0.076***     0.076***     
    [0.007]     [0.007]     
STD OF MARKUP     0.185***     0.185***   
      [0.039]     [0.039]   
STD OF ROA       -0.215***     -0.215*** 
        [0.013]     [0.013] 
CONSTANT   0.307*** 0.701*** -0.036*** 0.310*** 0.706*** -0.034*** 
    [0.013] [0.015] [0.009] [0.013] [0.015] [0.009] 
                
Observations   36,505 36,505 36,505 36,505 36,505 36,505 
Adjusted R-squared   0.21 0.47 0.56 0.21 0.47 0.56 
Year FE   YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Industry FE   YES YES YES YES YES YES 





Panel B: Moderate Diversification  
VARIABLES 
  CAPX MARKUP ROA CAPX MARKUP ROA 
  1  2  3  4  5  6  
PRISK   -0.009*** -0.015*** -0.011*** -0.011*** -0.020*** -0.013*** 
    [0.003] [0.003] [0.002] [0.003] [0.004] [0.002] 
MOD DIVER   -0.032*** -0.007 -0.013*** -0.037*** -0.021*** -0.018*** 
    [0.005] [0.005] [0.003] [0.006] [0.006] [0.004] 
MOD DIVER * PRISK         0.006 0.019*** 0.008*** 
          [0.005] [0.004] [0.003] 
SIZE   -0.011*** 0.053*** 0.026*** -0.011*** 0.053*** 0.026*** 
    [0.002] [0.002] [0.001] [0.002] [0.002] [0.001] 
TANGIBILITY   -0.046*** 0.114*** 0.102*** -0.046*** 0.113*** 0.101*** 
    [0.015] [0.019] [0.010] [0.015] [0.019] [0.010] 
MARKET TO BOOK   0.048*** 0.028*** 0.022*** 0.048*** 0.028*** 0.022*** 
    [0.002] [0.002] [0.001] [0.002] [0.002] [0.001] 
R&D INTENSITY   0.095*** -1.151*** -1.069*** 0.095*** -1.150*** -1.068*** 
    [0.035] [0.036] [0.032] [0.035] [0.036] [0.032] 
R&D MISSING DUMMY   -0.023*** -0.011 -0.024*** -0.023*** -0.011 -0.024*** 
    [0.008] [0.008] [0.005] [0.008] [0.008] [0.005] 
LEVERAGE   -0.048*** -0.040*** -0.067*** -0.048*** -0.040*** -0.067*** 
    [0.013] [0.012] [0.009] [0.013] [0.012] [0.009] 
STD OF CAPX   0.075***     0.075***     
    [0.007]     [0.007]     
STD OF MARKUP     0.186***     0.185***   
      [0.040]     [0.040]   
STD OF ROA       -0.211***     -0.211*** 
        [0.013]     [0.013] 
CONSTANT   0.312*** 0.688*** -0.046*** 0.313*** 0.693*** -0.044*** 
    [0.013] [0.015] [0.009] [0.013] [0.016] [0.010] 
                
Observations   34,821 34,821 34,821 34,821 34,821 34,821 
Adjusted R-squared   0.21 0.47 0.57 0.21 0.47 0.57 
Year FE   YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Industry FE   YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Year * Industry FE   YES YES YES YES YES YES 
 
Panel C: High Diversification          
VARIABLES 
  CAPX MARKUP ROA CAPX MARKUP ROA 
  1  2  3  4  5  6  
PRISK   -0.009*** -0.017*** -0.012*** -0.011*** -0.018*** -0.012*** 
    [0.003] [0.003] [0.002] [0.003] [0.004] [0.002] 
HIGH DIVER   -0.026*** -0.074*** -0.065*** -0.054*** -0.081*** -0.062*** 
    [0.010] [0.012] [0.008] [0.011] [0.013] [0.009] 
HIGH DIVER * PRISK         0.036*** 0.009 -0.003 
          [0.009] [0.010] [0.005] 
SIZE   -0.012*** 0.061*** 0.032*** -0.012*** 0.061*** 0.032*** 
    [0.002] [0.003] [0.002] [0.002] [0.003] [0.002] 
TANGIBILITY   -0.019 0.118*** 0.100*** -0.02 0.117*** 0.100*** 
    [0.019] [0.025] [0.012] [0.019] [0.025] [0.012] 
MARKET TO BOOK   0.048*** 0.027*** 0.019*** 0.048*** 0.027*** 0.019*** 
    [0.002] [0.002] [0.002] [0.002] [0.002] [0.002] 
R&D INTENSITY   0.062 -1.095*** -1.041*** 0.062 -1.095*** -1.041*** 
    [0.038] [0.041] [0.034] [0.038] [0.041] [0.034] 
R&D MISSING DUMMY   -0.030*** -0.008 -0.029*** -0.029*** -0.008 -0.029*** 
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Panel C: High Diversification (continued)     
    [0.010] [0.011] [0.007] [0.010] [0.011] [0.007] 
LEVERAGE   -0.065*** -0.049*** -0.082*** -0.065*** -0.049*** -0.082*** 
    [0.016] [0.015] [0.011] [0.016] [0.015] [0.011] 
STD OF CAPX   0.071***     0.071***     
    [0.008]     [0.008]     
STD OF MARKUP     0.213***     0.213***   
      [0.045]     [0.045]   
STD OF ROA       -0.202***     -0.202*** 
        [0.013]     [0.013] 
CONSTANT   0.326*** 0.635*** -0.072*** 0.329*** 0.635*** -0.073*** 
    [0.016] [0.019] [0.012] [0.016] [0.020] [0.012] 
                
Observations   24,844 24,844 24,844 24,844 24,844 24,844 
Adjusted R-squared   0.19 0.49 0.59 0.19 0.49 0.59 
Year FE   YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Industry FE   YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Year * Industry FE   YES YES YES YES YES YES 
 
The Prisk coefficients of columns (1)–(3) indicate that if political risk increases 
by one standard deviation, firms observe a 0.7% reduction in the investments (with a 
standard error 0.003), a 1.5% decrease in Mark-up (with a standard error 0.003), and a 
1.1% decrease in the ROA  (with a standard error 0.002). The diversified coefficients of 
columns (1)–(3) suggest that diversified firms, on average, invest 3.2% less and have 
1.0% less Mark-up and 1.5% less ROA than focused firms. The effect of diversification 
on investments is 3.28 times worse than political risk. The interaction variable in 
columns (4)–(6) and suggests that diversification mitigates the effects of political risk 
on investing and operating activities.  A diversified firm, on average, has 1.0% more 
investments for a given firm-level political risk, 1.8% more Mark-up, and 0.7% more ROA 
compared to the focused firms. 
The coefficients of other control variables used in the base regression model are 
in line with the literature. Size is negatively linked with the investment rate but has 
positive impacts on the firm-level ROA  and Mark-up.  Firms with large tangible assets have 
lower investments and higher profitability. Market to Book ratio has a positive effect on all 
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three dependent variables. R&D Intensity is positively associated with investment growth 
but negatively associated with firms’ operating performance and profitability as predicted. 
Panel B of Table 2 presents findings on moderately diversified firms, and Panel C 
relates to highly diversified firms. Prisk coefficients in columns (1)–(3) are similar to 
what is reported in panel A. One standard deviation increase of political risk is 
associated with a 0.9% reduction in investments (with a standard error 0.003), a 1.5% 
decrease in Mark-up (with a standard error 0.003), and a 1.1% decrease in the ROA 
(with a standard error 0.002) for moderately diversified firms. The coefficients for 
highly diversified firms are 0.9%, 1.7%, and 1.2%, respectively, as reported in Panel C. 
In Panel B, the MOD DIVER coefficients of columns (1)–(3) suggest that 
moderately diversified firms, on average, invest 3.2% less and have 1.3% less ROA 
relative to focused firms. In Panel C, the coefficients of HIGH DIVER in columns (1)–
(3) suggest that highly diversified firms invest 2.6% less and have respectively 7.4% and 
6.5% less Mark-up and ROA than focused firms. Lang and Stulz (1994); Scharfstein and 
Stein (2000) show that inefficient allocation of internal resources derives these results. 
The interaction variable in columns (4)–(6) suggests a higher level of diversification 
reduces the impact of political risk on investments. In contrast, a moderate level of 
diversification lessens the effect of political risk on operating activities. In summary, the 
findings above are consistent with the hypotheses that diversification mitigates the 
adverse consequences of political risk, and the level of diversification also matters.  
Figure 2.2 plots the marginal effect of the interaction term between 𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑘𝑖,𝑡  ∗
 𝐷𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑠𝑖𝑓𝑖𝑒𝑑𝑖,𝑡  on investment and profitability from equation (2). At low levels of the 
firm’s political risk (and when political risk=0), focused firms dominate diversified firms 
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in investments and profitability. As firm-level political risk goes up, the gap between 
focused and diversified gets narrower. At the highest firm-level political risk, diversified 
firms are more efficient compared to focused firms. In other words, as political risk 
increases, the decrease in (slope) is much higher for focused firms than it is for 
diversified firms. Interestingly, in the plot (d), highly diversified firms plot positive 
investment when firm-level political risk increases. 
Figure 2.2: Marginal Effects of interaction between diversification dummy and political 
risk 
 
2.3.1Political risks, nonpolitical risks, and risks (falsification exercise) 
This section performs a falsification exercise by incorporating non-political risk (NPrisk) 
and overall risk (Risk) measures to compare PR’s information content's robustness.  If the overall 
risks mainly drive the observed relationship between PR and my dependent variables, controlling 
for overall risks should significantly weaken PR’s estimated coefficient. In table 3, I present the 
results for non-political risk and risk in addition to the political risk to compare their combined 
impact on investing and operating activities between diversified and focused firms. 
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Table 2.3: Political risks, nonpolitical risks, and risks 
This table presents the results from the regression to explore the rational component of the firm-level political risk 
i.e. Prisk. Nprisk is a measure of non-political risks the individual firm faces in each quarter measured based on 
nonpolitical bigrams. Risk is computed based on the textual analysis of the number of synonyms of “risks” and 
related words. For details about the construction of Prisk, Nprisk, and Risks please see Hassan, Hollander, Lent, 
Tahoun, (2019). Prisk, Nprisk, and Risk are standardized by their respective standard deviations. Variables are 
defined in the appendix A. Firm-level clustered standard errors in brackets. Statistical significance is denoted a*** 
p<1%, ** p<5%, * p<10%.  
VARIABLES   CAPX MARKUP ROA CAPX MARKUP ROA 
    1  2  3  4  5  6  
PRISK   -0.008** -0.023*** -0.014*** -0.011*** -0.018*** -0.011*** 
    [0.003] [0.004] [0.002] [0.004] [0.004] [0.002] 
NPRISK   -0.009*** 0.007*** 0.0010       
    [0.003] [0.002] [0.001]       
RISK         0.001 -0.004* -0.003* 
          [0.003] [0.003] [0.002] 
DIVERSIFIED   -0.040*** -0.023*** -0.019*** -0.039*** -0.023*** -0.019*** 
    [0.006] [0.006] [0.004] [0.006] [0.006] [0.004] 
DIVERSIFIED * PRISK   0.010** 0.017*** 0.007** 0.010** 0.018*** 0.007** 
    [0.005] [0.004] [0.003] [0.005] [0.004] [0.003] 
SIZE   -0.011*** 0.051*** 0.024*** -0.010*** 0.050*** 0.024*** 
    [0.001] [0.002] [0.001] [0.001] [0.002] [0.001] 
TANGIBILITY   -0.043*** 0.114*** 0.103*** -0.043*** 0.114*** 0.103*** 
    [0.015] [0.019] [0.009] [0.015] [0.019] [0.009] 
MARKET TO BOOK   0.048*** 0.029*** 0.022*** 0.048*** 0.029*** 0.022*** 
    [0.002] [0.002] [0.001] [0.002] [0.002] [0.001] 
R&D INTENSITY   0.098*** -1.160*** -1.072*** 0.100*** -1.162*** -1.072*** 
    [0.035] [0.036] [0.031] [0.035] [0.036] [0.031] 
R&D MISSING DUMMY   -0.022*** -0.011 -0.023*** -0.022*** -0.01 -0.023*** 
    [0.007] [0.007] [0.005] [0.007] [0.007] [0.005] 
LEVERAGE   -0.046*** -0.039*** -0.065*** -0.046*** -0.039*** -0.065*** 
    [0.012] [0.012] [0.009] [0.012] [0.012] [0.009] 
STD OF CAPX   0.076***     0.076***     
    [0.007]     [0.007]     
STD OF MARKUP     0.184***     0.186***   
      [0.039]     [0.039]   
STD OF ROA       -0.215***     -0.214*** 
        [0.013]     [0.013] 
CONSTANT   0.316*** 0.700*** -0.035*** 0.309*** 0.710*** -0.031*** 
    [0.013] [0.015] [0.009] [0.013] [0.016] [0.009] 
                
Observations   36,505 36,505 36,505 36,505 36,505 36,505 
Adjusted R-squared   0.21 0.47 0.56 0.21 0.47 0.56 
Year FE   YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Industry FE   YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Year * Industry FE   YES YES YES YES YES YES 
 
I use the firm-level non-political risk and risk measure of Hassan et al. (2019). The firm-
level non-political risk is the weighted bigram frequency of a firm’s non-political risk 
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divided by the call’s total duration to obtain the firm-level non-political risk measure. The 
firm-level risk is calculated by counting the number of times management mentions the 
phrase ”risk” and synonymous words during the conference call without considering the 
bigram for political and non-political risks. The average impacts of Prisk on the firms’ 
investment and profitability are negative and statistically significant even after 
controlling for other risk types. However, the inclusion of risk variable in the regression 
model results in a smaller coefficient for Prisk variable in the absolute term only for 
Mark-up but retain the significant negative sign in all cases (Table  2 Panel A columns [4] 
[6] vs. Table 3, columns [4]–[6]). The interaction variable (Prisk×diversified) is positive and 
highly significant. When I control both Prisk and NPrisk (columns [1]–[3]), the average 
CAPX, Mark-up, ROA for diversified firms is 1.0%, 1.7%, and .7% higher, respectively, 
relative to focused firms. The results are similar when  I  control for both Prisk and RISK 
(columns [4]–[6]). The coefficients of the RISK variable are negative and weakly 
significant for Mark-up and CAPX. Again, the interaction variable 
(Prisk×diversified) is positive and strongly significant. The sign and statistical significance 
of other control variables remain like those reported in table 2.  This evidence suggests that 
reductions in the firms’ investments and profitability are associated with firm-level political 
risk only (Hassan et al. 2019), and the benefits of diversification increase with the level of 
political risk. 
2.3.2Policy uncertainty, political risk, and diversification (falsification exercise) 
In this section, I perform another falsification exercise by incorporating economic policy 
uncertainty to compare the robustness of PR’s information content. Suppose the overall 
economic policy uncertainty mainly drives the observed relationship between PR and 
my dependent variables. In that case, controlling for economic policy uncertainty should 
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significantly weaken the estimated coefficient of PR. In Table 4, I examine this impact 
of political risk on investments and operating performance of the diversified and 
focused firms at the time of high economic policy uncertainty (EPU). 
Table 2.4: Economic policy uncertainty, political risk, and diversification 
This table presents the regression results from Economic policy uncertainty (Baker, Bloom and Davis 2016), 
political risk, and diversification. Variables are defined in Appendix B1. Firm-level clustered standard errors in 
brackets. Statistical significance is denoted as *** p<1%, ** p<5%, * p<10%. 
VARIABLES   CAPX MARKUP ROA CAPX MARKUP ROA 
    1  2  3  4  5  6  
PRISK   -0.009*** -0.013*** -0.011*** -0.012*** -0.019*** -0.013*** 
    [0.002] [0.003] [0.002] [0.003] [0.004] [0.002] 
LN(1+EPU)   0.006 0.023*** 0.007** -0.005 0.032*** 0.010** 
    [0.006] [0.004] [0.003] [0.009] [0.006] [0.004] 
DIVERSIFIED   -0.035*** -0.008* -0.013*** -0.176*** 0.097** 0.018 
    [0.005] [0.005] [0.003] [0.053] [0.038] [0.027] 
DIVERSIFIED * PRISK         0.008* 0.018*** 0.006** 
          [0.005] [0.004] [0.003] 
DIVERSIFIED * LN(1+EPU)         0.028** -0.025*** -0.007 
          [0.011] [0.008] [0.006] 
SIZE   -0.010*** 0.048*** 0.022*** -0.011*** 0.048*** 0.022*** 
    [0.001] [0.002] [0.001] [0.001] [0.002] [0.001] 
TANGIBILITY   -0.037** 0.139*** 0.120*** -0.038** 0.138*** 0.119*** 
    [0.015] [0.019] [0.009] [0.015] [0.019] [0.009] 
MARKET TO BOOK   0.048*** 0.029*** 0.022*** 0.048*** 0.030*** 0.022*** 
    [0.002] [0.002] [0.001] [0.002] [0.002] [0.001] 
R&D INTENSITY   0.106*** -1.179*** -1.086*** 0.107*** -1.179*** -1.085*** 
    [0.035] [0.036] [0.031] [0.035] [0.036] [0.031] 
R&D MISSING DUMMY   -0.022*** -0.013* -0.024*** -0.022*** -0.013* -0.024*** 
    [0.007] [0.007] [0.005] [0.007] [0.007] [0.005] 
LEVERAGE   -0.041*** -0.045*** -0.072*** -0.041*** -0.045*** -0.072*** 
    [0.012] [0.012] [0.009] [0.012] [0.012] [0.009] 
STD OF CAPX   0.071***     0.071***     
    [0.007]     [0.007]     
STD OF MARKUP     0.143***     0.143***   
      [0.038]     [0.038]   
STD OF ROA       -0.214***     -0.214*** 
        [0.012]     [0.012] 
CONSTANT   0.280*** 0.605*** -0.060*** 0.332*** 0.567*** -0.071*** 
    [0.031] [0.025] [0.016] [0.043] [0.033] [0.022] 
                
Observations   36,520 36,520 36,520 36,520 36,520 36,520 
Adjusted R-squared   0.197 0.452 0.557 0.197 0.453 0.557 
Year FE   YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Industry FE   YES YES YES YES YES YES 





2.4 Active management of firm-level political risk 
In the last section, I show that diversification is associated with the benefits of managing 
firm-level political risk. In this section, I empirically investigate the mechanisms 
diversified firms imply to manage PR's adverse impacts. In doing so, first,  I check 
whether the internal capital markets of diversified firms allow them to outperform the 
focused firms in lessening the negative effects of PR. Second, I check if the superior 
ability of diversification in mitigating political risk is derived from its more intensive 
involvement in political activities. 
2.4.1 Internal capital market 
Shin and Stulz (1998) find that investments by a segment of a diversified firm depend 
on not only its cash flow but also the other segments’ cash flow. If the investments and 
profitability of a diversified firm’s segment that operates in different industries impacted 
by  PR, it is not surprising that the segment will continue its investment due to the benefit of 
an active internal capital market when a focused firm cannot. 
The firm-level political risk measure of Hassan et al. (2019) does not have segment-
level political risk information. Therefore, I estimate the median political risk 
information of the focused firms in the segment’s industry (two-digit SIC) as the proxy 
for the segment’s political risk. Following the same approach, I estimate the segment-
level Tobin’s q22. I build the empirical analysis using the following equation23; 
 
22 Shin and Stulz (1998) use a similar approach to estimate a segment’s Tobin’s q.  
23 9We obtain segment data from Compustat historical segment reporting from 2002-2018. We use seven- segment 
variables (net sales, depreciation, Capxs, Assets (ias), operating profit(loss), segment SIC, and parent SIC). 
Following Shin and Stulz (1998), we exclude the observation with any missing information of the above variables. 
We also exclude accounting ratios that exceed the value of 1. Ratios are defined as net capaxs at time t scaled by 
total identifiable assets (ias) of time t-1 ( netcapxs is the difference between gross capxs and depreciation expense), 
Sales growth (change in sales over the last year sales), cashflow at time t scaled by total identifiable asses (ias) at 






= 𝒂 + 𝒃






𝐶𝑎𝑠ℎ𝑓𝑙𝑜𝑤𝑗(𝑡) −  𝐶𝑎𝑠ℎ𝑓𝑙𝑜𝑤𝑖,𝑗(𝑡)
𝑇𝐴𝑗(𝑡 − 1)




 ×  𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑘𝑖,𝑗(𝑡 − 1)
+ 𝒉
𝐶𝑎𝑠ℎ𝑓𝑙𝑜𝑤𝑗(𝑡) −  𝐶𝑎𝑠ℎ𝑓𝑙𝑜𝑤𝑖,𝑗(𝑡)
𝑇𝐴𝑗(𝑡 − 1)
 ×   𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑘𝑖,𝑗(𝑡 − 1)  +  𝜂𝑖,𝑗 + 𝜃𝑗
+ 𝜖𝑖,𝑗(𝑡) (3) 
where, 
Yi,j = Gross capital expenditure (capxs) or Mark-up of the i
th segment of firm j during the year t. 




𝑇𝐴𝑗(𝑡 − 1) = Book value of total assets of firm j at the end of year t-1. 
𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠𝑖,𝑗= Sales of i
th segment of firm j during the year t. 
𝐶𝑎𝑠ℎ𝑓𝑙𝑜𝑤𝑖,𝑗= Segment’s own cashflow is proxied by 𝑂𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑝𝑡𝑜𝑓𝑖𝑡/𝑙𝑜𝑠𝑠𝑖,𝑗(𝑡) −
 𝐷𝑒𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑖𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖,𝑗(𝑡) of the i
th segment of firm j during the year t. 
𝐶𝑎𝑠ℎ𝑓𝑙𝑜𝑤𝑗(𝑡) −  𝐶𝑎𝑠ℎ𝑓𝑙𝑜𝑤𝑖,𝑗(𝑡)= Other segment’s cashflow is measured as the cashflow of 
firm j at the end of year t minus the Cashflow of the ith segment of firm j during the year t. 
𝑞𝑖,𝑗(𝑡 − 1)= Tobin’s q of i
th segment of firm j during the year t-1. Tobin’s q is calculated as the 
ratio of firm value (market value of equity plus the book value of assets minus the book value of 
equity) to book value of total assets at time t-1. 
𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑘𝑖,𝑗(𝑡 − 1)= Political risk of i
th segment of firm j during the year t-1. 
 
at 1% level. We  calculate  the smallest and largest segments of diversified firms using identifiable segment assets. 
All the segments have different four-digit SIC from their parent company. 
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𝜂𝑖,𝑗= Fixed effects specific to i
th segment of firm j. 
𝜃𝑗= Year fixed effects. 
Table 5: Internal capital, firm-level political risk, and diversification 
 
This table presents results from equation (3). Gross capital expenditure (capxs) or Mark-up of the ith segment of firm 
j during the year t. Mark-up is calculated as 
𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠𝑖,𝑗(𝑡)
𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠𝑖,𝑗(𝑡)−𝑂𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑝𝑡𝑜𝑓𝑖𝑡𝑖,𝑗(𝑡)− 𝐷𝑒𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑖𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖,𝑗(𝑡)
 and capital expenditure is 
scaled by the identifiable total assets ith segment of firm j during the year t-1. All other variables are defined in 
equation (3). Estimates of investment and profitability measure for levels of diversification are presented in Panel A. 
Estimates of investment and profitability for the smallest and largest segments of moderate and high diversified 
firms presented in Panel B and Panel C, respectively. Follwing Shin and Stulz (1998), we exclude the observation 
with any missing information of the above variables. We also exclude accounting ratios (net capaxs at time t scaled 
by total identifiable assets (ias) of time t-1 ( netcapxs is the difference between gross capxs and depreciation 
expense), Sales growth (change in sales over the last year sales), cashflow at time t scaled by total identifiable asses 
(ias) at time t, other segment’s cashflow scaled by total identifiable asses (ias) at time t.) that exceed one. We 
winsorize the segment variables at 1% level. We calculate the smallest and largest segments of diversified firms 
using identifiable segment assets. All the segments have different four-digit SIC from their parent company. 
Standard errors in brackets. Statistical significance is denoted as *** p<1%, ** p<5%, * p<10%.   
 
  Diversified   Moderately Diversified   Highly Diversified 
Dependant Variable CAPXi,j Mark-up i,j   CAPXi,j Mark-up i,j   CAPXi,j Mark-up i,j 
Sales Growth 0.002** 0.064***   0.002* 0.072***   0.001** 0.028** 
  [0.001] [0.006]   [0.001] [0.007]   [0.001] [0.014] 
Segment Cashflow (SC) 0.016** 0.335***   0.012* 0.283***   0.001 1.197*** 
  [0.006] [0.060]   [0.007] [0.061]   [0.013] [0.305] 
Other Segments Cashflow (OSC) 0.0080 0.179**   0.005 0.208***   0.027*** 0.053 
  [0.007] [0.070]   [0.009] [0.079]   [0.008] [0.173] 
Segment Tobin's q 0.002*** 0.012**   0.002*** 0.008   0.001** 0.019 
  [0.001] [0.005]   [0.001] [0.006]   [0.001] [0.012] 
Segment PRISK (SPR) -0.008*** -0.062***   -0.009*** -0.067***   -0.0003 -0.044 
  [0.002] [0.015]   [0.002] [0.017]   [0.002] [0.038] 
SPR*SC 0.048*** 0.710***   0.057*** 0.722***   0.039* 0.072 
  [0.011] [0.102]   [0.013] [0.106]   [0.020] [0.458] 
SPR*OSC 0.038*** 0.236**   0.047*** 0.210*   -0.003 0.409* 
  [0.011] [0.106]   [0.014] [0.122]   [0.011] [0.243] 
Constant 0.035*** 1.173***   0.041*** 1.182***   0.014*** 1.147*** 
  [0.001] [0.013]   [0.002] [0.015]   [0.001] [0.033] 
                  
Observations 26,773 26,773   20,521 20,521   6,252 6,252 
R-squared (within) 0.02 0.05   0.02 0.06   0.02 0.04 
Firm and Segment FE YES YES   YES YES   YES YES 
Year FE YES YES   YES YES   YES YES 
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In Table 5, I present evidence of internal capital. Sales growth is positively 
associated with segment investments and profitability. Segment’s industry q is positively 
associated with the segment’s investments for all levels of diversification. Segment’s 
industry political risk is negatively related to the segment’s investments except for the 
highly diversified firms. The estimated coefficients of SPR × SC and SPR × OSC 
suggest that when faced with an increased level of political risk, segments become more 
sensitive not only to their own cashflow (SPR × SC) but also to the cashflow of other 
segments (SPR × OSC). The sensitivity of a segment’s investments to its cashflow in a 
high political risk environment (SPR × SC) is significantly larger than its sensitivity to 
other segments’ cashflow (SPR × OSC) except for the highly diversified firms. The 
estimated coefficient of different segments’ cashflow (OSC) suggests that the internal 
capital market more actively supports operating activities for moderately diversified 
firms and investments for highly diversified firms in the ordinary course of business. 
Interestingly, the interaction of SPR× OSC shows that the internal capital market 
shifts its focus and pays keen attention to support investments when political risks are 
high: this agrees with the results of baseline regression that diversification retrenches 
the effect of firm-level political risk. 
2.4.2Do diversified firms manage political risk politically? 
One way firms proactively manage political risk is by spending money on professional 
lobbyists and donating to the preferred politicians' political campaigns (Peltzman 1976; Tullock 
1967). Can diversified firms’ superior ability be attributed to a higher level of political activities 
by these firms? To state it differently, “Do diversified firms handle political risk politically?” 
Unfortunately,  the literature does not provide a  clear answer to this question. Therefore, it is 
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essential to investigate whether proactive management of idiosyncratic political risk gives 
diversified firms an edge over the focused firms. 
According to Olson (1965), only large firms with higher organizational capacity can 
deploy resources to gain political favor than small firms. The diversified firms in my sample, on 
average, are 22% (approximately) larger than the focused firms. Thus, consistent with the 
prediction of Olson (1965), diversified firms are expected to be more politically active than 
focused firms. However, Brasher and Lowery (2006) document a curvilinear relationship 
between the firm size and political activity level. They argue that large firm biases limit the 
scope of the literature’s findings and may lead to specification errors in PAC and lobbying 
studies.  Hassan et al. (2019) find that the firms exposed to higher political risk spend more on 
lobbying activities afterward to neutralize the risk. I test if a diversified firm’s superior ability to 
reduce the firm-level  PR is possibly due to its ability to spend more on lobbying and PAC. A 
positive and significant interaction between the diversified firm and political risk for the 
subsequent period’s political spending would weaken the internal capital market's contribution in 
mitigating PR. It will be an inherently noisy specification if  I  assume that my findings based on 
equations (1) and (3) are associated with lobbying and PAC  expenditure. I build the empirical 
analysis assuming that when a firm, irrespective of organizational structure, faces higher political 
risk,  it mitigates the risk by spending more on lobbying and PAC in the subsequent year. Thus, I 
expect not to observe any difference in lobbying and PAC efforts to manage diversified firms' 
political risk. 
   (4) 
Our dependent variable 𝑍𝑖,𝑡+1 represents PAC and lobbying variables. The PAC 
dependent variables include Log(1+$PAC)i,t+1 and PACDUMMYi,t+1 . The former is a log of 1 
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plus the all political action committee (PAC) contributions in $millions. The latter is an indicator 
variable that takes on a value of 1 for firms’ that donate to political action committees (PAC) and 
zero otherwise. The lobbying dependent variable Log(1+$LOBBY)i,t+1 is the log of 1 plus the 
amount of US dollar spend on professional lobbyists and related expenditure; 
LOBBYDUMMYi,t+1 is an indicator variable that takes on a value of 1 for firms that spend 
money on lobbying and related activities and zero otherwise. Θ𝑖𝑡 is a vector of control variables 
that include Size, Tangibility, Market to Book, Book leverage, ROA, Sale/Assets, R&D 
expenditure, CAPX. The variables are defined in appendix B1. 
The results from table 6 support the general view that political risk is associated with 
increased political activity in the subsequent period. In panel A, firms are more likely to spend 
more on PAC and lobbying in the following period when they face higher political risk. It is 
worth noting that, in general, diversified firms are more likely to donate in the political 
campaign, and the level of diversification is positively associated with PAC and lobbying 
activities. Consistent with prior literature (Hassan et al. 2019; Olson 1965; Peltzman 1976; 
Schattschneider 1960; Schlozman and Tierney 1986), the coefficients of the Size variable are 
positive and significant both in panel A and panel B. I find that a highly diversified firm spend 
significantly more on political purpose than an average diversified firm. My primary variable of 
interest, the interaction term between diversification and political risk, indicates that diversified 
firms do not spend more money on lobbying and political donation than focused firms to reduce 
political risk.  The implication of my findings is somewhat similar to Brasher and Lowery (2006) 
that diversified firms and, more specifically, highly diversified firms are politically active on 
multiple issues but do not be more involved in mitigating political risk than the focused firms. 
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Table 2.6: Political connection, lobbying, firm level political risk, and diversification  
 
This table presents the regression results of corporate political connections and lobbying on firm-level political risk and diversification. Log(1+$PAC)i,t+1 is the 
log of 1 plus the all political action committee (PAC) contribution amount in millions of U.S. dollars. PACDUMMYi,t+1 is an indicator variable that takes 
values of 1 for firms’ that donate to a political action committee (PAC) and zero otherwise. Log(1+$LOBBY)i,t+1 is the log of  1 plus the amount of U.S. dollar 
spend on professional lobbyists and related expenditure. LOBBYDUMMYi,t+1 is an indicator variable that takes values of 1 for firms that spend money on 
lobbying and related activities and zero otherwise. Other variables are defined in Appendix A. Panel A presents estimates for diversified firms and Panel B 
presents results for moderate and highly diversified firms. Firm-level clustered standard errors in brackets. Statistical significance is denoted as *** p<1%, ** 
p<5%, * p<10%.  
 
Panel A: Diversification, political risk, and political activities 
VARIABLES PAC DUMMYi,t+1 
LOBBY  











  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
PRISK 0.015*** 0.015*** 0.011*** 0.011*** 0.175*** 0.214*** 0.128*** 0.156*** 
  [0.003] [0.003] [0.004] [0.004] [0.038] [0.046] [0.042] [0.047] 
DIVERSIFIED 0.029*** 0.023** 0.020* 0.015 0.290*** 0.296** 0.188* 0.171 
  [0.010] [0.010] [0.011] [0.011] [0.106] [0.138] [0.112] [0.148] 
DIVERSIFIED * PRISK     0.013* 0.011     0.14 0.172 
      [0.008] [0.008]     [0.087] [0.107] 
SIZE 0.062*** 0.064*** 0.062*** 0.064*** 0.702*** 0.920*** 0.701*** 0.920*** 
  [0.004] [0.004] [0.004] [0.004] [0.042] [0.056] [0.042] [0.056] 
TANGIBILITY -0.018 -0.048** -0.019 -0.048** -0.321 -0.760*** -0.327 -0.767*** 
  [0.020] [0.020] [0.020] [0.020] [0.215] [0.266] [0.215] [0.267] 
MARKET TO BOOK -0.001* -0.0004 -0.001* -0.0004 -0.011 -0.005 -0.011 -0.005 
  [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.007] [0.009] [0.007] [0.009] 
LEVERAGE -0.024*** -0.022** -0.024** -0.022** -0.299*** -0.366*** -0.298*** -0.365*** 
  [0.009] [0.010] [0.009] [0.010] [0.100] [0.132] [0.100] [0.132] 
CASHFLOW -0.042*** -0.038*** -0.042*** -0.038*** -0.492*** -0.551*** -0.494*** -0.554*** 
  [0.011] [0.012] [0.011] [0.012] [0.119] [0.161] [0.119] [0.161] 
SALE/AT 0.022*** 0.023*** 0.022*** 0.023*** 0.262*** 0.328*** 0.261*** 0.326*** 
  [0.006] [0.006] [0.006] [0.006] [0.065] [0.080] [0.065] [0.080] 
R&D INTENSITY 0.054** 0.053** 0.054** 0.053** 0.672*** 0.844** 0.674*** 0.845** 
  [0.022] [0.025] [0.022] [0.025] [0.231] [0.341] [0.231] [0.341] 
CAPX -0.012*** -0.011*** -0.012*** -0.011*** -0.125*** -0.138*** -0.126*** -0.139*** 
  [0.002] [0.003] [0.002] [0.003] [0.025] [0.035] [0.025] [0.035] 
CONSTANT -0.330*** -0.340*** -0.327*** -0.337*** -3.798*** -4.943*** -3.756*** -4.891*** 
  [0.022] [0.023] [0.022] [0.023] [0.255] [0.340] [0.255] [0.338] 
                  
Observations 38,010 38,010 38,010 38,010 38,010 38,010 38,010 38,010 
Adjusted R-squared 0.18 0.18 0.18 0.18 0.20 0.19 0.20 0.19 
Year FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Industry FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 




Panel B: Moderate and High diversification, political risk, and political activities 
VARIABLES PAC DUMMYi,t+1 LOBBY DUMMYi, t+1 PAC DUMMYi,t+1 LOBBY DUMMYi, t+1 Log(1+$PAC)i,t+1 Log(1+$Lobby)i,t+1 Log(1+$PAC)i,t+1 Log(1+$Lobby)i,t+1 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
PRISK 0.014*** 0.014*** 0.011*** 0.011*** 0.161*** 0.194*** 0.130*** 0.156*** 
  [0.003] [0.003] [0.004] [0.004] [0.036] [0.042] [0.041] [0.047] 
MOD DIVER 0.026*** 0.018* 0.019* 0.012 0.242** 0.2040 0.169 0.116 
  [0.010] [0.010] [0.011] [0.011] [0.104] [0.135] [0.109] [0.143] 
MOD DIVER * PRISK     0.0100 0.0080     0.1010 0.1220 
      [0.007] [0.007]     [0.081] [0.096] 
HIGH DIVER                 
                  
HIGH DIVER * PRISK                 
                  
SIZE 0.058*** 0.060*** 0.058*** 0.060*** 0.647*** 0.846*** 0.647*** 0.845*** 
  [0.004] [0.004] [0.004] [0.004] [0.040] [0.054] [0.041] [0.054] 
TANGIBILITY -0.016 -0.046** -0.0160 -0.046** -0.2590 -0.690*** -0.2630 -0.695*** 
  [0.019] [0.019] [0.019] [0.019] [0.203] [0.252] [0.203] [0.252] 
MARKET TO BOOK -0.001* -0.0002 -0.001* -0.0002 -0.011* -0.002 -0.011 -0.002 
  [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.006] [0.009] [0.006] [0.009] 
LEVERAGE -0.020** -0.019** -0.020** -0.019** -0.246*** -0.304** -0.245*** -0.304** 
  [0.009] [0.009] [0.009] [0.009] [0.093] [0.124] [0.093] [0.124] 
CASHFLOW -0.036*** -0.029*** -0.036*** -0.030*** -0.414*** -0.409*** -0.416*** -0.411*** 
  [0.010] [0.011] [0.010] [0.011] [0.111] [0.151] [0.111] [0.151] 
SALE/AT 0.019*** 0.020*** 0.019*** 0.020*** 0.222*** 0.271*** 0.221*** 0.271*** 
  [0.006] [0.006] [0.006] [0.006] [0.062] [0.077] [0.062] [0.077] 
R&D INTENSITY 0.055*** 0.059** 0.055*** 0.059** 0.650*** 0.888*** 0.651*** 0.888*** 
  [0.021] [0.024] [0.021] [0.024] [0.211] [0.317] [0.211] [0.317] 
CAPX -0.011*** -0.010*** -0.011*** -0.010*** -0.119*** -0.135*** -0.120*** -0.136*** 
  [0.002] [0.002] [0.002] [0.002] [0.024] [0.033] [0.024] [0.033] 
CONSTANT -0.306*** -0.313*** -0.303*** -0.310*** -3.440*** -4.453*** -3.414*** -4.421*** 
  [0.021] [0.022] [0.021] [0.023] [0.241] [0.321] [0.242] [0.322] 
                  
Observations 36,294 36,294 36,294 36,294 36,294 36,294 36,294 36,294 
Adjusted R-squared 0.17 0.16 0.17 0.16 0.18 0.17 0.18 0.17 
Year FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Industry FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 





Panel B: Moderate and High diversification, political risk, and political activities (continued) 
 
VARIABLES PAC DUMMYi,t+1 LOBBY DUMMYi, t+1 PAC DUMMYi,t+1 LOBBY DUMMYi, t+1 Log(1+$PAC)i,t+1 Log(1+$Lobby)i,t+1 Log(1+$PAC)i,t+1 Log(1+$Lobby)i,t+1 
  (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16) 
PRISK 0.014*** 0.015*** 0.012*** 0.013*** 0.162*** 0.209*** 0.139*** 0.178*** 
  [0.004] [0.004] [0.004] [0.004] [0.043] [0.050] [0.042] [0.047] 
MOD DIVER                 
                  
MOD DIVER * PRISK               
                  
HIGH DIVER 0.087*** 0.096*** 0.064* 0.072** 1.166*** 1.574*** 0.856** 1.164** 
  [0.031] [0.033] [0.035] [0.036] [0.367] [0.485] [0.401] [0.533] 
HIGH DIVER * PRISK   0.0300 0.0310     0.4080 0.5380 
      [0.025] [0.026]     [0.324] [0.415] 
SIZE 0.056*** 0.057*** 0.055*** 0.057*** 0.619*** 0.812*** 0.617*** 0.809*** 
  [0.004] [0.004] [0.004] [0.004] [0.046] [0.062] [0.046] [0.062] 
TANGIBILITY -0.033 -0.050** -0.033* -0.050** -0.439** -0.753*** -0.443** -0.759*** 
  [0.020] [0.020] [0.020] [0.020] [0.213] [0.274] [0.213] [0.274] 
MARKET TO BOOK -0.001* 0.0000 -0.001* 0.0000 -0.011* -0.005 -0.011* -0.005 
  [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.007] [0.009] [0.007] [0.009] 
LEVERAGE -0.013 -0.014 -0.013 -0.013 -0.169* -0.216* -0.166* -0.213* 
  [0.008] [0.009] [0.008] [0.009] [0.090] [0.123] [0.089] [0.123] 
CASHFLOW -0.033*** -0.030*** -0.033*** -0.030*** -0.380*** -0.418*** -0.378*** -0.415*** 
  [0.010] [0.011] [0.010] [0.011] [0.109] [0.153] [0.109] [0.153] 
SALE/AT 0.022*** 0.022*** 0.022*** 0.022*** 0.240*** 0.299*** 0.239*** 0.298*** 
  [0.006] [0.006] [0.006] [0.006] [0.064] [0.081] [0.064] [0.081] 
R&D INTENSITY 0.048** 0.042* 0.048** 0.042* 0.521** 0.615* 0.521** 0.616* 
  [0.021] [0.024] [0.021] [0.024] [0.215] [0.330] [0.214] [0.330] 
CAPX -0.010*** -0.009*** -0.010*** -0.010*** -0.110*** -0.130*** -0.112*** -0.133*** 
  [0.002] [0.002] [0.002] [0.002] [0.024] [0.034] [0.024] [0.034] 
CONSTANT -0.290*** -0.296*** -0.287*** -0.293*** -3.254*** -4.250*** -3.221*** -4.207*** 
  [0.023] [0.025] [0.023] [0.025] [0.266] [0.360] [0.265] [0.359] 
                  
Observations 26,034 26,034 26,034 26,034 26,034 26,034 26,034 26,034 
Adjusted R-squared 0.20 0.20 0.20 0.20 0.23 0.22 0.23 0.22 
Year FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Industry FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 





2.5 Sensitivity analysis and robustness check 
This section applies a series of sensitivity analyses and robustness tests to validate my 
findings and eliminate the concerns for endogeneity issues. Specifically, I investigate the 
diversification benefits in reducing firm-level risk. I conduct a robust- ness check through 
alternative measures of investments that consider firm-level intangible investments. Then, I 
apply two-stage residual-based regression models to overcome the limitations of the fixed-effects 
analysis. Finally, I conduct a selection bias test to control the endogeneity issues using the 
Heckman-selection model. 
2.5.1 Firm-level risk and diversification 
So far, I have used accounting-based performance measures in the analysis. Accounting-
based measures, especially profitability measures, have been a long debate in the literature 
(Aaker and Jacobson 1987). However, accounting-based measures have remained prevalent 
among the practitioner, academicians, and analysts to gauge the managers' performance and the 
firms. According to Grant et al. (1988), the accounting-based measure is more relatable than 
stock returns to a firm's performance. However, in this section, I  use firm-level realized and 
implied volatility measures from Alfaro et al. (2018) as the proxy for firm-level risk and regress 
them on the right-hand side of equations 1 and 2 to gauge the shortcomings of account ratios. 
The realized volatility is measured as the twelve months standard deviation of CRSP daily stock 
returns, and the implied volatility measure is based on the 365 days options implied volatility of 
forward call options that are at the money. My theoretical discussions of political risk and 
diversification predict a positive association between political risk and volatility (Hassan et al. 
2019) and a negative association between diversification and volatility (Kuppuswamy and 
Villalonga 2016). I test these predictions empirically by regressing implied and realized volatility 
on the firm-level political risk and diversification. I present the results in Table 7. 
95 
 
Table 2.7: Firm-level uncertainty and diversification 
This table presents the regression results from Firm-level uncertainty (Alfaro, Ivan, Bloom, and Lin 2017), political 
risk, and diversification. Dependent variables are realized and implied volatility. Where realized volatility is the 
twelve months standard deviation of daily returns from CRSP, and implied volatility is calculated from 365-day at 
the money forward call options. Other variables are defined in Appendix A. Panel A presents estimates for 
diversified firms and Panel B presents results for moderate and highly diversified firms. Firm-level clustered 
standard errors in brackets. Statistical significance is denoted as *** p<1%, ** p<5%, * p<10%. 
Panel A: Diversification and Volatility 
VARIABLES   REALIZED VOL IMPLIED VOL REALIZED VOL IMPLIED VOL 
    (1) (2) (3) (4) 
PRISK   0.007*** 0.006*** 0.004 0.006** 
    [0.002] [0.002] [0.003] [0.003] 
DIVERSIFIED   -0.014*** -0.012*** -0.020*** -0.012** 
    [0.004] [0.004] [0.005] [0.005] 
DIVERSIFIED * PRISK     0.008* 0.0010 
        [0.004] [0.004] 
SIZE   -0.059*** -0.062*** -0.059*** -0.062*** 
    [0.001] [0.002] [0.001] [0.002] 
TANGIBILITY   -0.017 -0.008 -0.017 -0.008 
    [0.012] [0.011] [0.012] [0.011] 
MARKET TO BOOK   -0.014*** -0.019*** -0.014*** -0.019*** 
    [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] 
LEVERAGE   0.139*** 0.093*** 0.139*** 0.093*** 
    [0.008] [0.008] [0.008] [0.008] 
R&D INTENSITY   0.332*** 0.471*** 0.333*** 0.471*** 
    [0.023] [0.024] [0.023] [0.024] 
R&D MISSING DUMMY 0.004 0.002 0.004 0.002 
    [0.006] [0.006] [0.006] [0.006] 
CAPX   -0.020*** -0.002 -0.020*** -0.002 
    [0.005] [0.005] [0.005] [0.005] 
STD OF REALIZED VOL 0.472***   0.472***   
    [0.021]   [0.021]   
STD OF IMPLIED VOL   0.604***   0.604*** 
      [0.035]   [0.035] 
CONSTANT   0.808*** 0.834*** 0.810*** 0.834*** 
    [0.012] [0.013] [0.012] [0.013] 
            
Observations   23,647 16,107 23,647 16,107 
Adjusted R-squared   0.55 0.65 0.55 0.65 
Year FE   YES YES YES YES 
Industry FE   YES YES YES YES 
Year * Industry FE   YES YES YES YES 
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Panel B: Moderate and High Diversification and Volatility 

















    (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
PRISK   0.007*** 0.006*** 0.004 0.006** 0.004* 0.007*** 0.004 0.007** 
    [0.002] [0.002] [0.003] [0.003] [0.003] [0.003] [0.003] [0.003] 
MOD DIVER   -0.015*** -0.013*** -0.020*** -0.013***         
    [0.004] [0.004] [0.005] [0.005]         
MOD DIVER * PRISK       0.008 -0.001         
        [0.005] [0.004]         
HIGH DIVER           0.01 0.015* 0.001 0.009 
            [0.009] [0.008] [0.011] [0.010] 
HIGH DIVER * PRISK               0.011 0.007 
                [0.009] [0.006] 
SIZE   -0.060*** -0.064*** -0.060*** -0.064*** -0.063*** -0.067*** -0.063*** -0.067*** 
    [0.001] [0.002] [0.001] [0.002] [0.002] [0.002] [0.002] [0.002] 
TANGIBILITY   -0.016 -0.009 -0.017 -0.009 -0.003 0.0003 -0.003 0.0004 
    [0.012] [0.012] [0.012] [0.012] [0.015] [0.014] [0.015] [0.014] 
MARKET TO BOOK   -0.014*** -0.019*** -0.014*** -0.019*** -0.012*** -0.018*** -0.012*** -0.018*** 
    [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] 
LEVERAGE   0.142*** 0.096*** 0.142*** 0.096*** 0.143*** 0.099*** 0.143*** 0.099*** 
    [0.008] [0.009] [0.008] [0.009] [0.010] [0.010] [0.010] [0.010] 
R&D INTENSITY   0.328*** 0.462*** 0.329*** 0.462*** 0.297*** 0.423*** 0.298*** 0.424*** 
    [0.023] [0.024] [0.023] [0.024] [0.025] [0.026] [0.025] [0.026] 
R&D MISSING DUMMY   0.004 0.003 0.004 0.003 -0.001 -0.015* -0.001 -0.015* 
    [0.006] [0.007] [0.006] [0.007] [0.008] [0.008] [0.008] [0.008] 
CAPX   -0.021*** -0.003 -0.021*** -0.003 -0.017*** -0.001 -0.018*** -0.001 
    [0.005] [0.005] [0.005] [0.005] [0.006] [0.005] [0.006] [0.005] 
STD OF REALIZED VOL   0.470***   0.469***   0.424***   0.424***   
    [0.021]   [0.021]   [0.024]   [0.024]   
STD OF IMPLIED VOL     0.604***   0.604***   0.556***   0.556*** 
      [0.036]   [0.036]   [0.042]   [0.042] 
CONSTANT   0.816*** 0.850*** 0.818*** 0.850*** 0.841*** 0.875*** 0.841*** 0.876*** 
    [0.012] [0.014] [0.013] [0.014] [0.014] [0.016] [0.014] [0.016] 
                    
Observations   22,710 15,298 22,710 15,298 15,770 10,521 15,770 10,521 
Adjusted R-squared   0.55 0.64 0.55 0.64 0.557 0.659 0.557 0.659 
Year FE   YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Industry FE   YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 





The results from table 7 are consistent with the predictions above.  The results in columns 
(1) and (2) show that political risk is positively associated with increased firm-level implied and 
realized volatility, and diversification is negatively associated with a 1% level of significance. A 
one standard deviation increase in political risk is associated with a 0.007 and .006 standard 
deviation increase, respectively, in realized volatility and implied volatility. The average realized 
and implied volatility of diversified firms are respectively 1.4% and 1.2% lower than focused 
firms. Interestingly, the interaction variable's inclusion between the diversification and political 
risk (Diversified × Prisk) in the volatility regression significantly weakens the political risk 
coefficients. 
2.5.2 Robustness check using alternative measures of investments 
I use CAPX to proxy firm-level investments. A key limitation of using CAPX as a proxy 
of investment is that it only considers the tangible assets and ignores intangible investments. 
Thus, my analysis has ignored a significant type of investment decisions corporations make in 
modern times -intangible investments. Over the past 30 years, most advanced countries shifted 
from brick and mortar economic structures to technology and service-oriented economies. One 
of the principal reasons for not including intangible capital in empirical tests of investment 
theory is that it is difficult to measure these capital assets' price and future benefits reliably. 
Peters and Taylor (2017) have developed a methodology that proxies intangible capital and 
brings it into neoclassical investment theory. An empirical test of the procedure they recommend 
suggests that almost 44% of capital stock in US Compustat firms consists of intangible capital. I 
follow the Peters and Taylor (2017), methodology. To perform the sensitivity test of the impact 
of political risk on the alternative measures of investments, I use three measures of investments 
such as intangible, physical, and total investments. The numerator for physical investment (iphy) 
is capital expenditures (Compustat item capx), and for intangible investment (iint), it is R&D  
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Table 2.8: Robustness check using alternative measures of investments 
This table presents the regression results from the alternative measures of diversification. Panel A reports the 
regression results on overall diversification and panel B reports results for the moderately and highly diversified 
firms. Dependent variables Investphy, Investint, Investtot is calculated following the methodologies of Peters & 
Taylor (2017). Variables are defined in Appendix A. Panel A presents estimates for diversified firms and Panel B 
presents results for moderate and highly diversified firms.  Firm-level clustered standard errors in brackets. 
Statistical significance is denoted as *** p<1%, ** p<5%, * p<10%.  













    (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
PRISK   -0.001*** -0.003*** -0.004*** -0.002*** -0.003*** -0.005*** 
    [0.000] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] 
DIVERSIFIED   -0.004*** -0.010*** -0.015*** -0.005*** -0.012*** -0.018*** 
    [0.001] [0.002] [0.002] [0.001] [0.002] [0.003] 
DIVERSIFIED * 
PRISK         
0.002*** 0.002* 0.005*** 
          [0.001] [0.001] [0.002] 
SIZE TOTAL   -0.001*** -0.008*** -0.010*** -0.001*** -0.008*** -0.010*** 
    [0.000] [0.000] [0.001] [0.000] [0.000] [0.001] 
TANGIBILITY 
TOTAL   
0.172*** -0.083*** 0.086*** 0.171*** -0.083*** 0.086*** 
    [0.005] [0.004] [0.007] [0.005] [0.004] [0.007] 
Q TOTAL   0.004*** 0.015*** 0.021*** 0.004*** 0.015*** 0.021*** 
    [0.000] [0.001] [0.001] [0.000] [0.001] [0.001] 
CASHFLOW 
TOTAL   
0.017*** -0.060*** -0.058*** 0.017*** -0.060*** -0.058*** 
    [0.004] [0.006] [0.008] [0.004] [0.006] [0.008] 
LEVERAGE TOTAL   -0.006** -0.037*** -0.043*** -0.006** -0.037*** -0.042*** 
    [0.003] [0.003] [0.005] [0.003] [0.003] [0.005] 
STD OF INVEST 
PHY   
0.007     0.007     
    [0.010]     [0.010]     
STD OF INVEST 
INT   
  0.331***     0.331***   
      [0.048]     [0.048]   
STD OF INVEST 
TOT   
    0.012     0.012 
        [0.015]     [0.015] 
CONSTANT   0.013*** 0.194*** 0.219*** 0.014*** 0.194*** 0.220*** 
    [0.002] [0.004] [0.005] [0.002] [0.004] [0.005] 
                
Observations   20,182 20,182 20,182 20,182 20,182 20,182 
Adjusted R-squared   0.60 0.60 0.34 0.60 0.60 0.34 
Year FE   YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Industry FE   YES YES YES YES YES YES 































  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
PRISK -0.002*** -0.003*** -0.004*** -0.002*** -0.003*** -0.005*** -0.002*** -0.003*** -0.005*** -0.002*** -0.003*** -0.005*** 
  [0.000] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] 
MOD DIVER -0.004*** -0.011*** -0.015*** -0.005*** -0.012*** -0.018***             
  [0.001] [0.002] [0.002] [0.001] [0.002] [0.003]             
MOD DIVER * 
PRISK       
0.002** 0.002 0.004** 
      
      
        [0.001] [0.001] [0.002]             
HIGH DIVER             -0.001 -0.002 -0.004 -0.005 -0.007 -0.012** 
              [0.003] [0.004] [0.005] [0.004] [0.004] [0.006] 
HIGH DIVER * 
PRISK       
      
      
0.005** 0.006** 0.010*** 
                    [0.002] [0.003] [0.004] 
SIZE TOTAL -0.001*** -0.008*** -0.010*** -0.001*** -0.008*** -0.010*** -0.002*** -0.008*** -0.010*** -0.002*** -0.008*** -0.010*** 
  [0.000] [0.001] [0.001] [0.000] [0.001] [0.001] [0.000] [0.001] [0.001] [0.000] [0.001] [0.001] 
TANGIBILITY 
TOTAL 
0.173*** -0.084*** 0.087*** 0.173*** -0.084*** 0.086*** 0.185*** -0.083*** 0.100*** 0.185*** -0.083*** 0.100*** 
  [0.005] [0.004] [0.007] [0.005] [0.004] [0.007] [0.006] [0.005] [0.009] [0.006] [0.005] [0.009] 
Q TOTAL 0.004*** 0.016*** 0.021*** 0.004*** 0.016*** 0.021*** 0.004*** 0.016*** 0.022*** 0.004*** 0.016*** 0.022*** 
  [0.000] [0.001] [0.001] [0.000] [0.001] [0.001] [0.000] [0.001] [0.001] [0.000] [0.001] [0.001] 
CASHFLOW 
TOTAL 
0.016*** -0.061*** -0.061*** 0.016*** -0.061*** -0.061*** 0.010** -0.069*** -0.075*** 0.010** -0.069*** -0.075*** 
  [0.004] [0.006] [0.008] [0.004] [0.006] [0.008] [0.004] [0.006] [0.009] [0.004] [0.006] [0.009] 
LEVERAGE TOT -0.007** -0.038*** -0.044*** -0.007** -0.038*** -0.044*** -0.006* -0.041*** -0.046*** -0.006* -0.041*** -0.046*** 
  [0.003] [0.003] [0.005] [0.003] [0.003] [0.005] [0.003] [0.004] [0.006] [0.003] [0.004] [0.006] 
STD OF INVEST 
PHY 
0.006     0.006     0.003     0.003     
  [0.009]     [0.009]     [0.007]     [0.007]     
STD OF INVEST 
INT 
  0.321***     0.321***     0.303***     0.303***   
    [0.048]     [0.048]     [0.050]     [0.050]   
STD OF INVEST 
TOT 
    0.012     0.012     0.007     0.007 
      [0.015]     [0.015]     [0.011]     [0.011] 
CONSTANT 0.013*** 0.198*** 0.222*** 0.014*** 0.198*** 0.223*** 0.014*** 0.194*** 0.219*** 0.014*** 0.195*** 0.220*** 
  [0.002] [0.004] [0.005] [0.002] [0.004] [0.005] [0.003] [0.004] [0.005] [0.003] [0.004] [0.006] 
                          
Observations 19,211 19,211 19,211 19,211 19,211 19,211 13,576 13,576 13,576 13,576 13,576 13,576 
Adjusted R-squared 0.61 0.60 0.34 0.61 0.60 0.34 0.63 0.61 0.35 0.63 0.61 0.35 
Year FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Industry FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Year * Industry FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
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(Compustat item xrd) plus 30% of selling, general, and administrative expenses. Total 
investment (itot) is the sum of iphy and iint. All three investment measures are scaled by total 
capital stock Kphy + Kint. Where Kphy is proxied by the net property, plant and equipment 
(Compustat item Ppent), and iint is measured as applying the perpetual inventory method to 
intangible investment iint (R&D (Compustat item xrd) plus 30% of selling, general, and 
administrative expenses). 
In table 8, I present the results from the regression of the new measures of 
investments using the following two equations; 











+ 𝛽7𝑆𝐷𝑦𝑖,𝑡+𝛿𝑡 + 𝛿𝑖 + 𝛿𝑠 ∗ 𝛿𝑖 + 𝜖𝑖𝑡 (5) 
𝑦𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑘𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽2𝐷𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑠𝑖𝑓𝑖𝑒𝑑𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽3𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑘𝑖,𝑡  ∗  𝐷𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑠𝑖𝑓𝑖𝑒𝑑𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽4𝐾𝑡𝑜𝑡,𝑖,𝑡 +










+ 𝛽8𝑆𝐷𝑦𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛿𝑡 + 𝛿𝑖 + 𝛿𝑠 ∗ 𝛿𝑖 + 𝜖𝑖𝑡   (6), 
 











is the CASH-FLOW, and 𝑆𝐷𝑦𝑖,𝑡 
is the standard deviation of each of the dependent variables over the preceding 3 years.   
Panel A presents the results for overall industrial diversification, and panel B and C 
show results for a moderate land high level of industrial diversification. In all three 
specifications of investment measures, my results remain consistent with my earlier 
findings. My sensitivity test results imply that political risks and diversification are 
associated with reducing firm-level intangible, physical, and total investments. 
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However, diversification provides benefits by eliminating the impact of political risk on 
physical investments and intangible and total investments. The results from new 
investments on political risk and diversification levels are consistent with my earlier 
findings. Indeed, the new measures of investments and control variables reveal that an 
increased level of diversification is associated with efficient management of political 
risk at the firm level. 
2.5.3 Two-stage residual-based regressions 
In this section, I  take steps to eliminate panel data shortcomings related to the fixed-effects 
model’s time-constant variables. In all my regression models, I use year, industry, and year 
× industry fixed effects to eliminate the time constant variables' impact with the time 
constant effects from the regression models. One of the concerns for using the fixed effects 
models for the diversification sample is the inability to capture the firms’ effects 
throughout maintaining diversification status. Fixed effect models provide inefficient 
estimations when the magnitude of the estimated variable variance is small (Plümper and 
Troeger 2007).  As most of the firms never change their diversification status or convert 
into focused firms, the ubiquitous use of fixed effects methods is most likely to 
evaporate the explanatory power of the time-constant feature of diversification. I apply a 
two-stage regression strategy to address this concern and investigate how much of the 
fixed effects models consume the explanatory power. In the first step, I run the OLS 
regressions of investments and profitability variables on the control variables using the 
following equation; 




where 𝑋𝑖𝑡 is the vector of firm characteristics variables, including the natural logarithm of the 




⁄ ), the market value of the firm divided to the book 
value of the total assets, the ratio of firm’s R&D expenditure to its book value of assets. The 
residuals from the first stage then regress as dependent variables on political risk, divarication, 
and their interaction terms.   
𝑅𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑑𝑢𝑎𝑙𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛼0 + 𝛼1𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑘𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛼2𝐷𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑠𝑖𝑓𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛼3𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑘𝑖,𝑡  ∗  𝐷𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑠𝑖𝑓𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖,𝑡
+ 𝜖𝑖,𝑡 (8) 
The regression results from the second stage re-asserts my earlier findings that 
diversification provides benefits to reduce the impacts of the political risk of the firms’ 
investments and operating activities. 
2.5.4 Control for endogeneity using the Heckman selection model 
My final robustness check addresses the self-selection bias by using Heckman (1977). I 
follow the methodologies of Campa and Kedia (2002) to examine the endogenous self-
selection bias. The main hypothesis here is that a firms’ decision to diversify is non-
random. In the first stage, I estimate the determinants of diversification using a probit 
model. 
𝐷𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑠𝑖𝑓𝑖𝑒𝑑 ∗𝑖,𝑡= 𝜔𝑍𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜇𝑖,𝑡  (9), 
where 𝐷𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑠𝑖𝑓𝑖𝑒𝑑 ∗𝑖,𝑡 is unobservable, 𝑍𝑖,𝑡 is the vector of firm-characteristics that include 
Size, HHI, Conglomerate attraction, (HHI concentration metric based on TNIC)24, PRisk, 
Psentiment, Market to book ratio, 3 years Industry sales growth. Next, using the estimated ?̂?, we
 




Table 2.9: Two-stage residual-based regressions 
This table presents the regression results from two-stage regressions. In the first stage, using the dependent variables from table 3, we run regressions on the 
control variables from equation 1. Then we collect the residuals for each of the regressions. In the second stage, we regress the residuals on Prisk, Diversification 
(Diversified, Mod Diver, High Diver), and Prisk interaction with respective diversification variable. We present the results from the second stage here 
(𝑅𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑑𝑢𝑎𝑙𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛼0 + 𝛼1𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑘𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛼2𝐷𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑠𝑖𝑓𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛼3𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑘𝑖,𝑡  ∗  𝐷𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑠𝑖𝑓𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜖𝑖,𝑡) . Control variables used in the first stage regression are 
defined as follows. Size is the natural logarithm of the book value of assets. Tangibility is the ratio of net property, plant, and equipment to the book value of 
assets. Market to book value is calculated as the firm's market value divided by the book value of the total assets. R&D intensity is the ratio of the firm’s R&D 
expenditure to its book value of assets. Std CAPX, Std Markup, and Std ROA are prior three years standard deviations for CAPX, Markup, and ROA, 
respectively. Firm-level clustered standard errors in brackets. Statistical significance is denoted as *** p<1%, ** p<5%, * p<10%.  
VARIABLES 
  CAPX MARKUP ROA CAPX MARKUP ROA CAPX MARKUP ROA 
  1  2  3  4  5  6  4  5  6  
PRISK   -0.012*** -0.021*** -0.015*** -0.012*** -0.020*** -0.015*** -0.013*** -0.019*** -0.014*** 
    [0.003] [0.004] [0.002] [0.003] [0.004] [0.002] [0.003] [0.004] [0.002] 
DIVERSIFIED   -0.033*** -0.029*** -0.018***             
    [0.006] [0.005] [0.004]             
DIVERSIFIED * PRISK   0.009** 0.018*** 0.008**             
    [0.005] [0.004] [0.003]             
MOD DIVER         -0.032*** -0.025*** -0.015***       
          [0.006] [0.005] [0.004]       
MOD DIVER * PRISK         0.006 0.019*** 0.009***       
          [0.005] [0.004] [0.003]       
HIGH DIVER               -0.039*** -0.058*** -0.040*** 
                [0.010] [0.011] [0.007] 
HIGH DIVER * PRISK               0.036*** 0.015* 0.002 
                [0.008] [0.009] [0.005] 
CONSTANT   0.018*** 0.021*** 0.016*** 0.019*** 0.022*** 0.016*** 0.022*** 0.020*** 0.014*** 
    [0.004] [0.004] [0.003] [0.004] [0.004] [0.003] [0.004] [0.004] [0.003] 
                      
Observations   36,505 36,505 36,505 34,821 34,821 34,821 24,844 24,844 24,844 
Adjusted R-squared   0.03 0.09 0.04 0.03 0.09 0.04 0.02 0.09 0.04 
Year FE   YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Industry FE   YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Year * Industry FE   YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
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 measure 𝜆1 and 𝜆2 to correct self-selection bias.  Expected 𝑦𝑖𝑡 from equation (1) for the 
diversified firm is given as  
𝐸(𝑦𝑖𝑡|𝐷𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑠𝑖𝑓𝑖𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑡 = 1) = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑋𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2 + 𝐸(𝑒|𝐷𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑠𝑖𝑓𝑖𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑡 = 1) 
where𝐸(𝑒|𝐷𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑠𝑖𝑓𝑖𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑡 = 1) = 𝜌𝜎𝜆1(𝝎𝒁𝒊,𝒕) and 𝜆1(𝝎𝒁𝒊,𝒕) =
𝜙(𝝎𝒁𝒊,𝒕)
𝛷(𝝎𝒁𝒊,𝒕)
, and for focused firm  




The difference between the operating and investing activities between the focused and 
diversified firms is captured by the following equation; 




In the second step, I estimate β using the following equation. 
𝑦𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑋𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2𝐷𝐼𝑉𝐸𝑅𝑆𝐼𝐹𝐼𝐸𝐷𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2𝐷𝐼𝑉𝐸𝑅𝑆𝐼𝐹𝐼𝐸𝐷𝑖𝑡 ∗ 𝛽2𝑃𝑅𝐼𝑆𝐾𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽𝜆[𝜆1(?̂?𝒁𝒊,𝒕)
∗ 𝐷𝐷𝐼𝑉𝐸𝑅𝑆𝐼𝐹𝐼𝐸𝐷𝑖𝑡 + 𝜆2(?̂?𝒁𝒊,𝒕) ∗ (𝟏 − 𝐷𝐷𝐼𝑉𝐸𝑅𝑆𝐼𝐹𝐼𝐸𝐷𝑖𝑡)] + 𝜂𝑖𝑡 
𝑦𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑋𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2𝐷𝐼𝑉𝐸𝑅𝑆𝐼𝐹𝐼𝐸𝐷𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2𝐷𝐼𝑉𝐸𝑅𝑆𝐼𝐹𝐼𝐸𝐷𝑖𝑡 ∗ 𝛽2𝑃𝑅𝐼𝑆𝐾𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽𝜆𝜆 + 𝜂𝑖𝑡 (10) 
Where 𝛽𝜆 = 𝜌𝜎𝑒 and 𝜌 determines the sign of 𝛽𝜆. 𝜌 presents the correlation between the error in 
equation (1) and (9).  
Table 10 presents the estimated results for the Heckman Selection model using equation 
(10). The estimated coefficients of the interaction term (Diversified × Prisk) for all the 
outcome variables are positive at a different level of significance. The coefficients of 
Prisk are negative significant at a 1% level.  The estimated coefficients of λ for CAPX   
is positive and significant. The self-selection parameter (λ) is negative and significant at 
1% level for both the profitability measures. The self-selection parameter suggests the 
existence of self-selection bias. It also indicates the specifications that motivate firms to 
diversify are positively associated with investment growth and negatively associated 
105 
 
with operating activities. Overall, my main results are robust to different endogeneity 
tests and sensitivity measures. 
Table 2.10: Control for endogeneity using the Heckman selection model 
This table reports the estimated coefficients from Heckman selection bias model (Heckman 1977). We follow the 
methodologies of Campa and Kedia (2002) to examine the endogenous self-selection bias. In the first stage we 
estimate the determinants of diversification using a probit model.  
𝐷𝐼𝑉𝐸𝑅𝑆𝐼𝐹𝐼𝐸𝐷 ∗𝑖,𝑡= 𝜔𝑍𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜇𝑖,𝑡  (2),  where 𝐷𝐼𝑉𝐸𝑅𝑆𝐼𝐹𝐼𝐸𝐷 ∗𝑖,𝑡 is unobservable, 𝑍𝑖,𝑡 is the vector of firm-
characteristics that include Size, HHI, Conglomerate attraction, (HHI concentration metric based on TNIC)25, PRisk, 
Psentiment, Market to book ratio, 3 years Industry sales growth. Next, using the estimated ?̂?, we measure 𝜆1 and 𝜆2 
to correct self-selection bias.  Expected 𝑦𝑖𝑡 from equation (1) for diversified firm is given as  
𝐸(𝑦𝑖𝑡|𝐷𝐼𝑉𝐸𝑅𝑆𝐼𝐹𝐼𝐸𝐷𝑖𝑡 = 1) = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑋𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2 + 𝐸(𝑒|𝐷𝐼𝑉𝐸𝑅𝑆𝐼𝐹𝐼𝐸𝐷𝑖𝑡 = 1),  
where𝐸(𝑒|𝐷𝐼𝑉𝐸𝑅𝑆𝐼𝐹𝐼𝐸𝐷𝑖𝑡 = 1) = 𝜌𝜎𝜆1(𝝎𝒁𝒊,𝒕) and 𝜆1(𝝎𝒁𝒊,𝒕) =
𝜙(𝝎𝒁𝒊,𝒕)
𝛷(𝝎𝒁𝒊,𝒕)
, and for focused firm  




The following equation captures the difference between the operating and investing activities between the focused 
and diversified firms; 




In the second step, we estimate β using the following equation. 
 
𝑦𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑋𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2𝐷𝐼𝑉𝐸𝑅𝑆𝐼𝐹𝐼𝐸𝐷𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2𝐷𝐼𝑉𝐸𝑅𝑆𝐼𝐹𝐼𝐸𝐷𝑖𝑡 ∗ 𝛽2𝑃𝑅𝐼𝑆𝐾𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽𝜆[𝜆1(?̂?𝒁𝒊,𝒕) ∗ 𝐷𝐷𝐼𝑉𝐸𝑅𝑆𝐼𝐹𝐼𝐸𝐷𝑖𝑡
+ 𝜆2(?̂?𝒁𝒊,𝒕) ∗ (𝟏 − 𝐷𝐷𝐼𝑉𝐸𝑅𝑆𝐼𝐹𝐼𝐸𝐷𝑖𝑡)] + 𝜂𝑖𝑡 
𝑦𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑋𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2𝐷𝐼𝑉𝐸𝑅𝑆𝐼𝐹𝐼𝐸𝐷𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2𝐷𝐼𝑉𝐸𝑅𝑆𝐼𝐹𝐼𝐸𝐷𝑖𝑡 ∗ 𝛽2𝑃𝑅𝐼𝑆𝐾𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽𝜆𝜆 + 𝜂𝑖𝑡 
 
VARIABLES 
  CAPX MARKUP ROA 
  1  2  3  
          
PRISK   -0.013*** -0.021*** -0.013*** 
    [0.004] [0.004] [0.003] 
DIVERSIFIED   -0.040*** -0.009 -0.008* 
    [0.006] [0.007] [0.005] 
DIVERSIFIED * PRISK   0.010* 0.022*** 0.011*** 
    [0.005] [0.005] [0.004] 
SIZE   0.002 0.031*** 0.013*** 
    [0.003] [0.004] [0.003] 
TANGIBILITY   -0.0001318 0.029*** 0.009*** 
    [0.003] [0.003] [0.002] 
MARKET TO BOOK   0.044*** 0.031*** 0.022*** 
    [0.002] [0.002] [0.002] 
LEVERAGE   -0.032** -0.053*** -0.067*** 
    [0.013] [0.014] [0.011] 
 




Table 2.10: Control for endogeneity using the Heckman selection model (continued) 
VARIABLES   CAPX MARKUP ROA 
   1  2  3  
LAMBDA   0.100*** -0.295*** -0.220*** 
    [0.017] [0.019] [0.015] 
STD OF CAPX   0.073***     
    [0.008]     
STD OF MARKUP     0.167***   
      [0.051]   
STD OF ROA       -0.296*** 
        [0.017] 
CONS   0.144*** 1.065*** 0.211*** 
    [0.032] [0.038] [0.028] 
          
Observation   28,624 28,624 28,624 
Adjusted R-squared   0.21 0.38 0.42 
Year FE   YES YES YES 
Industry FE   YES YES YES 
Year * Industry FE   YES YES YES 
 
2.6 Conclusions 
Using the political risk measure of Hassan et al. (2019) and considering the conflicting 
cost-benefit arguments of diversification, I find that the benefits of diversification stemming 
from its ability to mitigate the firm-level political risk outweigh the costs of diversification. 
Consistent with the literature, I document that both political risk and diversification are 
associated with lower firm-level investments and profitability.  However,  mine is the first one to 
provide evidence that diversified firms manage the idiosyncratic aspect of political risk and its 
interaction with firm-level investing and operating decisions more efficiently than the focused 
firms. 
I also explore the channel that allows a diversified firm to mitigate the firm- level 
political risk more efficiently than a focused firm. Two potential channels that I consider are–a) 
the activism of the internal capital market, and b) political activism (via lobbying and donation to 
PAC). Using segment data from Compustat, I produce evidence that the internal capital market 
allows diversified firms can reallocate funds to the segments that are adversely affected by the 
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political risk, a feat that a single-segment firm cannot accomplish. Furthermore, I find that there 
is no significant difference in political activism between a diversified firm and a focused firm for 
a given level of political risk. 
Additionally, I examine the impacts of political risk on the diversified and focused firms’  
investments and operating performance during periods of high economic policy uncertainty 
(EPU). Diversification increases investment relative to focused firms. I  validate my findings and 
address endogeneity concerns by using various robustness tests.  Overall, my study provides new 
evidence of corporate diversification benefits and the mediating role in the relationship between 
political risk and firms’ investments and profitability. While political risk dynamics are complex, 


















Appendix of Chapter 2 
Appendix B1: Variable Definition and Data Sources 










= 𝑐𝑎𝑝𝑥𝑖,𝑡   K
tot = Kphy + Kint. Where Kphy = 𝑝𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑡 and Kint is 







tot  where Iit
int = R&D + .3 × SG&A. SG&A is calculated following the 


















Market to book ratio 
This variable is calculated as the market value of the firm divided by the book value of the 
total assets. MARKET TO BOOK𝑖,𝑡 =
prcc_𝑓𝑖,𝑡 ∗ csho𝑖,𝑡 + at𝑖,𝑡 − ceq𝑖,𝑡
𝑎𝑡𝑖,𝑡−1
⁄  
Log size Logarithm of book value of assets 𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸 = 𝑙𝑛(𝑎𝑡) 
Tangibility 
Tangibility is calculated as the gross property plant and equipment divided by book value 






This variable takes value of 1 if a firm has business segments operating in more than one 4 
digits sic industry and zero otherwise. Berger and Hann (2003) 
Moderately 
Diversified 
This variable takes value of 1 if a firm has more than 1 but less than 5 business segments 
operating in more than one 4 digits sic industry and zero otherwise. 
Highly Diversified 
This variable takes value of 1 if a firm has 5 or more business segments operating in more 
than one 4 digits sic industry and zero otherwise. 




R&D Dummy Takes value of 1 if R&D information is missing for a firm and zero otherwise 
Political Risk 
Standardize firm level political risk data is obtained from Hassan, Hollander, Lent, Tahoun, 
(2019). 
Nonpolitical Risk  
Standardize firm level Nonpolitical risk data is obtained from Hassan, Hollander, Lent, 
Tahoun, (2019). 
Risk Standardize firm level risk data is obtained from Hassan, Hollander, Lent, Tahoun, (2019). 
Economic Policy 
Uncertainty 
US monthly economic policy uncertainty data is obtained from Baker, Bloom and Davis 
(2016) 
Realized volatility 
Firm level realized volatility data is obtained from Alfaro, Ivan, Nicholas Bloom, and 
Xiaoji Lin, The Finance Uncertainty Multiplier (2017). 
Implied Volatility 
Firm level implied volatility data is obtained from Alfaro, Ivan, Nicholas Bloom, and 
Xiaoji Lin, The Finance Uncertainty Multiplier (2017). 
Ownership 
Concentration 
Herfindahl-Hirschman Index for ownership concentration 
# of Institutional 
ownership  
Natural log of number of institutional ownerships 
Institutional 
ownership turn-over 
This dummy variable takes value of 1 if the change in the percentage of institutional 
ownership from the previous year lies in the 75th percentile. Bushee (1998) 
Sale 𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑒 = 𝑠𝑎𝑙𝑒 𝑎𝑡𝑖,𝑡−1⁄
 








Aaker, D. A. and Jacobson, R. (1987). The role of risk in explaining differences 
in profitability. Academy of Management Journal, 30(2):277–296. 
Acharya, V., & Xu, Z. (2017). Financial dependence and innovation: The case of 
public versus private firms. Journal of Financial Economics, 124(2), 223-243. 
Aidt, T. S. (2016). Rent-seeking and the economics of corruption. Constitutional Political 
Economy, 27(2), 142–157. 
Akey, P. and Lewellen, S. (2017). Policy uncertainty, political capital, and firm 
risktaking. Political Capital, and Firm Risk-Taking (March 22, 2017). 
Alfaro, I., Bloom, N., & Lin, X. (2018). The Finance Uncertainty Multiplier. SSRN 
Electronic Journal, 18. 
Al-Ubaydli, O. and McLaughlin, P. A. (2017). Regdata: A numerical database on 
industry-specific regulations for all united states industries and federal 
regulations, 1997–2012. Regulation & Governance, 11(1):109–123. 
Anderson, R. I., Stowe, J. D., and Xing, X. (2011). Does corporate diversification 
reduce firm risk? Evidence from diversifying acquisitions. Review of Pacific 
Basin Financial Markets and Policies, 14(03):485–504. 
Ataullah, A., Davidson, I., Le, H., and Wood, G. (2014). Corporate 
diversification, information asymmetry and insider trading. British Journal of 
Management, 25(2):228–251. 
Azar, J. (2011). A new look at oligopoly: Implicit collusion through portfolio 
diversification. Available at SSRN 1993364. 
Bai, J., S. Jayachandran, E. J. Malesky, and B. A. Olken. (2013). Does economic growth 
reduce corruption. Theory and evidence from Vietnam: National Bureau of Economic 
Research. 
Baker, S. R., Bloom, N., and Davis, S. J. (2016). Measuring economic policy 
uncertainty. The quarterly journal of economics, 131(4):1593–1636. 
Barclay, M. J., Marx, L. M., & Smith, C. W. (2003). The joint determination of leverage and 
maturity. Journal of Corporate Finance, 9(1), 149–167. 
Bardhan, P. (1997). Corruption and Development: A Review of Issues. Journal of Economic 
Literature, 35(3), 1320–1346. 
Baxamusa, M., & Jalal, A. (2014). The effects of corruption on capital structure: When does it 
matter? The Journal of Developing Areas, 48(1), 315–335. 
Bellemare, M. F., T. Masaki, and T. B. Pepinsky. (2017). Lagged explanatory variables and the 
estimation of causal effect. The Journal of Politics 79 (3):949-963. 
Belo, F., V. D. Gala, and J. Li. (2013). Government spending, political cycles, and the cross-
110 
 
section of stock returns. Journal of Financial Economics 107 (2):305-324. 
Benlemlih, M. (2017). Corporate social responsibility and firm debt maturity. Journal of 
Business Ethics, 144(3), 491-517. 
Ben-Nasr, H., S. Boubaker, and W. Rouatbi. (2015). Ownership structure, control 
contestability, and corporate debt maturity. Journal of Corporate Finance 35:265-285. 
Berger, P. G. and Hann, R. (2003). The impact of sfas no. 131 on information and 
monitoring. Journal of accounting research, 41(2):163–223. 
Berger, P. G. and Ofek, E. (1995). Diversification’s effect on firm value. Journal of 
financial economics, 37(1):39–65. 
Bharath, S. T., Dahiya, S., Saunders, A., & Srinivasan, A. (2011). Lending 
relationships and loan contract terms. In Review of Financial Studies (Vol. 24, 
Issue 4). 
Bradley, D., Pantzalis, C., and Yuan, X. (2016a). The influence of political bias in 
state pension funds. Journal of Financial Economics, 119(1):69–91. 
Bradley, D., Pantzalis, C., and Yuan, X. (2016b). Policy risk, corporate political 
strate- gies, and the cost of debt. Journal of Corporate Finance, 40:254–275. 
Brasher, H. and Lowery, D. (2006). The corporate context of lobbying activity. 
Business and Politics, 8(1):1–23. 
Brockman, P., Martin, X., & Unlu, E. (2010). Executive compensation and the maturity 
structure of corporate debt. The Journal of Finance, 65(3), 1123-1161. 
Brown, N. C., Smith, J. D., White, R. M., & Zutter, C. J. (2019). Political Corruption and 
Firm Value in the U.S.: Do Rents and Monitoring Matter? Journal of Business Ethics, 
1–17.  
Butler, A. W., Fauver, L., & Mortal, S. (2009). Corruption, political connections, and 
municipal finance. Review of Financial Studies, 22(7), 2873–2905. 
Campa, J. M. and Kedia, S. (2002). Explaining the diversification discount. The 
journal of Finance, 57(4):1731–1762. 
Campante, F. R., and Q.-A. Do. (2014). Isolated capital cities, accountability, and 
corruption: Evidence from US states. American Economic Review 104 (8):2456-2481. 
Caprio, L., Faccio, M., & McConnell, J. J. (2013). Sheltering corporate assets from 
political extraction. The Journal of Law, Economics, & Organization 29(2), 332-354. 
Chava, S., & Roberts, M. R. (2008). How does financing impact investment? the role of 
debt covenants. Journal of Finance, 63(5), 2085–2121. 
Cho, Y. J. (2015). Segment disclosure transparency and internal capital market 
efficiency: Evidence from sfas no. 131. Journal of Accounting Research, 
53(4):669–723. 
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Plümper, T. and Troeger, V. E. (2007).  Efficient estimation of time-invariant and 
rarely changing variables in finite sample panel analyses with unit fixed effects. 
Political Analysis, 15(2):124–139. 
Rajan, R. G. ., & Zingales, L. (1995). What Do We Know about Capital Structure ? Some 
Evidence from International. The Journal of Finance, 50(5), 1421–1460. 
Rajan, R., Servaes, H., and Zingales, L. (2000). The cost of diversity: The 
diversification discount and inefficient investment. The journal of Finance, 
55(1):35–80. 
Reed, W. R. (2015). On the practice of lagging variables to avoid simultaneity. Oxford 
Bulletin of Economics and Statistics 77 (6):897-905. 
Reinikka, R., & Svensson, J. (2002). Measuring and understanding corruption at the 
micro-level. Corrupt exchanges: Empirical themes in the politics and the political 
economy of corruption. Baden-Alemania: Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft. 
Rose-Ackerman, S. (1975). The economics of corruption. Journal of Public Economics, 
4(2), 187–203. 
Scharfstein, D. S. and Stein, J. C. (2000). The dark side of internal capital 
markets: Divisional rent-seeking and inefficient investment. The Journal of 
Finance, 55(6):2537– 2564. 
Schattschneider, E. E. (1960). Party government. Transaction Publishers. 
Schlozman, K. L. and Tierney, J. T. (1986). Organized interests and American 
democracy. Harpercollins College Div. 
Shin, H.-H. and Stulz, R. M. (1998). Are internal capital markets efficient? The 
Quarterly Journal of Economics, 113(2):531–552. 
Smith, J. D. (2016). US political corruption and firm financial policies. Journal of 
Financial Economics, 121(2), 350–367. 
Smith, J. A., & Todd, P. E. (2005). Does matching overcome LaLonde's critique of 
nonexperimental estimators?. Journal of econometrics, 125(1-2), 305-353. 
116 
 
Shleifer, A., & Vishny, R. W. (1993). Corruption. The quarterly journal of economics, 
108(3), 599-617. 
Stohs, M. H., & Mauer, D. C. (1996). The Determinants of Corporate Debt Maturity 
Structure.pdf. The Journal of Business, 69(3), 279–312. 
Stulz, R. M. (2000). Financial Structure, Corporate Finance and Economic Growth. 
International Review of Finance, 1(1), 11–38.  
Svensson, J. (2005). Eight questions about corruption. Journal of Economic Perspectives, 
19(3), 19–42. 
Tran, D., and H. V. Phan. (2017). Policy uncertainty and corporate debt maturity: 
Working Paper, University of Massachusetts Lowell. 
Tullock, G. (1967). The welfare costs of tariffs, monopolies, and theft. Economic 
Inquiry, 5(3):224–232. 
Waisman, M., Ye, P., and Zhu, Y. (2015). The effect of political uncertainty on the 
cost of corporate debt. Journal of Financial Stability, 16:106–117. 
Wang, Y. (2020). Three Essays on Political Economy and the Methods. 
 
Yan, A. (2006). Value of conglomerates and capital market conditions. Financial 
Management, 35(4):5–30. 
Yan, A., Yang, Z., and Jiao, J. (2010). Conglomerate investment under various 
capital market conditions. Journal of Banking Finance, 34(1):103–115. 
Zhang, L. (2005). The value premium. The Journal of Finance, 60(1):67–103. 
Yusoff, W. S., Salleh, M. F. M., Ahmad, A., & Idris, F. (2015). Estimating the Value of Political 







The author was born in Habiganj, Bangladesh. His journey to the PhD. program at the University 
of New Orleans is backed by his more than nine years of banking and private equity experience. 
After completing BBA and MBA in Accounting & Information Systems from University of 
Dhaka in 2006 and2007, respectively, the author started professional career with the 
Management Trainee position at AB Bank Limited, one of Bangladesh's largest banks. Over 
time, Credit risk management became his specialization in banking. Before joining the UNO 
Ph.D. program in 2017, he was the Chief Investment Officer of a private equity firm in 
Bangladesh. Within the short span of his career, he traveled from the very entry-level position to 
the C-suite and demonstrated how to maximize a firm's value. 
